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Plato's Myths
Socrates and the Daimonion
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Plato's Myths
Socrates and the Daimonion
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SOCRATES had a special sense — which he called the daimonion (δαιμόνιον) — that infallibly warned and prevented him from doing something wrong or harmful to himself. This is also sometimes called Socrates' sign and, mistakenly, his daimon or daemon. The word daimonion is notoriously difficult to define. In English, rough translations might be 'the spiritual' or 'the supernatural.' Cicero simply translated it as divinum aliquid — a 'divine something.' The daimonion sometimes occurred as a voice only Socrates heard, and other times as ordinary events like someone's unexpected sneeze. All ancient sources agree that the daimonion warned Socrates not to act. Some sources suggest it also sometimes prompted him to positive action. Again, sources disagree on whether the daimonion only protected Socrates alone, or sometimes issued warnings to prevent harmful actions of friends or others. Everything about the phenomenon is an enigma, and 2400 years later we're no closer to understanding it than were Socrates' own students. Recent scholarship (e.g., Vlastos, 1991; McPherran, 1996) has focused somewhat narrowly on resolving the apparent contradiction that Socrates, considered in modern centuries as the paragon of objective rational thought, heeded an unexplained sense that gave no logical basis for its promptings. But an equally valid perspective is the religious one: that Socrates, like a prophet, was a man who learned the secret of what it means to walk by faith (Bussanich, 2009). It's sometimes said that Socrates' daimonion was 'merely' human conscience. But that only defines one perplexing term with another. For, in truth, we have little scientific understanding of what conscience is; and ordinary experience alone is enough to suggest that it encompasses different psychological processes and experiences. Was the daimonion an aberration, a hallucination, an eccentricity — as some authors have suggested (e.g., Karpas, 1915; Muramoto & Englert, 2006)? Or does it illustrate for us a peculiar problem in the integration of the conscious and unconscious mind in making decisions? For instance, could this relate to recent suggestions that human beings have two parallel minds — a verbal, analytical 'left brain,' and a nonverbal, intuitive, unconscious 'right brain' (Jaynes, 1976; McGilchrist, 2009). If unconscious cognitive processes are involved, are these a biological unconscious? Gut instinct? Or a higher unconscious that involves potentially supra-rational mental abilities? In some of his myths, Plato, our chief source of information (along with Xenophon) on the daimonion, also mentioned a tutelary daimon (something like a guardian angel) that accompanies human souls (Timaeus 90c–e, Phaedo 107d–108c, Republic 10.617e, 10.620d–e). However Plato does not associate this daimon with Socrates in particular or directly imply it is the source of Socrates' special sense. While the two words are etymologically related, daimonion conveys a more general sense than that associated with daimones, which are entities. The difference is analogous to the distinction we might in English make between "the spiritual" and a "spirit." Nevertheless it's interesting to note a trend over time, beginning with Middle Platonist commentators (Plutarch, Apuleius and Maximus of Tyre) and continuing with Neoplatonists to conflate the daimonion and the personal daimon. To return to psychology, there are practical reasons for us today to study Socrates' daimonion. As each one may readily observe, in the course of any day we frequently experience inner 'voices' of doubt, caution and hesitation — what the modern Platonist, Paul Elmer More called the "inner check." This presents us with a task of discernment — often difficult: should we act as originally planned, or heed the voice of warning. And on what basis do we decide? It therefore benefits us to learn about and reflect on Socrates daimonion — partly so that we may be more adept at monitoring similar activities within our own psyche. For that purpose of individual 'interior science' a theoretical discussion is not nearly so helpful as raw data. That is what the present aims to supply, by listing excerpts from ancient philosophical literature on the subject. These are supplied, grouped by authors, oldest to most recent. To further aid personal study, a bibliography of main ancient and modern sources is follows.
Contents
Plato Plato
Apology 31c-dAt his trial, Socrates explains that he avoided engaging in politics because the daimonion warned him against it.
Apology 40a-c, 41c-dHere Socrates concludes he should attend his trial without fear because the daimonion did not warn him against it.
I feel that you are my friends, and I wish to show you the meaning of this which has now happened to me. For, judges — and in calling you judges I give you your right name — a wonderful thing has happened to me. For hitherto the customary prophetic monitor [μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου] always spoke to me very frequently and opposed me even in very small matters, if I was going to do anything I should not; but now, as you yourselves see, this thing which might be thought, and is generally considered, the greatest of evils has come upon me; but the divine sign [τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον; θεοῦ σημεῖον] did not oppose me either when I left my home in the morning, or when I came here to the court, or at any point of my speech, when I was going to say anything; and yet on other occasions it stopped me at many points in the midst of a speech; but now, in this affair, it has not opposed me in anything I was doing or saying. What then do I suppose is the reason? I will tell you. This which has happened to me is doubtless a good thing, and those of us who think death is an evil must be mistaken. A convincing proof of this been given me; for the accustomed sign [μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον; εἰωθὸς σημεῖον] would surely have opposed me if I had not been going to meet with something good. (tr. Fowler)
[41c-d]
Phaedrus 242b-dSocrates thought he heard a voice telling him to remain and alter a speech he just made
Phaedrus: What do you mean? Socrates: Phaedrus, a dreadful speech it was, a dreadful speech, the one you brought with you, and the one you made me speak. Phaedrus: How so? Socrates: It was foolish, and somewhat impious. What could be more dreadful than that? (tr. Fowler)
Republic 6.496cSocrates here argues that a philosopher would have no interest in politics, but would quietly mind his own affairs. Philosophers come to this understanding in different ways, including exile, living in a small, parochial town — or, in Socrates case, his divine sign held him back.
My own case, the divine sign [τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον], is hardly worth mentioning — for I suppose it has happened to few or none before me. And those who have been of this little company [i.e., philosophers] and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession [philosophy] and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics, and that there is no ally with whose aid the champion of justice could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts, unwilling to share their misdeeds and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his friends or the state come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others,—for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair... (tr. Shorey)
Theaetetus 150e–151aSocrates' daimonion forbids him to take back cocky students who left his tutelage prematurely and fell into error.
Euthyphro 3b
Euthyphro: I understand, Socrates; it is because you say the divine monitor [τὸ δαιμόνιον] keeps coming to you. So he has brought the indictment against you for making innovations in religion, and he is going into court to slander you, knowing that slanders on such subjects are readily accepted by the people. Why, they even laugh at me and say I am crazy... (tr. Fowler)
Alcibiades I 105e–106aPreviously the daimonion prevented Socrates from teaching Alcibiades, but now no longer.
1. That is, Alcibidaes was too ambitious and headstrong.
Euthydemus 272e–273aAs Socrates is preparing to leave the gymnasium, the daimonion urges him to wait. Just then two prominent sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, enter — with whom Socrates is evidently destined to converse.
Theages 128d–129e
Theages: What? Socrates: “Cleitomachus,” he said, “I tell you I am going to my death now, because I would not take Socrates' advice.” Now, why on earth did Timarchus say that? I will tell you. When Timarchus and Philemon, son of Philemonides, got up from the wine-party to kill Nicias, son of Heroscamandrus, those two alone had knowledge of the plot; and Timarchus, as he got up, said to me: “What say you, Socrates? Go on drinking, all of you; I have to get up and go somewhere, but I will join you a little later, if I get the chance.” Then occurred that voice of mine, [φωνή] and I said to him: “No, no, do not get up; for my accustomed spiritual sign [τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον] has occurred to me.” So he stopped. Then after an interval of time he again started to go, and said: “Well, I am going, Socrates.” Again the voice occurred, [φωνή] and so again I constrained him to stop. The third time, wishing to give me the slip, he got up without saying another word to me; he gave me the slip by watching until my attention was turned elsewhere. Thus it was that he went right off and committed the deed which was the cause of his going then to his death. And hence it was that he spoke those words to his brother which I quoted to you just now, that he was going to his death because he had not taken my advice. And moreover, in regard to the Sicilian business, many will tell you what I said about the destruction of the army. As to bygones, you may hear from those who know: but there is an opportunity now of testing the worth of what the sign says. For as the handsome Sannio was setting out on campaign, the sign occurred to me, [οι τὸ σημεῖον] and he has gone now with Thrasyllus on an expedition bound for Ephesus and Ionia. I accordingly expect him to be either killed or brought very near it, and I have great fears for our force as a whole. Now I have told you all this, because this spiritual power that attends me [δύναμις αὕτη τοῦ δαιμονίου] also exerts itself to the full in my intercourse with those who spend their time with me. To many, indeed, it is adverse, and it is not possible for these to get any good by conversing with me, and I am therefore unable to spend my time in conversing with them. And there are many with whom it does not prohibit my intercourse, yet the intercourse does them no good. But those who are assisted in their intercourse by that spiritual power are the persons whom you have noticed; for they make rapid progress there and then. And of these, again, who make progress some find the benefit both solid and enduring; while there are many who, for as long a time as they are with me, make wonderful progress, but when they are parted from me relapse, and are no different from anybody else. This once befell Aristeides, son of Lysimachus, son of Aristeides. (tr. Lamb)
XenophonMemorabilia 1.1.1–5According to Xenophon, Socrates sometimes advised friends based on the guidance of his daimonion.
First then, that he rejected the gods acknowledged by the state — what evidence did they produce of that? He offered sacrifices constantly, and made no secret of it, now in his home, now at the altars of the state temples, and he made use of divination with as little secrecy. Indeed it had become notorious that Socrates claimed to be guided by ‘the deity’ [τὸ δαιμόνιον]: it was out of this claim, I think, that the charge of bringing in strange deities arose. He was no more bringing in anything strange than are other believers in divination, who rely on augury, oracles, coincidences and sacrifices. For these men's belief is not that the birds or the folk met by accident know what profits the inquirer, but that they are the instruments by which the gods make this known; and that was Socrates' belief too. Only, whereas most men say that the birds or the folk they meet dissuade or encourage them, Socrates said what he meant: for he said that the deity gave him a sign [δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν]. Many of his companions were counselled by him to do this or not to do that in accordance with the warnings of the deity [δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος]: and those who followed his advice prospered, and those who rejected it had cause for regret. And yet who would not admit that he wished to appear neither a knave nor a fool to his companions? but he would have been thought both, had he proved to be mistaken when he alleged that his counsel was in accordance with divine revelation [προαγορεύων ὡς ὑπὸ θεοῦ]. Obviously, then, he would not have given the counsel if he had not been confident that what he said would come true. And who could have inspired him with that confidence but a god? And since he had confidence in the gods, how can he have disbelieved in the existence of the gods? (tr. Marchant)
Apology 12–13Xenophon compares Socrates' daimonion with divination and oracles.
But more than that, in regard to God's foreknowledge of the future and his forewarning thereof to whomsoever he will, these are the same terms, I assert, that all men use, and this is their belief. The only difference between them and me is that whereas they call the sources of their forewarning ‘birds,’ ‘utterances,’ ‘chance meetings,’ ‘prophets,’ I call mine a ‘divine’ thing;1 and I think that in using such a term I am speaking with more truth and deeper religious feeling than do those who ascribe the gods' power to birds. Now that I do not lie against God I have the following proof: I have revealed to many of my friends the counsels which God has given me, and in no instance has the event shown that I was mistaken.” (tr. Todd)
Cicero
De divinatione 1.54.122–123
It is also related of Socrates that one day he saw his friend Crito with a bandage on his eye. "What's the matter, Crito?" he inquired. "As I was walking in the country the branch of a tree, which had been bent, was released and struck me in the eye." "Of course," said Socrates, "for, after I had had divine warning, as usual, and tried to call you back, you did not heed." It is also related of him that after the unfortunate battle was fought at Delium under command of Laches, he was fleeing in company with his commander, when they came to a place where three roads met. Upon his refusal to take the road that the others had chosen he was asked the reason and replied: "The god prevents me." Those who fled by the other road fell in with the enemy's cavalry. Antipater has gathered a mass of remarkable premonitions received by Socrates [1], but I shall pass them by, for you know them and it is useless for me to recount them. (tr. Falconer) 1. Perhaps Antipater of Tarsus (d. 130 BC), a Stoic philosopher with an interest in divination, dreams and the supernatural; or possibly Antipater of Tyre (fl. 1st century BC) another Stoic and Cicero's contemporary.
Plutarch
On Socrates' daimonion 580d–fThe swine incident
On Socrates' daimonion 581d–e(1) fate of the Sicilian expedition foretold; (2) the retreat at Delium
Apuleius
On the god of Socratis (De deo Socratis)For an excellent summary of this work see Finamore (2014). The excerpt below comes from 16.155−156.
The consequence is that such a daemon participates in everything with close attention, inspecting everything and understanding everything, and dwelling in the inmost sanctum of the human mind in the function of consciousness [conscientiae] itself. This daemon I talk of is a personal guardian, an individual governor, an inspector in the household, a personal supervisor, an inner attorney, a continuous overseer, the one and only judge, an inseparable witness, a critic of the bad and commender of the good. If it is rightly acknowledged, recognized with attention, and served with reverence, just as it was served in justice and innocence by Socrates, it can provide a clear view forward when things are doubtful, warning in times of uncertainty, protection in peril, and aid in need; it is a being which can, by means of dreams, signs, or even perhaps by face-to-face encounter when the occasion demands, help you by sweeping away evil, promoting good, raising up lowliness, supporting weakness, elucidating obscurity, guiding success, and rectifying adversity. (tr. Harrison)
Maximus of Tyre
Orations 8 & 9 (What was Socrates' daimonion?)
8. God himself, settled and immobile, administers the heavens and maintains their ordered hierarchy. But he has a race of secondary immortal beings, the so-called daimones, which have their station in the space between earth and heaven. These daimones are inferior in power to God, but superior to men; they are the gods’ servants and men’s overseers [...] The mortal realm would indeed be separated from the immortal and from any sight or dealings with the heavens by a great intervening gulf, were it not for the harmonizing effect of these daimones, who bind and connect human beings to divine beauty in virtue of their kinship with both. Just as, although Greeks and foreigners are separated by their inability to speak each other’s language, they are still connected and enabled to deal with each other by interpreters, who take in what each side says and ferry it over to the other; just so, the race of daimones is held to have dealings both with gods and with men. It is they who speak to men and appear to them, threading their ways through the midst of this realm of mortal nature and giving help in those matters in which men are compelled to appeal to the gods. [...] Some heal diseases, some dispense advice to the perplexed, some reveal what is hidden, some assist the craftsman in his work, some the traveller on his journey; some inhabit cities, some the countryside, some the seas, some the dry land. Different daimones are assigned homes in different human bodies: one Socrates, another Plato, another Pythagoras, another Zeno, another Diogenes. (From sections7–8 of Oration 8; tr. Trapp)
NeoplatonismWith Neoplatonism the trend to equate Socrates daimonion with a personal daemon, understood as a higher self or part of ones soul that does not descend into the sensory and material realm, continues. Important sources are Plotinus' Enneads 3.4 (On the Tutelary Spirit) and Enneads 4.8 (The Soul's Descent Into Body; esp. 4.8.8), Porphry's Life of Plotinus 10, Hermias (Commentary on the Phaedrus 66–69), Proclus (Commentary on 1 Alcibiades78.7–85,14) and Olympiodorus (On First Alcibiades, Lecture 3). Excellent discussion may be found in Rist (1963), Addey (2014), Finamore (2014) and Roskam (2014). Two examples are shown below. Hermias, Commentary on the Phaedrus 67
Olympiodorus, On First Alcibiades Lecture 3.21
First, that it always used to turn him aside [from a course of action], and that whenever it did not turn him aside, this was a sign of encouragement. That is, since Socrates was beneficent and always eager to help everyone, like a spirited horse eager for the race, he needed the bit rather than the whip. Second, that his allotted daimon was divine, and he makes this clear: for he says in the present dialogue that ‘My guardian is better and wiser than yours’ [Plato, 1 Alc. 124C], and when the young man asks, ‘Who is that?’ he replies, ‘A god, Alcibiades, a god.’ Third, that he seemed to hear the voice [of the god], not because [the god] was actually talking, but [because] a kind of emanation (ellampsis) of [the god] was present in the region of his acoustic organs, and he took this to be a voice. In the same way we observe even now in common usage (sunetheia) that those who live the priestly life, when they suddenly catch the scent of a sweet fragrance, will say (since in their case too an emanation is present in the region of the olfactory organs) that it is ‘the presence of an angel’. (tr. Griffin)
Bibliography
Ancient Sources
Apuleius. De Deo Socratis. Christopher P. Jones (tr.). In: Christopher P. Jones (ed.), Apuleius: Apologia. Florida. De Deo Socratis. Loeb Classical Library L534. Harvard University Press, 2017. Apuleius. On the God of Socrates. Stephen J. Harrison (tr.). In: Stephen J. Harrison, John L. Hilton, Vincent J.C. Hunink, Apuleius: Rhetorical Works, Oxford University Press, 2001 (repr. 2007); pp. 185−216. Apuleius. On the God of Socrates. Thomas Taylor (tr.). In: Thomas Taylor (ed.), The Metamorphosis or Golden Ass and Philosophical Works of Apuleius, London, 1822; pp. 291–318. Cicero. De Divinatione. William Armistead Falconer (tr.). In: William Armistead Falconer (ed.), Cicero: De Senectute De Amicitia De Divinatione. Loeb Classical Library L154. London: Heinemann, 1923 (repr. 1964). Hermias. On Plato Phaedrus 227A–245E. Volume 1. Dirk Baltzly, Michael Share (trs.). London: Bloomsbury, 2018. Maximus of Tyre. The Dissertations of Maximus Tyrius, Vol. 2. Thomas Taylor (tr.). London: C. Wittingham, 1804. Dissertations 26 & 27 (pp. 59–82). Maximus of Tyre. The Philosophical Orations. M. B. Trapp (tr.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Orations 8 & 9 (pp. 67–83). Olympiodorus. Life of Plato, On Plato's First Alcibiades 1-9. Michael Griffin (tr.). London: Bloomsbury, 2014. Plato. Alcibiades I. W. R. M. Lamb (tr.). Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12. Loeb Classical Library L201. London: Heinemann, 1927 (repr. 1964). Plato. Apology. Harold North Fowler (tr.). Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 1. Loeb Classical Library L036. London: Heinemann, 1913 (repr. 1966). Plato. Euthydemus. W. R. M. Lamb (tr.). Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 2. Loeb Classical Library L165. Harvard University Press, 1967 (orig. publ. 1924). Plato. Euthyphro. Harold North Fowler (tr.). Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 1. Loeb Classical Library L036. London: Heinemann, 1913 (repr. 1966). Plato. Phaedrus. Harold North Fowler (tr.). Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 1. Loeb Classical Library L036. London: Heinemann, 1913 (repr. 1966). Plato. Republic. Paul Shorey (tr.). Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6. Loeb Classical Library L237, L276. Harvard University Press, 1937 (v1), 1942 (v2). Plato. Theages. W. R. M. Lamb (tr.). Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12. Loeb Classical Library L201. London: Heinemann, 1927 (repr. 1964). Plato. Theaetetus. Harold North Fowler (tr.). Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 7. Loeb Classical Library L123. London: Heinemann, 1921. Plato. The Platonic Theages: An Introduction, Commentary and Critical Edition, Mark Joyal (ed.). Verlag, 2000. Plotinus. Plotinus: The Enneads, in 5 vols. Stephen MacKenna (tr.), B. S. Page (ed.). London, 1917–1930. Plotinus. Plotinus, in 7 volumes. A. H. Armstrong (tr.). Loeb Classical Library. Harvard University Press, 1968–1988. Plutarch. On the Sign of Socrates. Phillip H. De Lacy, Benedict Einarson (trs.). In: Phillip H. De Lacy, Benedict Einarson (eds.), Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. VII. Loeb Classical Library L405. Harvard University Press, 1959. Porphyry. On the Life of Plotinus. In: Stephen MacKenna (tr.), B. S. Page (ed.), Plotinus: The Enneads, in 5 vols. London, 1917–1930. Vol. 1. Proclus. Excerpt from Commentary on the First Alcibiades (68-84). Thomas Taylor (tr.). In: The Dissertations of Maximus Tyrius, Vol. 2. London: C. Wittingham, 1804. (pp. 235–254). Proclus. Proclus: Alcibiades I, A Translation and Commentary. William O'Neill (tr.). 2nd ed. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971. Xenophon. Memorabilia, Apology, Symposium. Henry Graham Dakyns (tr.). In: Xenophon in Four Volumes, vol. 3, part 1. London: Macmillan, 1897. Xenophon. Memorabilia. E. C. Marchant (tr.). In: Xenophon in Seven Volumes, vol. 4. Loeb Classical Library L168. Harvard University Press, 1997 (orig. publ. 1923). Xenophon. Symposium, Apology. O. J. Todd (tr.). In: Xenophon in Seven Volumes, vol. 4. Loeb Classical Library L168. Harvard University Press, 1997 (orig. publ. 1922).
Modern Sources
Addey, Crystal. The daimonion of Socrates: daimones and divination in Neoplatonism. In: Harold Tarrant & Danielle A. Layne (eds.), The Neoplatonic Socrates. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Ch. 3 (pp. 51–72). Beckman, James. The Religious Dimension of Socrates’ Thought. Ontario:Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979. Boyancé, Pierre. Les deux démons personnels dans l'antiquité grecque et latine. Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes 9, 1935, 189–210. Brickhouse, Thomas C.; Smith, Nicholas D. The divine sign did not oppose me: a problem in Plato's Apology. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 3 (September 1986): 511–526. Bussanich, John. Socrates and religious experience. In: Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Rachana Kamtekar (eds.), A Companion to Socrates. New York: Wiley, 2009 (pp. 200–213). Bussanich, John. Socrates the mystic. In: J. Cleary (ed.), Traditions of Platonism: Essays in Honour of John Dillon, Farnham: Ashgate, 1999; pp. 29–51. Cross, R. Nicol. Socrates: The Man and His Mission. London: Methuen, 1914. Finamore, John F. Plutarch and Apuleius on Socrates’ daimonion. In: Harold Tarrant & Danielle A. Layne (eds.), The Neoplatonic Socrates. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Ch. 2 (pp. 36–50). Frieden, Ken. Genius and Monologue. Cornell University Press, 1985. Ch. 1. Greek Gods, daimon, and Socrates' daimonion. Howland, Jacob. Kierkegaard and Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Jaynes, Julian. The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990 (orig. publ. 1976). Karpas M. J. Socrates in the light of modern psychopathology. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 1915 Aug;10(3):185–200. Long, A. A. How does Socrates’ divine sign communicate with him? In: Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Rachana Kamtekar (eds.), A Companion to Socrates. New York: Wiley, 2009 (pp. 63–74). MacNaghten, R. E. Socrates and the ΔAIMONION. The Classical Review, vol. 28, no. 6, 1914, pp. 185–189. Manning, Henry Edward. The Daemon of Socrates. London: Longmans, 1872. McGilchrist, Iain. The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World. New Haven: Yale, 2009. McPherran, Mark L. The Religion of Socrates. Pennsylania State University Press, 1996 (repr. 2010). McPherran, Mark L. Socratic religion. In: Donald R. Morrison (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Socrates, Cambridge University Press, 2011; 111–137. More, Paul Elmer. Platonism. Princeton University Press, 1917. (pp. 141–149). Morgan, Michael L. Platonic Piety Philosophy and Ritual in Fourth-Century Athens. Yale University Press, 1990. Muramoto, Osamu; Englert, Walter G. Socrates and temporal lobe epilepsy: a pathographic diagnosis 2400 years later. Epilepsia 47.3 (2006): 652–654. Myers, Frederic WH. Automatic writing. IV. The daemon of Socrates. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, Vol. 5. 1889, pp. 522–547. Pope, Alton R. The daimonion of Socrates: a search for definition and an epistemological assessment. MS Thesis. Department of Philosophy, Kansas State University, 1969. Rist, John M. Plotinus and the ‘daimonion’ of Socrates. Phoenix, vol. 17, no. 1, 1963, pp. 13–24. Roskam, Geert. Socrates’ daimonion in Maximus of Tyre, Apuleius, and Plutarch. In: Françoise Frazier et Delfim F. Leão (eds.), Tychè et Pronoia: La marche du monde selon Plutarque. Centro de Estudos Clássicos e Humanísticos da Universidade de Coimbra, 2010; 93–108. Roskam, Geert. Hermias of Alexandria on Socrates' divine sign. In: Pieter d’Hoine, Gerd Van Riel (eds.), Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought. Leuven University Press, 2014 (pp. 309 – 324). Sauvage, Micheline. Socrates and the Conscience of Man. Translated by Patrick Hepbume-Scott. New York: Harper & Bros., 1960. Smith, Nicholas D.; Destrée, Pierre (eds.). Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice and Value in Socratic Philosophy. (Apeiron, Volume 38, Issue 2). Kelowna: Academic Printing and Publishing, 2005. Smith, Nicholas D.; Woodruff, Paul. Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2000. Vlastos, Gregory. Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Cornell University Press, 1991. Ch. 6. Socratic piety (157–178). Wild, K. W. Plato's presentation of intuitive mind in his portrait of Socrates. Philosophy 14.55, 1939, 326–340. Willing, Augustus. De Socratis daemonio quae antiquis temporibus fuerint opiniones. Dissertation (Jena), Teubner, 1909. Zeller, Eduard. Socrates and the Socratic Schools. 3rd ed. (Tr. Oswald J. Reichel). London: Longmans, 1885. (The daimonion; pp. 82–98). |
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