

GREEK  
PHILOSOPHICAL  
TERMS

*A Historical Lexicon*

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With Epictetus *diairesis* reappears in a moral context; see *proairesis*.

#### dialektike: *dialectic*

1. On the testimony of Aristotle dialectic was an invention of Zeno the Eleatic (D.L. ix, 25), probably to serve as a support for the hypothetical antinomies of Parmenides (Plato, *Parm.* 128c). But what was a species of verbal polemic (what Plato would call "eristic" or disputation; see *Soph.* 224c–226a, *Rep.* 499a, *Phaedrus* 261c) for the Eleatics was transformed by Plato into a high philosophical method. The connecting link was undoubtedly the Socratic technique of question and answer in his search for ethical definitions (see Plato, *Phaedo* 75d, 78d; Xenophon, *Mem.* 1, 1, 16; and *elenchos*), a technique that Plato explicitly describes as dialectical (*Crat.* 390c). With the hypostatization of the Socratic definitions into the Platonic *eide* (perhaps reflected in the transition from *Phaedo* 100a to *ibid.* 101d; see *eidos*) the role of dialectic becomes central and is the crown of the ideal curriculum described in the *Republic*: after ten years devoted to mathematics the philosopher-to-be will devote the years between thirty and thirty-five to the study of dialectic (*Rep.* 531d–534e, 537b–537e).

2. What is dialectic? The question is not an easy one since Plato, as usual, thought about it in a variety of ways. There is the view of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, which envisions dialectic as a progressively more synoptic ascent, via a series of "positions" (*hypotheseis*, q.v.; the theory of Forms is one such in *Phaedo* 100b), until an ultimate is reached (*Phaedo* 101d, *Rep.* **s u e**). In the *Republic*, where the context of the discussion is confessedly moral, this "unhypothetized principle" is identified with the good-in-itself (*auto to agathon*; *Rep.* 532a–b) that subsumes within itself all the lower hypotheses (*ibid.* 533c–d).

3. If the dialectic of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* may be described as "synoptic" (*Rep.* 537c), that which emerges from the *Phaedrus* onwards is decidedly "diacritic" (see *Soph.* 226c, 253d). It is introduced in *Phaedrus* 265c–266b (compare *Soph.* 253d–e) and consists of two different procedures, "collection" (*synagoge*, q.v.) and "division" (*diairesis*, q.v.), the latter process in particular being amply illustrated in subsequent dialogues like the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*. The earlier dialectic appeared similar to the operations of *eros* (q.v.), but here we are transported into an almost Aristotelian world of classification through division: ascent has been replaced by descent. While it is manifest that we are here still dealing with ontological realities, it is likewise clear that a crucial step has been taken along the road to a conceptual logic. The term of the *diairesis* is that *eidos* which stands immediately above the sensible particulars (*Soph.* 229/I), and, while this is "really real" (*ontos on*) in the Platonic

scheme of things, it is significant that the same process, *diairesis*, ends, in Aristotle, in the *atomon eidos*, the *hmfima species* in a logical descent (*De an.* 11, 414b); see *diairesis*.

4. Aristotle abandons the central ontological role given to dialectic in Plato's *Republic*; he is concerned, instead, with the operations of the mind that culminate in demonstration (*apodeixis*). Dialectic is not strict demonstration (*Anal. pr.* 1, 24a–b; *Top.* 1, 100a–b) in that it does not begin from premisses that are true and primary, but from opinions (*endoxa*) that are accepted by the majority or the wise. The irony of this distinction is, of course, that Aristotle's own procedure is most frequently what he has described as "dialectical" (see *endoxon*). But as a theoretician Aristotle has little love of dialectic (cf. *De an.* 1, 403a; *Top.* 105b), and suggests in *Meta.* 987b that it, or rather the confusion between thought and reality, may have been Plato's undoing.

5. For the Stoics dialectic is reduced to logic, i.e., a study of the forms of internal and external discourse (D.L. v n, 43; cf. *logos, onoma*), while in the same breath they extend its preserves to embrace ethics and even physics (*ibid.* v n, 46, 83). The result is that logic is no longer an instrument (*organon*) of philosophy as understood by the Peripatetic school (the collection of the logical treatises into an *Organon* is post-Aristotelian, though Aristotle certainly foresaw the propaedeutic role of the *Analytics*; cf. *Meta.* 1005b).

6. The rehabilitation of dialectic in its Platonic sense was undertaken by Plotinus (*Enn.* 1, 3). It is once again, as in the *Republic*, a cognitive approach to the intelligibles (see *noesis*), but with distinctly Stoic overtones: dialectic is an education for virtue and so includes both actions and objects as well as the *noeta*.

#### dianoia: understanding

On the Platonic line *dianoia* is a type of cognition between *doxa* and *noesis* (*Rep.* 510d–511a; for the special objects of *dianoia* on the Platonic line, see *mathematika*). In Aristotle it is used as a more general term for intellectual activity. Where it is opposed to *nous* (= intuitive knowledge) it means discursive, syllogistic reasoning (Aristotle, *Anal. post.* 11, 100b), and (*ibid.* 1, 89b) it is subdivided into the following species: *episteme*, knowledge pursued for its own sake (see also *theoria*), *techne* (knowledge applied to production), and *phronesis* (knowledge applied to conduct). In Stoicism it is identical with the *hegemonikon* (*SVF* 11, 459).

For its location in the general context of intellection, see *noesis*.

#### diaphora: *difference, specific difference*

1. The presence of *diaphorai* is explicit in the Platonic dialectical process of division (*diairesis*, q.v.) where the "generic form" is di-

mixis: mixture  
See *genesis*, *holon*.

monas: unit, the one

The unit is either *the* primary *arche* of the Pythagoreans (D.L. vin, 25) or, together with the *Dyas*, one of the primary co-principles (Aristotle, *Meta.* 986a), ethically associated with the good (*agathon*), and considered a god (*theos*) (Aetius 1, 7, 18), even though the position of limit (*peras*) and *apeiron* at the head of the list would suggest that they were more primary. Aristotle is quite explicit that number (*arithmos*) has its own more basic elements (*stoicheia*), i.e., "Even" and "Odd" (*Meta.* 986a). According to Aristotle all philosophers agree in making the *monas* the *arche* of number (*arithmos*), yet the Pythagoreans are peculiar in that their units have spatial magnitude (*ibid.* 1080b) that is indivisible (*ibid.* 1083b), a confusion between the arithmetical unit and the geometric point, which was cleared up later (Nichomachus, *Arith. intro.* n, 6 and 7). Aristotle's own definition of the *monas* is "substance without position," clearly distinct from the "point" (*stigma*) that is "substance with position," *Anal. post.* 1, 87a; see *arithmos*, *megethos*.

mousike: *the Muses'* art, *music*  
See *katharsis*.

mythos: myth

1. The traditional attitude of philosophy toward myth is expressed in the contrast *mythos-logos*, where the latter is intended to signify a rational, analytic, and true account (see Plato, *Phaedo* 61b, *Tim.* 26e, etc.). It runs parallel to the distinction *theologos-physikos* (see *theologia*), but the relationship of the former pair is somewhat more complex. It is clear that both Socrates and Plato had strenuous moral objections to the traditional myths (*Euth.* 6a–c, *Phaedrus* 229c–230a, *Rep.* 3766–3800), a type of criticism that went back at least as far as Xenophanes (see fr. 11). One attempt to meet this type of attack was the belief that there was an underlying sense (*hyponoia*) to the old myths. This was apparently popular in fifth-century philosophical circles; see Prodicus (Diels, fr. B5), Anaxagoras (D.L. n, 11), and Antisthenes (Dio Chrysostom, *Orat.* 53, 4–5; compare Xenophon, *Symp.* in, 6). Plato will have none of *hyponoia* (*Rep.* 378d), but in the subsequent literature the use of an allegorical interpretation (*allegoria*), either moral, physical, or cosmogonical, to extract the hidden sense became a potent method of reconciling philosophy and the traditional material in the poets. The Stoics were particularly active in

*allegoria* (see Cicero, *De nat. deor.* n, 24, 25, 64, 65, and *passim*; the Stoic facility in etymologizing names was of considerable help here; see *onoma*), and with Philo *allegoria* passed into the service of accommodating philosophy and scripture (cf. *Leg. all.*, *passim*).

2. But *mythos* was not quite so easily dismissed: Aristode felt that there was a point in the early cosmogonies where *logos* and *mythos* overlapped (*Meta.* 982b, 1074b; see *aporia*, *endoxon*), but the presentation of the latter was childlike (*Meta.* 1000a; compare Plato, *Soph.* 243a), and Plato, for one, was sceptical of the results (see the heavy irony of *Tim.* 40d–41a). Yet the dialogues are filled with myths that play a central part in the development of the argument, as for instance, in the *Phaedo* and *Republic* (eschatological; see *athanatos*), *Phaedrus* (psychological), and *Timaeus* (physical). Nor is the technique new with Plato; it can be seen in Protagoras (if the myth in *Protagoras* 320c–323a is his own and not Plato's), in the proem to Parmenides' poem (fr. 1) and the half-disguised abstractions of Pherecydes' myths (D.L. 1, 119; compare Aristotle, *Meta.* 1091b); see *theos*.

## n

n6esis: the operation of nous (q.v.), *thinking* (as opposed to sensation), *intuition* (as opposed to *discursive reasoning*)

1. Subtle differences between the mere perception of an object or objects, i.e., sensation (*aisthesis*, q.v.) and another kind of psychic awareness that goes beyond the sense data and perceives less tangible things, like resemblances and differences between objects, is already present in Homer and is identified with the organ called *nous*. With the philosophers the difference becomes a problem. Heraclitus suspects the unreliability of sensation for the perception of the *true* nature of things. He is tireless in his assertion that "nature loves to hide" (see fr. 123 and *logos* 1), and this hidden reality is clearly beyond the reach of men who trust too implicitly in their senses (fr. 107). How the other faculty that is capable of discerning the hidden *logos* of things might operate is not immediately apparent, though we are told (Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* vii, 129) that the *nous* that is within us is activated by its contact, via the channels of sensation (*aisthetikoi poroi*), with the divine *logos* in the universe, a contact that is maintained in an atten-

uated fashion during sleep by breathing (see *pneuma*). The senses, then, are obviously some sort of condition for *noesis*, though not, as is clear from fr. 107 and its congeners, identical with it.

2. Aristotle remarks (*De an.* in, 427a; *Meta.* 1009b) that the pre-Socratics generally made no distinction between *noesis* and *aisthesis*. It is easy to understand why he thought so since they all attempted to explain the operations of the *psyche* in purely physical terms, a procedure that, according to Aristotle (*loc. cit.*), cannot account for error (*pseudos*) since like must know like (see *homoios*, *aisthesis*). From one point of view this is true; but it is likewise true that since Parmenides' assault on sense perception in terms of the instability of its object (see on 1, *episteme* 2) it became an epistemological necessity to distinguish between the obvious perils of *aisthesis* and a "true knowledge" more or less independent of the senses.

3. These attempts can be seen in Empedocles' doubts about the reliability of our sense perception and the need of divine assistance (Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* vn, 122–124). But the limitations of sensation here seem to be due to our misuse of them rather than to any inherent weakness of their own (fr. 3, lines 9–13). When he comes to explain the possibility of error (called ignorance and opposed to *phronesis*; Theophrastus, *De sens.* 9), Empedocles resorts to a mechanistic explanation of how the effluences (*aporrhoai*; see *aisthesis* 7) of one sense object are symmetrical only with the pores of its proper sense organ, and so cannot be judged by the others (Theophrastus, *op. cit.* 7). If thought is anything to Empedocles it is a special type of sensation that occurs in the blood by reason of its being a perfect mixture of all the *stoicheia* (*ibid.* 9).

4. It is somewhat more perplexing to find Anaxagoras, the eminent proponent of *nous*, in Aristotle's catalogue of those who failed to distinguish sensation and thought. In the fragments we do find the usual statements casting doubts on sensation (e.g. fr. 21), but there is no explanation of *noesis*. Indeed *nous* does not seem to be a cognitive principle at all but rather a cosmological one. It initiates motion (and in this it has obvious affinities to soul; see *psyche* 1, 7, and *passim*) and it guides and rules all (fr. 12). What Anaxagoras is obviously offering is the presence of some intelligent and hence purposeful principle in the universe. But it appears the *nous* is an immanent principle as well and we are told that it is not present in everything (fr. 11). Alcmaeon of Crotona, who had already sharply distinguished *phronesis* from *aisthesis*, maintained that the former was characteristic of men only (Theophrastus, *De sens.* 25), but we have no idea of the extension of the immanent *nous* in Anaxagoras. Presumably it would cover the same territory as *psyche*, i.e., the entire animate world.

5. For Diogenes of Apollonia, who also addressed himself to the

problem, *aer* (q.v.), the intelligent and divine *arche*, is continuous and present in all things that are (fr. 5), but it is present in varying degrees. The degree is based on the dryness and warmth of the air, distinctions of texture that explain progressively higher cognitive acts (Theophrastus, *op. cit.* 40–43). In this way are explained the complete absence of cognitive activities in plants and the relatively higher degree of *phronesis* in man as compared to the other animals (*ibid.* 44).

6. The Atomists' theories of sensible qualities (see *aisthesis* 11, *pathos* 4) demanded refinements in the cognitive faculties. Many so-called qualities are merely subjective impressions and the true nature of the *atomon* is not visible to sight. Hence Democritus draws the distinction (fr. 11) between a genuine and a bastard knowledge; the latter is sensation and the former, presumably (the text breaks off), reason, the operation of the *logikon* that is located in the breast (Aetius iv, 4, 6; see *kardia* 2 and *psyche* 7). But even though *phronesis* and *aisthesis* have different objects and different seats, the mechanics of their operation are the same (Aetius iv, 8, 5; iv, 8, 10).

7. To resume the pre-Socratic attitude: there were solid epistemological grounds for making a distinction *in kind* between thought (*noesis*, *phronesis*; in the epistemological context, *episteme*) and sensation (*aisthesis*; in the epistemological context, *doxa*), and, indeed, the differentiation could be specified when it came to giving them different locations in the body (*aisthesis* tied to the sense organs; the higher faculty in a central location, though not always distinguished from the more generic notion of *psyche*; see *kardia*). But the operations of this higher faculty could be distinguished from those of sensation only *in degree*, e.g. finer or warmer in composition.

8. Plato, while adhering firmly to the Parmenidean epistemology (see *episteme* 2), has, in addition, a new spiritualized conception of soul that, though originally posited on religious grounds (see *psyche* 13), is incorporated in Plato's theory of knowledge (*ibid.* 14). It is this pure unitary soul of the *Phaedo* that becomes the epistemological correlative of the *eide* and, being absolutely different *in kind* from the body, can perform all the cognitive activities that the post-Parmenidean philosophers associated with *nous* but were unable to explain on the level of substance. But the problem is considerably more complex than this. Even in the *Phaedo* the soul is the *arche* of all cognitive activity: sensation is perception *by* the soul *through* the body; *phronesis* is an operation of the soul alone (*Phaedo jgd*; see *aisthesis* 15–16).

9. In the *Phaedo* the distinction between the two operations is largely in terms of the objects known; in the *Republic* it reappears, in a much more complex form, based as well upon the internal operations of the soul. This latter is now divided into three parts (see *psyche* 15) and the upper part, the *logistikon* (*ibid.* 16), is responsible for noetic

activity. But the psychology is far more sophisticated here, and in the Diagram of the Line in *Rep.* vi the noetic activity is explained in some detail. The distinction drawn previously (*Rep.* iv, 476a-480a) between *episteme* and *doxa* is maintained here, but we discover that there is more than one type of *episteme*. The upper part of the Line that represented knowledge of the *noeta* (*ibid.* 509c) is further subdivided into what Plato calls *noesis* and *dianoia* (*ibid.* 511d).

10. These two operations of the *logistikon* have been much debated; one school of thought sees *dianoia* as that activity of the mind which has as its object the "mathematicals," while the objects of *noesis* are the *eide* (see *mathematika* 2); the other school sees *dianoia* as discursive reasoning in general and *noesis* as immediate intellectual intuition, in much the same way as Aristotle (see *Anal. post.* n, 100b; *epagoge* 3) and Plotinus (see 18-19 *infra*) distinguished between *logismos* and *nous*. What is clear, however, is that the method of *noesis* is that known to Plato as *dialektike*; q.v.; *ibid.* 511b) and the way of life based upon it is *philosophia* (q.v., and compare *phronesis, theoria*).

11. There are certain passages in Plato, echoed by Aristotle, that give somewhat more of a purely psychological insight into the workings of the intellective process. Both men seek to derive *episteme* from the Greek word to "stand" or "come to a halt" (*ephistamai*) and so explain intellection as a "coming to a halt" in the midst of a series of sense impressions, the "fixing" of an intuitive concept (*Crat.* 437a; *Phaedo* 96b; *Anal. post.* n, 100a; *Phys.* v n, 247b). But this psychological approach is overwhelmed by a flood of "physical" considerations. *Noesis* is an activity and so must be located within the general categories of change and *kinesis*. Plato speaks of revolutions in the World Soul (*Tim.* 37a) and in the immortal part of the individual soul (*ibid.* 43a). This owes nothing, of course, to introspection, but is based upon considerations of the revolutions of the body of the *kosmos* that reveal the motion of its own soul (*ibid.* 34b) and provide a visible moral paradigm for the motions of our own soul (*ibid.* 47b, and see *ouranos* 2-3; for sensation as motion, see *ibid.* 43c; and for the larger question of motion in the soul, *psyche* 19).

For the operation of cosmic *nous* in Plato, see *nous* 5-6; *kinoun* 5.

12. Aristotle's treatment of *noesis*, like his explanation of *aisthesis*, is conducted within the categories of potency (*dynamis*) and act (*energeia*, q.v.). The *nous* before it knows is actually nothing but potentially all the things it can know; the *eide* are present in it but only potentially (*De an.* m, 429a). When the *nous* begins to operate it passes from a passive to an activated state by reason of its becoming identical with its object, the intelligible form (*ibid.* in, 431a). There is in *noesis* a parallel with *aisthesis*: just as *aisthesis* extracts the sensible

forms (*eide*) of sensible objects (see *aisthesis* 19), so *noesis* thinks the intelligible forms in sensible images (*phantasiai*), and *noesis* never occurs without these latter (*ibid.* in, 431a-b). *Noesis* can be directly of essences (for the intuitive role of *nous*, see *epagoge* 3-4 and compare *Meta.* 1036a), or it can operate through judgments (*hypolepseis*), i.e., by the combination (*synthesis*) or separation (*diairesis*) of concepts, and it is only in this latter operation that error (*pseudos*) is possible (*ibid.* 430a-b; for the Platonic theory of judgment, see *doxa* 4).

For the operation of cosmic *nous* in Aristotle, cf. *nous, kinoun*.

13. The Atomists considered the soul, which was distributed throughout the body (Aristotle, *De an.* 1, 409a; Lucretius **Hi**, 370), to be the seat of all sensation (for the mechanics of this, see *aisthesis* 22-23). But given that soul (*psyche*) and mind (*nous*) are substantially the same (*De an.* 1, 404a), it would seem to follow that sensation and thought are identical, and so Aristotle concluded (*Meta.* 1009b; see Aetius iv, 8, 5; iv, 8, 10). As for its operation, since *nous* is nothing more than a kind of aggregation (see *holon* 10) of soul-atoms in the breast, it is reasonable to suppose that some of the *eidola* penetrate beyond the surface sense organs, reach the interior of the breast, and so cause this higher type of perception (see Lucretius iv, 722-731).

14. But we have already seen that the earlier Atomists had attempted to distinguish, by the purity of its constitution and its location, mind from soul. The Epicureans preserved and refined the distinction and it is specifically present in Lucretius' consistent use of *anima* for *psyche* and *animus* for *nous* or *dianoia* (*mens* is somewhat too narrow in connotation for the latter since the *animus* is the seat of volitional as well as intellectual activity; **III**, 145). He clearly separates the two at in, 396-416 where he argues that part of the *anima* may be lost (e.g., in the loss of a limb) and a man still survive, but the loss of the *animus* means the instantaneous end of the organism.

15. For the Epicurean *nous* operates somewhat in the fashion of the senses. It too may directly perceive the *eidola* given off by bodies but that are not, in this case, grasped by the senses. Such are, for example, the accidental mixtures of *eidola* that give rise to the imagining of centaurs and chimeras (Lucretius iv, 129), visions seen in dreams (iv, 749-776), and the *eidola* of the gods (v, 148-149; Cicero, *De nat. deor.* 1, 49). These operations are akin to Aristotle's *nous* thinking of indivisible concepts (*De an.* **III**, 430a); there is, as well, intellection *componendo et dividendo*, i.e., evaluating and passing judgment on the data of sensation. The images (*phantasiai*) in which the *eidola* are grouped are passed along to the *dianoia* or *nous* where they accumulate into general "preconceptions" (*prolepseis*, q.v.). These in turn serve as a standard of comparison for judgments (*hypolepseis*) about individual sensible things (D.L. x, 33). This is the area

of opinion into which error enters (see *doxa* 7; the Epicurean criterion of truth and error is discussed under *enargeia*). Finally, the mind is also capable of entering the realm of the imperceptibles (*adela*), i.e., to perform a discursive reasoning process (*logismos*, the *ratio* of Lucretius) dealing with entities not immediately perceptible to the senses, a class that would, of course, include the *atoma* themselves (see D.L. x, 32)-

16. The Stoic version of *noesis*, the operation of the *hegemonikon* (q.v.), is properly *katalepsis* or apprehension. The process begins with an impression (*typosis*) on the senses that results in a sensible image (*phantasia*; see *aisthesis* 24–25). These are borne, via the *pneuma* (q.v.), to the *hegemonikon* where it is first assented to (*synkathesis*, *adsensio*) and is thus apprehended (*katalepsis*, q.v.; Cicero, *Acad. post.* 1, 40–42). In this way what was a sensible image (*phantasia*) becomes an intelligible image or concept (*ennoia*, q.v.). In the earliest years this is almost an unconscious process and the child builds up various "preconceptions" (*prolepseis*, q.v.) under whose influence the *hegemonikon* matures to the point where it is capable of creating its own conscious *ennoiai* (*SVF* II, 83; according to this same text, the full operation of the *hegemonikon* begins at the age of seven, or at least between seven and fourteen, a judgment not based on the observation of rational behavior in adolescents but on the onset of puberty and the first production of sperm; see *SVF* n, 764, 785). As in Epicureanism, *noesis* is not only of the *aistheta* but ranges freely over a wide area of thought, creating its own *ennoiai* by recourse to the principles of similarity, analogy, privation, opposition, etc. (*SVF* n, 87).

On the Stoics' primary *prolepsis* of good and evil, see *oikeiosis*.

17. This theory did not remain completely intact. Chrysippus made some important revisions that had as their effect the reunification of the *psyche* under the aegis of the *hegemonikon* so that even the *pathe* became intellectual judgments (*kriseis*; *SVF* in, 461) and, in direct opposition to Plato's vision of the tripartite soul, volitional activity was subsumed under the intellectual (*SVF* 11, 823; see *aisthesis* 25, *pathos* 12). This is followed by a strong Platonizing reaction under Poseidonius who opposed Chrysippus on the intellectual nature of the *pathe* and restored the Platonic partition of the soul (Galen, *Placita Hipp. et Plat.* 448, 460). There follows from this a sharper distinction between *psyche* and *nous* (particularly apparent in Marcus Aurelius in, 16; xn, 3) with emphasis on the divine and immortal nature of *nous* as opposed to the other parts of the soul (see *sympatheia* 5), and, by reason of the presence of this *daimon* in it (so Galen, *op. cit.* 448; Plutarch, *De genio Socr.* 591c–f; Platonic inspiration in *Tim.* 90a and see *daimon*), a new interest in the medial position of the soul (see *psyche* 29).

18. Middle Platonism concentrated its attention on the cosmic aspects of *nous* (q.v.) and it is not until Plotinus that we have any significant contribution to the workings of the immanent *nous*. As did Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus distinguishes two types of intellectual activity, one intuitive and one discursive. The former, *noesis*, is, in the first instance, the life and *energeia* of the cosmic hypostatized *nous*. It is not, however, an activity of the One since for Plotinus even so self-integrated an act as *noesis* bespeaks duality and so is anathema to the One (*Enn.* vi, 6, 3, with passing reference to Plato's remarks in *Soph.* 254d and *Parmenides* 146a on the role of "the Other" [*heteron*] in being and therefore in intellection). What need, Plotinus asks (vi, 7, 4), would the eye have to see something if it were itself the light?

19. *Noesis*, then, in its genuine form is a unity of subject and object that, though they differ only logically, constitute a plurality (*plethos*). It is characteristically internalized: the *noeta* that are the objects of *noesis* are in the *nous* that knows them (vi, 2, 21). *Noesis*, which is the life of *nous*, casts forth its image (*eikon*) in the form of an *energeia* in the lower *hypostasis* of the soul. This is *logismos* or discursive reasoning, an operation that, unlike the immediate and internalized *noesis*, comprehends the *phantasmata* of objects outside itself offered to it by sensation, and makes judgments (*kriseis*) concerning them by invoking rules (*kanones*) transmitted from *nous* (v, 3, 4), or, as he puts it elsewhere, by composition and division (*synagoge, diairesis*: v, 3, 2; see the Platonic antecedents of these terms under *dialektike*). What he refers to here is a knowledge of the *eide* supplied by the *nous* that contains them and that make possible our comparative judgments (cf. v, 1, 11; v, 3, 3; and compare *Phaedo* 74a ff.).

20. The soul is capable of two activities: when "turned upward" it gives itself over to *noesis/logismos*; when "downward," to *aisthesis* and the operation of the other faculties (vi, 2, 22; see *aisthesis* 26). Sensation uses a medium, an image (*phantasma*), separated from its model and yet different from the thing in which it resides; *noesis* is immediate: knower and known confront each other directly and become identified (v, 3, 8). But we do not have *noesis* in its purity. *Noesis* is a vision of unity; our image of it, *logismos*, deals with plurality, and the more one frees oneself from the composing and dividing that is our imitation of *noesis* and turns instead to a contemplation of self, the more one will be assimilating oneself to the true operation of *nous* (v, 3, 6). Why the soul is forced to endure this *logismos* is part of the general condition of its descent into a body (see *kathodos*). It is, like its external manifestation, language, a weakness, a sign of the soul's preoccupation with areas not akin to itself (iv, 3, 18).

21. In this passage (iv, 3, 18) Plotinus makes use of the principle of attention (*phrontis*) to explain the degeneration of *noesis* into *logis-*

mos (compare the elaborate metaphor in *iv*, 3, 17 where the soul's preoccupation with the material is compared to that of a ship's captain toward his ship and its cargo; for the further degeneration of thought into activity, see *physis* 5) and he resorts to a similar type of explanation in confronting another problem. If *nous* is a faculty in the soul, how is one to explain the intermittent nature of *noesis* in man as compared to its continuous exercise in the higher principle? Aristotle had already faced the question and had suggested that while the objects of *noesis* are always *in* the mind, they are not always present to the mind; in short, man must choose to think (*De an.* II, 417b). Further, this activity can last for only brief periods in man since it involves a passage from potency to act and so fatigues the thinker (*Meta.* 1050b, 1072b; *Eth. Nich.* 1175a). For Plotinus it is a question of awareness. The immanent *nous* is always in operation but we, because our attention is turned elsewhere, are not always aware of it (*iv*, 8, 8). This view, based as it is on a desire to keep the human soul perpetually linked, via the *nous*, to the *kosmos noetos*, Proclus finds a novelty in the Platonic tradition (*In Tim.* in, 333-334) and therefore returns to the position of an intermittent functioning of *noesis* in the "descended" soul (*Elem. theol.*, prop. 211; see *kathodos* and *psyche* 35).

noeton: capable of being grasped by the intellect; the object of the intellect, the intelligible (opposite of aistheton)

1. The *noeton* is the object of the operation of the faculty of *nous*. Among the pre-Socratics, where the distinction of *nous* from the general cognitive principle of the *psyche* was a very gradual one (see *noesis* 7), the objects of the former faculty were not very closely considered. They do, of course, constitute "true knowledge" (*episteme*, q.v.), for Heraclitus the knowledge of "the nature that loves to hide," for Parmenides the knowledge of "true being." With Plato the distinctions become sharper. The *noeta* are the objects of the faculty of the soul called *logistikon* (see *psyche* 15-18); they are, in short, the transcendent *eide*. But for Aristotle the *eide* are immanent (see *eidosis* 15) and so further distinctions are in order. The *eidosis* in things can be considered from two points of view. With respect to the substance in which it inheres, it is the formal cause of that substance; with respect to the *nous* of another, it is potentially intelligible (*noeton*) by that *nous*. But before it becomes actually *noeton* it must be carried to and presented to that *nous*. This is the function of the *phantasma* that is like a visual image except that it is without matter: the *nous* thinks the *noeta* in the *phantasmata* (*De an.* in, 431b-432a). In the final analysis, then, the *noeta qua noeta* are in the *nous*, first potentially, then actually. This transition from potency to act occurs in the *nous pathetikos*

(see *nous* 11). But in terms of Aristotelian act-potency theory, the *noeta* should all be present in act in the *nous poetikos* (see *nous* 12). But Aristotle never says this, resorting to a comparison of the operation of the agent intellect to that of a light source: the active intellect illumines the passive intellect (*ibid.* III, 430a).

2. During the period of Middle Platonism a number of revisions were made in the *ei^os*-theory, part of what was very probably an extensive syncretizing of Platonism and Peripateticism (baldly put in Cicero, *Acad. post.* 1, 17-18) in such a fashion as to include both the Platonic transcendent *eidosis* and the Aristotelian immanent *eidosis* within the causality schema (its progressive development can be traced in Seneca, *Ep.* 65, 8 and Basil the Great, *De spiritu sancto* 76a). Authors of the period began to draw a distinction between the *eidosis* that is immanent in things as their formal cause and the *idea* that is the exemplary cause of natural things (Seneca, *Ep.* 58, 19; Albinus, *Epit.* ix, 2; compare Aristotle, *Meta.* 1070a). They appealed to such Platonic proof-texts as *Tim.* 48c and 50C-d (see Chalcidius, *In Tim.* 304, 9 where *idea* = *species intelligibilis* and *eidosis* = *natura corporis*; on the general question of the immanence of the Platonic *eide*, see *genesis* 10-11), and the constant invocation of the example of the artisan, with its overtones of the Platonic *demiourgos*, seems finally to have led to the explicit description of the *ideai* as "the thoughts of God" (Philo, *De opif.* 17-20; D.L. in, 12-13; Seneca, *Ep.* 65, 7; Albinus, *Epit.* ix, 1: *noeseis theou*). This was not, of course, a completely novel concept. It does seem alien to Plato for whom the *nous-demiourgos*, for all its being a God, was markedly subordinate to the transcendent *eide* (see *nous* 6). But Aristotle speaks (*De an.* in, 429a) as if someone in the Academy were holding that the *nous* was "the place of the Forms" (*topos eidon*) and, as we have already seen, the direction of Aristotle's own theorizing would seem to suggest that the *noeta* are actually present in the *nous poetikos* and, possibly, in the cosmic *nous* as well (see *nous* 9).

3. Two points are to be noted in the subsequent history of the transcendent *noeta*, the *ideai* of Albinus, which serve as the exemplary cause of things. First, since Albinus' first principle is a *nous* and a *demiourgos* (see *nous* 15), there is nothing to militate against the *noeta* being the thoughts (*noeseis*) of God. But between Albinus and Plotinus the transcendence of the One has displaced *nous* from the first place in the hierarchy of hypostases, and the question immediately arises as to whether the *noeta* are the thoughts of the One and, indeed, whether there is any noetic activity at all in the One. Secondly, granting that the *noeta* are in the cosmic *nous*, what exactly is their ontological status?

4. The question of the noetic activity of the One was almost

*republica* ill, 33) that founds human laws. Its operation is most eminently visible in man's first "instinctive" (*physikos*) impulse toward self-preservation that gradually extends to embrace all of mankind (see *oikeiosis* ).

3. This is what may be called the immanent tradition in natural law; the transcendent tradition, based on the *nous* of a "separated God" can be seen in Plato, *Laws* 7136-7143 and Philo, *De migre. Abr.* 32,179-181; see *thesis, dike*.

nomothetes: *law-given*  
See *onoma*.

nous: *intelligence, intellect, mind*

1. A search for order or an ordering principle is implicit in both Greek mythology and philosophy from their beginnings, in the myths by the application of a genealogical arrangement back to an original source or "father" to the welter of gods drawn from a variety of sources, and among the Milesian philosophers by their search for an *arche* (q.v.). This latter quest for a "father" of things received its initial check with the discovery of a "father" who consumed all his "sons," i.e., the *on* (q.v.) of Parmenides. But regress to a source is only one type of order, and thinkers with a very different cast of mind were investigating the problem in other directions. There is, Heraclitus insists, an order hidden under the appearances of things, an order that he describes as *logos* (q.v. 1). The Pythagoreans went further still: they discovered that this order could be expressed in mathematical terms (see *harmonia*) and, made explicit, that it could be applied to the universe as a whole (see *kosmos*).

2. The kinetic conditions imposed by Parmenides had led his successors to posit some sort of external mover to explain change in the sensible world (see *kinesis* 2, *kinoun* 1). To do so Empedocles had reached into the moral sphere for hypostatizations of the human motive forces of "Love" and "Strife" (see *kinoun* 2), but for his choice of a mover Anaxagoras turned to another tradition. What Parmenides had done in ontology had already been accomplished in theology by Xenophanes. Part of Xenophanes' struggle against anthropomorphism (see *mythos* 1, *theos* 1) was his insistence that God must be completely immobile (fr. 26; the argument here is based on "what is fitting," *prepon*, a recurring aesthetic, moral, and theological motif) and one who accomplishes his ends by the power of his mind (*nous*) alone (fr. 25). These sentiments are pregnant with future developments. Apart from establishing, here at the onset of theological discourse, the intellectual nature of God, Xenophanes' view confronts the question of his activity in the world and draws the conclusion that this must take place

without any change in God himself (see Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 96-103). How this difficult feat was to be accomplished was left to others to determine (see *kinoun* 9, *pronoia* 2, *proddos* 2).

3. Anaxagoras turns to Xenophanes' notion of God as *nous* in positing a motive force that causes the original "mixture" to rotate and separate off into the various elements (see *genesis* 7). For Empedocles' moral hypostases has been substituted an intellectual principle, *nous*, that is separate from the mass upon which it works (fr. 12; but it is also curiously immanent; see *noesis* 4). Its operation is described as "ordering" (*diakosmesis*), and it knows all things, past, present, and future (fr. 12 cont.). Here, then, the Heraclitan and Pythagorean order in the universe, governed, according to Heraclitus (fr. 64), by the all-pervasive fire, is put under the tutelage of a purposeful intellectual force whose knowledge embraces not only the past and present but future events as well.

4. The *aer* of Diogenes of Apollonia, which in its warmed state is *nous* (see *noesis* 5), is more a Milesian *arche* than a post-Parmenidean *kinoun* (see *noesis* 4), but has an even more strongly developed sense of purpose (*telos*, q.v.). Both Socrates (*Phaedo* 97b) and Aristotle (*Meta.* 984b) had criticized Anaxagoras for his mechanistic use of *nous*, but Diogenes is somewhat more careful in his handling of the problem. The operation of *aer-nous* is witnessed by the fact that all things operate according to a principle of measure (*metron*) and in the best way possible (fr. 3; his own example is the regular succession of the seasons).

For the subsequent history of these teleological motifs, see *telos*.

5. In addition to the *nous* immanent in human souls (the *logistikon*; see *psyche* 15, 18) whose operation is to know the *eide* and rule the other parts of the soul (see *noesis* 8-9), there is, in Plato, a cosmic *nous*. This cosmic reason emerges in *Phil.* 2&Z-2.JC where it is called "the maker" (*demiourgoun, poioun*), the "cause of the mixture" that is the world of *genesis*. Almost the same terms are applied to the *demiourgos* (q.v.) of the *Timaeus* where the *kosmos noetos* is called the work of *nous* (47c). Now *nous* is an essential property of the gods shared by only a few men (*ibid.* 51e) and it seems more than likely that this cosmic *nous* is divine (see *Phil.* 30d, *Tim.* 30b). It rules everything (*Laws* 875c-d), has ordered the universe (*ibid.* g66e), and its revolution, reflected in the motion of the heavens, is a moral paradigm for man (*ibid.* 8g7d-8g8a; see *noesis* 10).

6. But any attempt to locate this divine *nous*, the cosmic cause of the universe, within the framework of Plato's general metaphysics is greeted with frustration, and not least by reason of the "mythical" nature of the account in the *Timaeus*. On a number of occasions we are informed that *nous* must exist in a soul (see *Soph.* 24ga, *Phil.* 30c,



*Tim.* 30b), and there are no grounds for thinking that this refers only to human intellects. If this is true it locates *nous*, cosmic or otherwise, beneath the *eide*. The intermediary status of the soul in the Platonic system is well attested (immortal and immaterial like the *eide*; plural and subject to *pathe* like the *aistheta*; see *psyche* 14 and, for the later tradition, 29), and we are told quite specifically that *nous* has a dependent relationship on the *eide* that are the cause of *nous*": being in the soul: *nous* is the ability of the soul to perceive the *eide* (*Rep.* 508e). Thus are frustrated any attempts at finding a transcendent God or gods in Plato (in the *Phaedrus* Plato says the gods owe their divinity to their nearness to the *eide*), or even to identify it or them with the Good that is "beyond being" in *Rep.* 509b. Another school of thought, however, sees the cosmic *nous* as the *nous* of the World Soul (*psyche tou pantos*), dismissing as myth the fact that in the *Timaeus* the World Soul is created by the *demiourgos* (34c).

7. In this fashion, then, Plato fulfills the desideratum of Socrates' complaint against Anaxagoras' *nous*: first, it is stated in terms already formulated by Diogenes that the *kosmos* is as it is because it is the work of an intelligent cause, framed to be "as good as possible" (*Tim.* 30a-b), and then, in a peculiarly Platonic formulation, that it is an image (*eikon*, q.v.) of the intelligible, a visible god (*ibid.* 92c; on the general theory, see *mimesis*).

8. Aristotle's transcendent principle is first and foremost a "mover," developed out of a series of arguments that derive from the nature of *kinesis* and *genesis* (see *kinoun* 7–10) and that Aristotle, like Anaxagoras, chooses to identify with an intelligent principle, *nous*. But unlike Anaxagoras, he is now confronted with a "separation" between the material and the immaterial and so must resort, even in the case of this efficient cause, to the motive force of final causality (see *kinoun* 7, *sympatheia* 7). He has, as well, a more highly developed explanation of intellection (*noesis*) based upon his theory of *energeia/dynamis* and that he must also apply to his *proton kinoun*.

9. In the *De anima* Aristotle had described knowledge, in all its manifestations, as becoming another, but only with respect to its form, not its matter (in, 425b, 431b-432a). To speak more specifically of *noesis* (q.v. 12), it is a passage from potency to act (*energeia*) in becoming the intelligible form of another, and this is effected by knowing this intelligible in its sensible image (in, 431b). Now the *proton kinoun* is described as *nous* and its *energeia* as *noesis* (*Meta.* 1072b), but it is clear that this must somehow differ from the operations described in the *De anima*. In the first instance, cosmic *nous* is not activated by something else since this would be to say that it is in potency to something else and thus not an unmoved mover. The cosmic *nous*, then, does not *become* its object; it *is* its object, and this eternally

since its object is always present (*loc. cit.*). God thinks himself; he is thought about thought (*noesis noeseos*; *ibid.* 1074b), *pr* perhaps thought about himself thinking. This activity is explicitly contrasted to all other forms of thought, *episteme*, *aisthesis*, *doxa*, *dianoia*, the first object of whose operation is "another" (*allon*) and then themselves thinking, but this latter only incidentally (*parergon*; *loc. cit.*; for the corollary of this, developed by Proclus, that God knows himself directly and the plural *noeta* only incidentally, see *noeton* 4).

10. In a number of places Aristotle compares human and divine *noesis*. Since man is a composite (*syntheton*) comprising body and a noetic soul, his *noesis* is intermittent and wearisome because it involves a passage from potency to act (*Meta.* 1050b, 1072b; *Eth. Nich.* x, 1175a). But *noesis*, for all the wearisome nature of its operation in us, is, nevertheless, the proper function (*ergon*, q.v.) of both God and man. And when we practice contemplation (*theoria*) we most approach the life of God and most contribute to our own happiness (*Eth. Nich.* x, 1177b–1178a, 1178b). But human *noesis* differs from its divine counterpart by more than its intermittency. The former is not only mediate (i.e., it knows the *noeta* in visible images), it is also discursive; it judges by combining and separating concepts (see *noesis* 12). Aristotle does have an intuitive form of human knowledge, which he calls *nous*, but it seems to be posited on epistemological grounds and never appears in a "mystical" context (see *epagoge* 3, *gnorimon* 2).

11. The functioning of the Aristotelian faculty of *nous* is clear in its general outlines, but the strict application of the principles of act and potency lead to a number of obscurities. There seems to be a distinction of faculty within the soul. The intellect must be potentially anything that it will know actually. But any passage from potency to act demands a principle already in act (the same argument that leads to the First Mover) and so Aristotle posits another intellect that "makes all things." These are distinctions (*diaphorai*) that occur in the soul and the two intellects stand to each other as matter to form (*De an.* **HI**, 430a). One, the passive intellect (*pathetikos nous*), later called "hylic" (*hylikos*), is perishable. The other, described as "a kind of state [*hexis*] like the sun," is separable (*choristos*), unaffected (*apathes*), unmixed (*amiges*), and essentially an *energeia*. When it is separated (*choristheis*), it alone is immortal and everlasting (*aidion*).

12. All of this occurs in one brief passage in the *De anima* (in, 5), and it, together with a parallel passage in the *De gen. anim.* 11, 736b that states that the *nous*, which alone is divine and has no commerce with any physical *energeia*, comes "from outside" (*thyrathen*), has provoked more comment than any other text in Aristotle. It appears clearly enough that we know because the *nous pathetikos* is energized, i.e., it becomes the intelligible form of the object known by reason of

the operation of another "part" of *nous* that is already in act (see *Meta.* 1049b). But the origin and precise nature of the operation of this latter *nous poietikos* or agent intellect, as it came to be known, was fiercely debated.

13. Most of the later complexities stem from a series of essays on the subject by the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias who distinguished another phase between the *nous pathetikos* and *poietikos*. This is the intellect *in habitu* that results from the purely passive intellect (also later identified with the imagination) becoming potentially intelligible by being illuminated by the *nous poietikos* and thus acquiring a "state" (*hexis, habitus*) of intelligibility (*De intellectu*, p. 107). He further measures the *nous poietikos* as it is described in the *De anima* against that of the First Mover in the *Metaphysics* and concludes that the agent intellect is, indeed, the first cause (*proton aition; De anima*, p. 89), an identification that was later to be accommodated to the Neoplatonic belief in a series of intermediary intelligences, where the last emanation, Aristotle's *nous poietikos*, becomes the bestower of forms, i.e., the intelligible forms are not extracted from the material *phantasiai*, as in Aristotle, but are given to the human intellect by a higher intelligence (see 20 *infra* and *noeton* 6).

14. The Epicureans recognized *nous* (Lucretius: *animus*) as a cognitive faculty distinct from *aisthesis* (see *noesis* 14), but in a materialist system devoid of providence (*pronoia*) it is given no important cosmic role. In Stoicism, however, the human *nous* or *hegemonikon* (see *noesis* 15) is a manifestation of the cosmic *nous* or *logos* that pervades, directs, and governs all (D.L. vñ, 135, 138). To call the *logos* both *nous* (in its providential aspect) and *physis* (in its creative aspect) is to blur the distinction that Aristotle had drawn between the two, but the more Aristotelian (and Platonic) view once more begins to prevail in the tradition from the time of Poseidonius when *nous* reappears as a characteristic of men alone, immortal, a product of the superlunary world (see *noesis* 17, *sympatheia* 5). The Platonists of the period, on the other hand, could assert the transcendence of *nous* without the immanentist restrictions imposed by the Stoic tradition.

15. Since the revival of the *eidos-theory* with Antiochus of Ascalon (see Cicero, *Acad. post.* 1, 30–33 where Varro gives the philosophical point of view of Antiochus) there was a new interest in the problems of causality in the *kosmos noetos*. To resolve some of the problems Platonic scholars of the period did not hesitate to have recourse to Aristotle. Thus the purely Platonic elements grow out of a synthesis of the Good beyond being of the *Republic*, the One of the *Parmenides*, the *nous* of the *Philebus*, and the *demiourgos* of the *Timaeus*: the first cause is *nous*, the source of all good in the universe, beyond qualification and description (Albinus, *Epit.* x, 1-4; on the "unspeakable"

cause, see *agnostos*). This *protos nous* of the *Philebus* is also the *demiourgos* of the *Timaeus* who looks to the *eide* in his creation of the *kosmos*, save that the *eide* are now located in the mind of the *demiourgos* (*ibid.*, xii, 1 and *noeton* 2).

16. But there is an Aristotelian side to this as well. The first *nous* thinks himself, and, though he is himself unmoved (*akinetos*), he moves others as an object of desire (*orekton; loc. cit.*). Aristotle had further designated the *proton kinoun* as God and his later commentators identified both with the *nous poietikos* of the *De anima*. Albinus, while he describes the *protos nous* as thinking himself in the prescribed Aristotelian fashion (*Epit.* x, 3), has a further subordinate principle, a second transcendent *nous* that is always energized and that is "the *nous* of the whole heaven," a description that at least suggests the *proton kinoun* of the *Metaphysics*. What seems likely is that Albinus has distinguished the final and efficient causality that Aristotle had united, and assigned the first to the *protos nous* that moves "as an object of desire" (x, 2) and the second to the subordinate *nous*. There is, finally, a third transcendent *nous*, a faculty of the World Soul (x, 3). Visible here are all the motifs of Neoplatonism: three transcendent hypostatized principles that may be denominated, in terms of their emphases, the Good, *nous, psyche*, all the causality proceeding from the first, even here described as "like the sun" or "Father."

17. Present too is another trait that is characteristic not only of later Platonism but of the entire philosophical tradition after Aristotle. Plato had considered the stars as intelligent living beings (see *ouranioi* 6) and Aristotle had given to each an intelligent mover (see *kinoun* 11-12; *ouranioi* 3). Middle Platonists incorporated this too into their systems. The planets are intellectual living beings dwelling in the *aither* (Albinus, *Epit.* xiv, 7) and beneath them are the *daimones* of the *aer*, also gods, children of the "Father," more perfect than men and responsible for omens and prodigies (*ibid.*, xv, 2; Maximus of Tyre xi, 12; Apuleius, *De deo Socr.* 6; see *daimon* 3–4, *psyche* 35).

18. As has already been indicated (see 6 *supra*), the *nous-demiourgos* in Plato seems to be subordinated to the *eide*, and thus to the Good of the *Republic* as well. Albinus' first *nous* embraces all of these entities, but thereafter new emphases are to be seen. The *protos nous* begins to yield to the *hen-agathon* of the *Parmenides* and *Republic*, and the *nous-demiourgos* function to center on the second hypostasis. These are the views of Numenius (see Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* xi, 356d~358b), as they will be of Plotinus, stolen, as some said, from Numenius (see Porphyry, *Vita Plot.* xvñ, 1). But there are differences as well. The second hypostasis of Numenius is twofold; its primary function, which is *noesis*, degenerating into discursive *dianoia* by reason of its involvement with matter (Eusebius, *op. cit.* xi, 537;

Proclus, *In Tim.* III, 103). In Plotinus, who also avails himself of the concept of "attention" (*phrontis*; see *noesis* 21), the polarity is transferred to the third hypostasis; it is the cosmic soul that has an "upper" and "lower" side (see *psyche ton pantos, physis*).

19. Plotinus follows the general Platonic tradition in making *nous* the second of the three *hypostases* (q.v.). It is the *demiourgos* in that it supplies the *psyche* with the *logoi* that are the forms of sensible things (*Enn.* v, 9, 3), but in general the creative function belongs more properly to *physis*, the lower part of the *psyche*, whose contemplation lapses into activity (*praxis*; III, 8, 4). Proclus puts more stress on *nous* as the *arche* of this sensible world, but he agrees with Plotinus that creation (see also *proddos*) is a consequence of *theoria* or *noesis* (*Elem. theol.*, prop. 174).

20. The first principle, the One, is perfectly self-sufficient and needs nothing; the cosmic *nous*, on the other hand, has a need of itself, a need of thinking itself, and so its operation of *noesis* is, in a sense, a return to itself (*Enn.* v, 3, 13). *Nous* is the *energeia* and *logos* of the One (v, 1, 6; compare Philo's view under *logos* 5) and a type of pluralistic externalization of the absolute unity of the One, just as our discursive reasoning is an *eikon* of the relatively unified operation of the cosmic *nous* (see *noesis* 18). The proper activity of *nous* is a direct intuitive grasp of the *noeta* as a unity, not in the sense that the *nous* "thinks" the *noeta*, but rather it *is* the *noeta* (see *noeton* 5).

21. The cosmic *nous*, a Platonic heritage, is linked with the reasoning power immanent in man by a species of Aristotelian bridge. The Aristotelian distinction of dissolution of *nous* into an active *energeia* and a passive *dynamis* is taken up and modified by Plotinus. In *Enn.* v, 9, 3 Plotinus asks himself, in his usual aporetic fashion, if there is a *nous choristos*, and then proceeds to answer by distinguishing between a *nous* that is in the soul as an *eidos* in matter and a *nous* that "gives the form to the soul as the maker [*poiotes*] gives form to the statue." Thus the Aristotelian *nous poietikos* is transformed into the *dator formarum*. The same passage goes on to draw a distinction between the *eide* themselves. The *eide* that the *nous* gives to the soul are "close to reality," those received by matter are "images and imitations" (*eidola, mimemata*; see *noeton* 6).

22. There are, then, three degrees of reality among the Plotinian *eide*. The lowest, the *eide aistheta* in material things, are *eikones* of the true Forms. They serve both a cognitive and paradigmatic end. As existing in others they form the basis of sensation on the Aristotelian model (see *aisthesis* 26); as existing in oneself they are the causal paradigms of the production of other beings (see *logoi spermatikoi, physis*). There are, too, the *eide noeta* or, as they are called from Middle Platonism on, the *ideai*, which exist primarily in the cosmic

*nous* where they constitute the *kosmos noetos* (q.v.) or, after bestowal, in the immanent human *nous* where, as "traces of *nous*," they provide the grounds for certain of our judgments (see *noesis* 19 and, for a more comprehensive treatment of the *ideai, noeton*).

## O

ochema: vehicle, chariot, *astral body*

1. As appears from the history of the *psyche* (q.v.), a number of apparently irreconcilable strains were present in its development almost from the beginning: the materialist view that sees the *psyche* as a refined form of one or other of the elements, and eventually, as the *pneuma*, a kind of fifth element akin to *aither* (q.v.); the spiritualist view flowing from the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul as a divine substance different in kind from the body; and, finally, the Aristotelian *entelecheia* (q.v.) theory that attempts to explain the *psyche* in terms of the function (see *ergon, energeia*) of some body.

2. Later Platonism was, in effect, forced to come to terms with the *entelecheia* view by reason of Plato's interest in function in the *Timaeus*. This they attempted to do by means of a theory that, in its most general terms, states that the soul has another quasi-physical body or *ochema*, usually acquired during the prenatal "descent" through the heavens (*kathodos*, q.v.; see Plotinus, *Enn.* iv, 3, 15; Macrobius, *In Somn. Scip.* 1, 12). This becomes progressively heavier and more visible as it descends through the moist *aer* (Porphyry, *De antro nymph.* 11). With their usual textual piety the Neoplatonists professed to discover the origin of this doctrine in Plato, and particularly in *Tim.* 41d-e where the *demiourgos* sows each soul in a star, "as in a chariot" (*ochema*; compare *Phaedrus* 247b), preliminary to embodying some of them on earth and "storing" others in the planets (*ibid.* 42d). But when it comes to explaining the nature of these "vehicles," resort is made to Aristotle.

3. Aristotle had described *pneuma* (q.v.) as the seat of the nutritive (*threptike*) and sensitive (*aisthetike*) soul and analogous in composition to *aither* that is the material element of the stars (*De gen. anim.* 736b-737a). Thus the "vehicle" of the soul is described by the Neoplatonists as an aetherial (*aitherodes*) and light-like (*augoeides*)