

# PLATO

## THE REPUBLIC

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IN TWO VOLUMES

II

BOOKS VI—X



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- 509 λείπω. Μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοίνυν, ἔφη, παραλίπης. Οἶμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολὺ ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατόν, ἐκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω. Μὴ
- D γάρ, ἔφη. Νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύο αὐτῶ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ' αὖ ὄρατοῦ, ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἶδη, ὄρατόν, νοητόν; Ἔχω. Ὡσπερ τοίνυν γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβὼν ἄνισα<sup>1</sup> τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνε ἐκάτερον τμήμα ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τό τε τοῦ ὀρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου, καὶ σοι ἔσται σαφηνεία καὶ ἀσαφεία πρὸς ἀλληλα ἐν μὲν
- E τῷ ὀρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμήμα εἰκόνας. λέγω
- 510 δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ ξυνέστηκε, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς. Ἄλλα κατανοῶ. Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον τίθει ὧ τοῦτο ἔοικε, τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῶα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος. Τίθημι, ἔφη. Ἡ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διηρησθαι ἀληθεία τε καὶ μή, ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν
- B πρὸς τὸ ὧ ὁμοιώθη; Ἐγὼ γ', ἔφη, καὶ μάλα. Σκόπει δὴ αὖ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ἢ τμητέον.

<sup>1</sup> ἄνισα ADM Proclus, ἄν, ἴσα F, ἀν' ἴσα Stallbaum.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. the similar etymological pun in *Cratyl.* 396 B-C. Here, as often, the translator must choose between over-translating for some tastes, or not translating at all.

<sup>b</sup> The meaning is given in the text. Too many commentators lose the meaning in their study of the imagery. Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See *Introd.* p. xxxi for my interpretation of the passage.

<sup>c</sup> Some modern and ancient critics prefer ἀν' ἴσα. It is a

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don't omit the least bit," he said. "I fancy," I said, "that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out." "Do not," he said. "Conceive then," said I, "as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the sky-ball,<sup>a</sup> but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible." "I do." "Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided<sup>b</sup> into two unequal<sup>c</sup> sections and cut each section again in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order), and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections of the visible world, images. By images<sup>d</sup> I mean, first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend." "I do." "As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man." "I so assume it," he said. "Would you be willing to say," said I, "that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion:<sup>e</sup> as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that of which it is a likeness?" "I certainly would." "Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section." "In what way?"

little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But again there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more honourable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf. *Plat. Quest.* 3.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 402 B, *Soph.* 266 B-C.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *supra* on 508 c, p. 103. note b.

Πῆ; ἥτις τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσιν<sup>1</sup> ὡς εἰκόσι χρωμένη ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτήν, τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον ἐπ'<sup>2</sup> ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἄνευ ὧν περ ἐκείνο εἰκόνων αὐτοῖς εἶδεσι δι' αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη. Ταῦτ', ἔφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἰκανῶς ἔμαθον. Ἄλλ' αὖθις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ῥᾶον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων μαθήσει. οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναί, ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἶδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ' ἐκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιούσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δ' ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο, οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὀρμήσωσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα. Οὐκ-

<sup>1</sup> τμηθεῖσιν DM, μιμηθεῖσιν A Proclus, τιμηθεῖσιν F.

<sup>2</sup> [τὸ] ἐπ' Ast.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, pp. 230-234, for the ἀνυπόθετον. Ultimately, the ἀνυπόθετον is the Idea of Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a transcendental ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense already explained. The ideal dialectician is the man who can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition back, not to some assumed *axioma medium*, but to its relation to ultimate Good. To call the ἀνυπόθετον the Unconditioned or the Absolute introduces metaphysical associations foreign to the passage. Cf. also *Intro.* pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.

<sup>b</sup> The practical meaning of this is independent of the disputed metaphysics. Cf. *Intro.* pp. xvi-xviii.

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“By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption,<sup>a</sup> and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas<sup>b</sup> only and progressing systematically through ideas.” “I don’t fully understand<sup>c</sup> what you mean by this,” he said. “Well, I will try again,” said I, “for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of them<sup>d</sup> to themselves or others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out.” “Certainly,” he said, “I know that.”

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 79, note *c* on 347 A and p. 47, note *f* on 338 D; *What Plato Said*, p. 503 on *Gorg.* 463 D.

<sup>d</sup> Aristot. *Top.* 100 b 2-3 οὐ δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, exactly expresses Plato’s thought and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly for the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles of logic. Cf. the mediaeval “contra principium negantem non est disputandum.” A teacher of geometry will refuse to discuss the psychology of the idea of space, a teacher of chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is “real.”

οὖν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὀρωμένοις εἶδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων πέρι, οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης ἦν  
 Ε γράφουσι, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα, ἃ πλάττουσί τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασι εἰκόνες εἰσὶ, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὐχρῶμενοι, ζητοῦντές δὲ αὐτὰ ἐκείνα ἰδεῖν, ἃ οὐκ  
 511 ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

XXI. - Τοῦτο τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσει δ' ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἰούσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένη τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν, εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκείνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις. Μανθάνω,  
 Β ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίαις τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις. Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον μάνθανε τμημῶν οὐ νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο, οὐ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἄπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 527 A-B. This explanation of mathematical reasoning does not differ at all from that of Aristotle and Berkeley and the moderns who praise Aristotle, except that the metaphysical doctrine of ideas is in the background to be asserted if challenged.

<sup>b</sup> i.e. a bronze sphere would be the original of its imitative reflection in water, but it is in turn only the imperfect imitation of the mathematical idea of a sphere.

<sup>c</sup> Stenzel, *Handbuch*, 118 "das er nur mit dem Verstande (διανοίᾳ) sieht" is mistaken. *διανοίᾳ* is used not in its special sense ("understanding." See p. 116, note c), but generally for the mind as opposed to the senses. Cf. 511 c.

<sup>d</sup> For the concessive *μὲν* cf. 546 E, 529 D, *Soph.* 225 c.

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“And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw <sup>a</sup>? And so in all cases. The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn <sup>b</sup> as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only by the mind.<sup>c</sup>” “True,” he said.

XXI. “This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true,<sup>d</sup> but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter <sup>e</sup> are esteemed as clear and held in honour.<sup>f</sup>” “I understand,” said he, “that you are speaking <sup>g</sup> of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts.” “Understand then,” said I, “that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason <sup>g</sup> itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics,<sup>h</sup> treating its

<sup>a</sup> The loosely appended dative *ἐκείνοις* is virtually a dative absolute. Cf. *Phaedo* 105 A. Wilamowitz' emendation (*Platon*, ii. p. 384) to *πρὸς ἐκείνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις* rests on a misunderstanding of the passage.

<sup>f</sup> The translation of this sentence is correct. But cf. Adam *ad loc.*

<sup>g</sup> *λόγος* here suggests both the objective personified argument and the subjective faculty.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. 533 A. *Phileb.* 57 E.



τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὀρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰῶν, ἴ ἀψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίῃ,

C αἰσθητῶ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρῶμενος, ἀλλ' εἶδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἶδη. Μανθάνω, ἔφη, ἱκανῶς μὲν οὐ—δοκεῖς γάρ μοι συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν—ὅτι μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοία μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ

D αἰσθήσεσιν αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι,

<sup>a</sup> τῷ ὄντι emphasizes the etymological meaning of the word. Similarly ὡς ἀληθῶς in 551 E, *Phaedo* 80 D, *Phileb.* 64 E. For hypotheses cf. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, p. 229, Thompson on *Meno* 86 E. But the thing to note is that the word according to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—ἀρχή—of the inquiry.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 211 C ὡσπερ ἐπαναβάσμοις, "like steps of a stair."

<sup>c</sup> παντὸς ἀρχὴν taken literally lends support to the view that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes the παντὸς ἀρχή may be the virtual equivalent of the ἱκανόν of the *Phaedo*. It is the ἀρχή on which all in the particular case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 B, p. 110, note a.

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assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses,<sup>a</sup> underpinnings, footings,<sup>b</sup> and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all,<sup>c</sup> and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense<sup>d</sup> but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.<sup>e</sup>”

“I understand,” he said; “not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding<sup>f</sup> and not their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true

<sup>a</sup> This is one of the passages that are misused to attribute to Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the senses. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c. The dialectician is able to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring to images. Plato is not here considering how much or little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience.

<sup>e</sup> The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first principle. I have never denied that. The point of my interpretation is that it also describes the method which distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science, and that this distinction is for practical and educational purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually says in the next few lines. Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 233-234.

<sup>f</sup> *διανοία* here as in 511 A is general and not technical.

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καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς. διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἕξιν ἄλλ' οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὔσαν. Ἰκανώτατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησι μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ, E διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας μετέχειν, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν. Μανθάνω, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ὡς λέγεις.

<sup>a</sup> νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. Colloquially the phrase means "have no sense." For its higher meaning cf. *Meno* 99 c, *Laws* 962 a.

<sup>b</sup> Unnecessary difficulties have been raised about καίτοι and μετὰ here. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 345 mistakenly resorts to emendation. The meaning is plain. Mathematical ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathematician does not deal with them quite as the dialectician deals with ideas and therefore does not possess νοῦς or reason in the highest sense.

<sup>c</sup> Here the word διάνοια is given a technical meaning as a

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intelligence<sup>a</sup> about them although<sup>b</sup> the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding<sup>c</sup> and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason." "Your interpretation is quite sufficient," I said; "and now, answering to<sup>d</sup> these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the second; assign belief<sup>e</sup> to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture,<sup>f</sup> and arrange them in a proportion,<sup>g</sup> considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality." "I understand," he said; "I concur and arrange them as you bid."

faculty inferior to *νοῦς*, but, as Plato says, the terminology does not matter. The question has been much and often idly discussed.

<sup>a</sup> For *ἐπι* cf. *Polit.* 280 A, *Gorg.* 463 B.

<sup>c</sup> *πίστις* is, of course not "faith" in Plato, but Neoplatonists, Christians, and commentators have confused the two ideas hopelessly.

<sup>f</sup> *εἰκασία* undoubtedly had this connotation for Plato.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. on 508 c, p. 103, note b.

533 πέρι, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, ἄλλη τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος  
ὁδῶ περι παντὸς λαμβάνειν. ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι  
 πᾶσαι τέχναι ἢ πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπι-  
 θυμίας εἰσὶν ἢ πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις ἢ  
 πρὸς θεραπείαν τῶν φυομένων τε καὶ συντιθεμένων  
 ἅπασαι τετράφαται· αἱ δὲ λοιπαί, ἃς τοῦ ὄντος τι  
 ἔφαμεν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς  
 C ταύτη ἐπομένας, ὁρῶμεν ὡς ὀνειρώττουσι μὲν  
 περι τὸ ὄν, ὕπαρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἰδεῖν, ἕως ἂν  
 ὑποθέσει χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἕωσι, μὴ  
 δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν. ὧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν  
 ὃ μὴ οἶδε, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξύ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδε  
 συμπλέκται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν  
 ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι; Οὐδεμία, ἢ δ' ὅς.

XIV. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος  
 μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα,  
 ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα βεβαιώσῃται, καὶ τῷ  
 D ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῶ τινὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 525 c, 527 b.

<sup>b</sup> The interpreters of Plato must allow for his Emersonian habit of hitting each nail in turn as hard as he can. There is no real contradiction between praising mathematics in comparison with mere loose popular thinking, and disparaging it in comparison with dialectics. There is no evidence and no probability that Plato is here proposing a reform of mathematics in the direction of modern mathematical logic, as has been suggested. Cf. on 527 a. It is the nature of mathematics to fall short of dialectics.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 20 b and on 520 c, p. 143, note g.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *supra* on 531 e.

<sup>e</sup> The touch of humour in the expression may be illustrated by Lucian, *Hermotimus* 74, where it is used to justify Lucian's scepticism even of mathematics, and by Hazlitt's remark on Coleridge, "Excellent talker if you allow him to start from no premises and come to no conclusion."

<sup>f</sup> Or "admission." Plato thinks of even geometrical

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systematically and in all cases to determine what each thing really is. But all the other arts have for their object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly concerned with generation and composition or with the service and tendance of the things that grow and are put together, while the remnant which we said <sup>a</sup> did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry and the studies that accompany it—are, as we see, dreaming <sup>b</sup> about being, but the clear waking vision <sup>c</sup> of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the assumptions which they employ undisturbed and cannot give any account <sup>d</sup> of them. For where the starting-point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known,<sup>e</sup> what possibility is there that assent <sup>f</sup> in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge or science? ” “None,” said he.

XIV. “Then,” said I, “is not dialectics the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is literally true that when the eye of the soul<sup>g</sup> is sunk in reasoning as a Socratic dialogue. Cf. the exaggeration of this idea by the Epicureans in Cic. *De fin.* i. 21 “*quae et a falsis initiis profecta, vera esse non possunt: et si essent vera nihil afferunt quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus.*”

Dialectic proceeds *διὰ συγχωρήσεων*, the admission of the interlocutor. Cf. *Laws* 957 D, *Phaedr.* 237 C-D, *Gorg.* 487 E, *Lysis* 219 C, *Prot.* 350 E, *Phileb.* 12 A, *Theaet.* 162 A, 169 D-E, 164 C, *Rep.* 340 B. But such admissions are not valid unless when challenged they are carried back to something satisfactory—*ικανόν*—(not necessarily in any given case to the idea of good). But the mathematician as such peremptorily demands the admission of his postulates and definitions. Cf. 510 B-D, 511 B.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *supra* on 519 B, p. 138, note a.

κατωρυγμένον ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω, συνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγοῖς χρωμένη αἴς διήλθομεν τέχναις· ἄς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης. διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν που ὠρισάμεθα· ἔστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ

Ε ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσοῦτων πέρι σκέψις ὄσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη· [ἀλλ' ὁ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω σαφήνεια, ἃ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ, ἀρκέσει.]<sup>1</sup> Ἄρέσκει γοῦν,<sup>2</sup> ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ τὸ πρότερον, τὴν μὲν πρώτην μοῖραν 534 ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν, δευτέραν δὲ διάνοιαν, τρίτην δὲ πίστιν καὶ εἰκασίαν τετάρτην· καὶ ξυναμφότερα μὲν ταῦτα δόξαν, ξυναμφότερα δ' ἐκεῖνα νόησιν· καὶ δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν· καὶ ὅ τι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν, καὶ ὅ τι νόησις πρὸς δόξαν, ἐπιστήμην πρὸς πίστιν καὶ διάνοιαν πρὸς εἰκασίαν· τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα

<sup>1</sup> The text as printed is that of Hermann, brackets by Adam. ἀλλ' ὁ AM, ἄλλο FD: ἔξιν σαφηνεία AFDM, ἔξω σαφηνείαν Herm., πως τὴν ἔξιν, σαφηνεία Burnet, τὴν ἔξιν πῶς ἔχει σαφηνείας Bywater: ἃ addidit et σαφηνείαν emendavit Herm.; λέγει AD, λέγειν FM, λέγεις A<sup>2</sup>: ἀρκέσει mss. See also Adam, Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> ἀρέσκει mss., καὶ ἀρκέσει Burnet; γοῦν AM, οὖν FD, Burnet.

<sup>a</sup> Orphism pictured the impious souls as buried in mud in the world below; cf. 363 D. Again we should not press Plato's rhetoric and imagery either as sentimental Platonists or hostile critics. See Newman, *Introd. Aristot. Pol.* p. 463, n. 3.

<sup>b</sup> All writers and philosophers are compelled to "speak with the vulgar." Cf. e.g. Meyerson, *De l'explication dans les sciences*, i. p. 329: "Tout en sachant que la couleur n'est pas réellement une qualité de l'objet, à se servir cependant, dans la vie de tous les jours, d'une locution qui l'affirme."

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the barbaric slough<sup>a</sup> of the Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as helpers and co-operators in this conversion the studies and sciences which we enumerated, which we called sciences often from habit,<sup>b</sup> though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness than opinion and more obscurity than science. 'Understanding,'<sup>c</sup> I believe, was the term we employed. But I presume we shall not dispute about the name<sup>d</sup> when things of such moment lie before us for consideration." "No, indeed," he said.<sup>e</sup> \* \* \* "Are you satisfied, then," said I, "as before,<sup>f</sup> to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief,<sup>g</sup> and the fourth conjecture or picture-thought—and the last two collectively opinion, and the first two intellection, opinion dealing with generation, and intellection with essence, and this relation being expressed in the proportion<sup>h</sup>: as essence is to generation, so is intellection to opinion; and as intellection is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to image-thinking or surmise? But the relation between their objective correlates<sup>i</sup> and the division into two

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 511 D, pp. 116-117, note c.

<sup>d</sup> This unwillingness to dispute about names when they do not concern the argument is characteristic of Plato. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 516 on *Meno* 78 B-C for numerous instances. Stallbaum refers to Max. Tyr. *Diss.* xxvii. p. 40 ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῖς τὰ τε ἄλλα, καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐλευθερίᾳ πείθουμαι Πλάτωνι.

<sup>e</sup> The next sentence is hopelessly corrupt and is often considered an interpolation. The translation omits it. See Adam, Appendix XVI. to Bk. VII., Bywater, *Journal of Phil.* (Eng.) v. pp. 122-124. <sup>f</sup> *Supra* 511 D-E.

<sup>g</sup> Always avoid "faith" in translating Plato.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. on 508 c, p. 103, note b.

<sup>i</sup> That is the meaning, though some critics will object to the phrase. Lit. "the things over which these (mental states) are set, or to which they apply."



ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν διχῆ ἑκατέρου, δοξαστοῦ τε καὶ νοητοῦ, ἐώμεν, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήση ἢ ὅσων οἱ παρ-  
 Β εληλυθότες. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγ', ἔφη, τά γε ἄλλα, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι ἔπεσθαι, ξυνδοκεῖ. Ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχη λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν; Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἢ δ' ὅς, φαίην; Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως· ὅς ἂν μὴ ἔχη διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελῶν τὴν τοῦ  
 C ἀγαθοῦ ιδέαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιῶν, μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φήσεις εἰδέναι τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' εἴ πη εἰδώλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξῃ,

<sup>a</sup> There are two probable reasons for this: (1) The objective classification is nothing to Plato's present purpose; (2) The second member of the proportion is lacking in the objective correlates. Numbers are distinguished from ideas not in themselves but only by the difference of method in dialectics and in mathematics. Cf. *supra* on 525 D, 526 A, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 83-84, and *Class. Phil.* xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218. The explicit qualifications of my arguments there have been neglected and the arguments misquoted but not answered. They can be answered only by assuming the point at issue and affirming that Plato did assign an intermediate place to mathematical conceptions, for which there is no evidence in Plato's own writings.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* on 531 E, p. 195, note f.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 511 D, p. 116, note a.

<sup>d</sup> This would be superfluous on the interpretation that the *ικανόν* must always be the idea of good. What follows distinguishes the dialectician from the eristic sophist. For the

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parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the intelligible, let us dismiss,<sup>a</sup> Glaucon, lest it involve us in discussion many times as long as the preceding.” “Well,” he said, “I agree with you about the rest of it, so far as I am able to follow.” “And do you not also give the name dialectician to the man who is able to exact an account<sup>b</sup> of the essence of each thing? And will you not say that the one who is unable to do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an account to himself and others, does not possess full reason and intelligence<sup>c</sup> about the matter?” “How could I say that he does?” he replied. “And is not this true of the good likewise<sup>d</sup>—that the man who is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea of the good, and who cannot, as it were in battle, running the gauntlet<sup>e</sup> of all tests, and striving to examine everything by essential reality and not by opinion, hold on his way through all this without tripping<sup>f</sup> in his reasoning—the man who lacks this power, you will say, does not really know the good itself or any particular good; but if he apprehends short cut, *kai . . . ὡσαύτως*, cf. 523 E, 580 D, 585 D, 346 A, etc.

<sup>a</sup> It imports little whether the objections are in his own mind or made by others. Thought is a discussion of the soul with itself (cf. *Theaet.* 189 E, *Phileb.* 38 E, *Soph.* 263 E), and when the interlocutor refuses to proceed Socrates sometimes continues the argument himself by supplying both question and answer, e.g. *Gorg.* 506 c ff. Cf. further *Phaedrus* 278 c, *Parmen.* 136 D-E, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 17.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 160 D, *Phileb.* 45 A. The practical outcome = *Laws* 966 A-B, *Phaedr.* 278 c, *Soph.* 259 B-C. Cf. Mill, *Diss. and Disc.* iv. p. 283: “There is no knowledge and no assurance of right belief but with him who can both confute the opposite opinion and successfully defend his own against confutation.”