Cicero - Tusculan Disputations

Book 4 - On the Passions


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Source: Latin Library

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I. [1] Cum multis locis nostrorum hominum ingenia virtutesque, Brute, soleo mirari, tum maxime in is studiis, quae sero admodum expetita in hanc civitatem e Graecia transtulerunt. Nam cum a primo urbis ortu regiis institutis, partim etiam legibus auspicia, caerimoniae, comitia, provocationes, patrum consilium equitum peditumque discriptio, tota res militaris divinitus esset constituta, tum progressio admirabilis incredibilisque cursus ad omnem excellentiam factus est dominatu regio re p. liberata. Nec vero hic locus est, ut de moribus institutisque maiorum et disciplina ac temperatione civitatis loquamur; aliis haec locis satis accurate a nobis dicta sunt maximeque in is sex libris, quos de re publica scripsimus.

[2] Hoc autem loco consideranti mihi studia doctrinae multa sane occurrunt, cur ea quoque arcessita aliunde neque solum expetita, sed etiam conservata et culta videantur. Erat enim illis paene in conspectu praestanti sapientia et nobilitate Pythagoras, qui fuit in Italia temporibus isdem quibus L. Brutus patriam liberavit, praeclarus auctor nobilitatis tuae. Pythagorae autem doctrina cum longe lateque flueret, permanavisse mihi videtur in hanc civitatem, idque cum coniectura probabile est, tum quibusdam etiam vestigiis indicatur. Quis enim est qui putet, cum floreret in Italia Graecia potentissumis et maximis urbibus, ea quae magna dicta est, in isque primum ipsius Pythagorae, deinde postea Pythagoreorum tantum nomen esset, nostrorum hominum ad eorum doctissimas voces aures clausas fuisse?

[3] Quin etiam arbitror propter Pythagoreorum admirationem Numam quoque regem Pythagoreum a posterioribus existimatum. Nam cum Pythagorae disciplinam et instituta cognoscerent regisque eius aequitatem et sapientiam a maioribus suis accepissent, aetates autem et tempora ignorarent propter vetustatem, eum, qui sapientia excelleret, Pythagorae auditorem crediderunt fuisse.

Source: Andrew P. Peabody, Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, Boston: Little & Brown, 1886 (pp. 195–250).

1. The Pythagorean philosophy in Magna Graecia.

1. SINCE, Brutus it is my frequent habit in my writings to express my admiration of the genius and the virtues of our fellow-countrymen, I feel that sentiment especially with regard to the studies which at a comparatively recent period they have imported from Greece into Rome. While from the origin of the city, — by royal ordinances, and in part, also, by laws, — auspices, ceremonies, popular assemblies, appeals to the people, the senate, the enrolment of cavalry and foot-soldiers, the entire military system, were established with divine aid, an admirable progress, an incredibly rapid advance was made toward every kind of excellence as soon as the State was freed from the sway of the kings. This, however, is not their place to speak of the customs and institutions of our ancestors, or of the discipline and government of the State. Elsewhere I have treated of these things with sufficient detail,' especially in the six books that I have written' on the Republic. But here, in thinking of the several departments of liberal culture, many reasons occur to me for-believing that, though in part brought from abroad, they were not wholly thus derived, but were in part preserved and cherished on our own soil; for our ancestors had almost under their eyes Pythagoras, a man of pre-eminent wisdom and nobleness of character, who was in Italy at the time when Lucius Brutus, the renowned founder of your distinguished family, gave freedom to his country. Now as the philosophy of Pythagoras flowed far and wide, I cannot doubt that its current reached our city ; and while this is probable as a conjecture, it is also indicated by certain vestiges. For who can think that when that part of Italy called Magna Graecia flourished with strong and great cities, and in these the name, first of Pythagoras, afterward of the Pythagoreans, was so highly honored, the ears of our people were closed to their surpassingly learned instruction? Indeed, I think that it was on account of admiration for the Pythagoreans that King Numa was regarded by posterity as a Pythagorean ; for while they knew the system and principles of Pythagoras, and had heard from their ancestors of the equity and wisdom of that king, in their ignorance of ages and dates belonging to so early a time, they took it for granted that a man of such transcendent wisdom was a disciple of Pythagoras.

 

II. Et de coniectura quidem hactenus. Vestigia autem Pythagoreorum quamquam multa colligi possunt, paucis tamen utemur, quoniam non id agitur hoc tempore. Nam cum carminibus soliti illi esse dicantur et praecepta quaedam occultius tradere et mentes suas a cogitationum intentione cantu fidibusque ad tranquillitatem traducere, gravissumus auctor in Originibus dixit Cato morem apud maiores hunc epularum fuisse, ut deinceps, qui accubarent, canerent ad tibiam clarorum virorum laudes atque virtutes; ex quo perspicuum est et cantus tum fuisse discriptos vocum sonis et carmina.

[4] Quamquam id quidem etiam duodecim tabulae declarant, condi iam tum solitum esse carmen; quod ne liceret fieri ad alterius iniuriam, lege sanxerunt. Nec vero illud non eruditorum temporum argumentum est, quod et deorum pulvinaribus et epulis magistratuum fides praecinunt, quod proprium eius fuit, de qua loquor, disciplinae. Mihi quidem etiam Appi Caeci carmen, quod valde Panaetius laudat epistola quadam, quae est ad Q. Tuberonem, Pythagoreum videtur. Multa etiam sunt in nostris institutis ducta ab illis; quae praetereo, ne ea, quae repperisse ipsi putamur, aliunde didicisse videamur.

[5] Sed ut ad propositum redeat oratio, quam brevi tempore quot et quanti poetae, qui autem oratores extiterunt! facile ut appareat nostros omnia consequi potuisse, simul ut velle coepissent.

2. Vestiges of it in Roman history, institutions and customs.

2. Thus far for conjecture. As for vestiges of the Pythagoreans, though many may be collected, I yet will name but few, since this is not the work that I have now in hand. While it is said that the Pythagoreans were accustomed both to deliver certain precepts somewhat obscurely in verse, and to bring their minds from intense thought to quietness by song and stringed instruments, Cato, the highest of all authorities, in his Origines says that it was customary with our ancestors at their feasts for the guests to sing by turns, to the accompaniment of the flute, the merits and virtues of illustrious men, whence it appears that poems and songs were then written to be sung. Indeed, the Twelve Tables show that it was customary to write songs ; for it was legally forbidden to write songs to another person's injury. Moreover, it is a proof that those times were not without culture, that stringed instruments were played at the shrines of the gods and at the civic feasts, — a custom characteristic of the practice of the Pythagoreans. It seems to me, too, that the poem of Appius Coecus, which Panaetius praises highly in a letter of his to Quintus Tubero, is Pythagorean in its tone. There are many things in our customs from this same source, which I pass over, lest we may seem to have learned from abroad what we are supposed to have originated ourselves. But, to return to our purpose, in how short a time, how many and how great poets, and what eminent orators, have risen among us! so that it is perfectly evident that everything is within the reach of our people as soon as they begin to desire it.

 

III. Sed de ceteris studiis alio loco et dicemus, si usus fuerit, et saepe diximus. Sapientiae studium vetus id quidem in nostris, sed tamen ante Laeli aetatem et Scipionis non reperio quos appellare possim nominatim. Quibus adulescentibus Stoicum Diogenen et Academicum Carneadem video ad senatum ab Atheniensibus missos esse legatos, qui cum rei publicae nullam umquam partem attigissent essetque eorum alter Cyrenaeus alter Babylonius, numquam profecto scholis essent excitati neque ad illud munus electi, nisi in quibusdam principibus temporibus illis fuissent studia doctrinae. Qui cum cetera litteris mandarent, alii ius civile, alii orationes suas, alii monumenta maiorum, hanc amplissimam omnium artium, bene vivendi disciplinam, vita magis quam litteris persecuti sunt.

[6] Itaque illius verae elegantisque philosophiae, quae ducta a Socrate in Peripateticis adhuc permansit et idem alio modo dicentibus Stoicis, cum Academici eorum controversias disceptarent, nulla fere sunt: aut pauca admodum Latina monumenta sive propter magnitudinem rerum occupationemque hominum, sive etiam quod imperitis ea probari posse non arbitrabantur, cum interim illis silentibus C. Amafinius extitit dicens, cuius libris editis commota multitudo contulit se ad eam potissimum disciplinam, sive quod erat cognitu perfacilis, sive quod invitabantur inlecebris blandis voluptatis, sive etiam, quia nihil erat prolatum melius, illud quod erat tenebant.

[7] Post Amafinium autem multi eiusdem aemuli rationis multa cum scripsissent, Italiam totam occupaverunt, quodque maxumum argumentum est non dici illa subtiliter, quod et tam facile ediscantur et ab indoctis probentur, id illi firmamentum esse disciplinae putant.

3. The study of philosophy in Rome.

3. But of other pursuits I will speak elsewhere if need be, as I have often done. The study of philosophy is indeed ancient among our people; yet- before the time of Laelius and Scipio I find none of its students whom I can specially name. While they were young men, I see that Diogenes the Stoic and Carneades of the Academy were sent as ambassadors from Athens to the Roman senate. As they had not the slightest connection with public affairs at Athens, one of them being from Cyrene, the other from Babylon, they certainly would not have been called out of their schools, or chosen to this office, unless learned pursuits had at that time been in favor with certain of the principal men in Borne, who, while they wrote on other subjects — some, on civil law ; some, their own speeches; some, the memorials of earlier days — at the same time cultivated the greatest of all arts, the method of living well, in practice more than in written words. Thus of that true and beautiful philosophy, which, derived from Socrates, still re-mains with the Peripatetics, and with the Stoics too, who in their controversies with the disciples of the Academy say substantially the same things in a different way, there are hardly any, certainly very few, remains of Latin authorship, and this, either because the subjects were too large and the men too busy, or else because those who might have written thought that these things could have no interest for persons not versed in them. Meanwhile, in their silence Caius Amafinius appeared as a writer, and by his books, when published, the people at large were excited, and many attached themselves to his school, either because its doctrine was easily understood, or because it invited them by the ensnaring blandishments of pleasure, or because they laid hold of what was placed before them for the sole reason that there was nothing better. After Amafinius many zealous members of the same school, and copious writers, were spread through the whole of Italy, and the greatest proof of the lack of subtilty in their writings is that they are so easily understood and that they receive the approval of the uneducated. This they regard as constituting the strength of their school.

 

IV. Sed defendat, quod quisque sentit; sunt enim iudicia libera: nos institutum tenebimus nullisque unius disciplinae legibus adstricti, quibus in philosophia necessario pareamus, quid sit in quaque re maxime probabile, semper requiremus. Quod cum saepe alias, tum nuper in Tusculano studiose egimus. Itaque expositis tridui disputationibus quartus dies hoc libro concluditur. Ut enim in inferiorem ambulationem descendimus, quod feceramus idem superioribus diebus, acta res est sic:

[8] - Dicat, si quis volt, qua de re disputari velit.
      - Non mihi videtur omni animi perturbatione posse sapiens vacare.
      - Aegritudine quidem hesterna disputatione videbatur, nisi forte temporis causa nobis adsentiebare.
      - Minime vero; nam mihi egregie probata est oratio tua.
      - Non igitur existumas cadere in sapientem aegritudinem?
      - Prorsus non arbitror.
      - Atqui, si ista perturbare animum sapientis non potest, nulla poterit. Quid enim? metusne conturbet? At earum rerum est absentium metus, quarum praesentium est aegritudo; sublata igitur aegritudine sublatus est metus. Restant duae perturbationes, laetitia gestiens et libido; quae si non cadent in sapientem, semper mens erit tranquilla sapientis.
      - Sic prorsus intellego.

[9] - Utrum igitur mavis? statimne nos vela facere an quasi e portu egredientis paululum remigare?
      - Quidnam est istuc? non enim intellego.

4. The subject of discussion, — "Whether the wise man is liable to perturbations of mind."

4. Let every man defend his own belief; for opinions are free. I shall adhere to my usual method, and, bound by no necessity of conforming to the dogmas of any one school, I shall always inquire on every subject what is the most probable opinion. As often elsewhere, I have carefully taken this course of late in my Tusculan villa. The discussions of three days having been given you in detail, that of the fourth is contained in this book. When we had come down into the lower apartment, as we had done the preceding day, the discussion took place as follows.

M. Will some one please to name a subject for discussion ?

A. It does not seem to me that the wise man is free from every disturbance of mind.

M. It appeared from yesterday's discussion that he is free from grief, unless perchance you assented to me rather than occupy more time.

A. Not by any means ; for I most heartily approve of all that you said.

M. You do not think, then, that a wise man is liable to grief.

A. Certainly not.

M. But if grief cannot disturb a wise man's mind, no other emotion can. What? Can fear disturb him? Fear has for its objects those things not present, the presence of which occasions grief. If then grief is removed, fear also is removed. There remain two perturbations,—excessive joy and inordinate desire. If these do not affect the wise man, the wise man's mind will be always tranquil.

A. So I understand, without doubt.

M. Which will you prefer? Shall I make sail at once, or shall I row a little while, as if we were getting clear of the harbor ?

A. What do you mean ? I do not understand you.

 

V. Quia Chrysippus et Stoici cum de animi perturbationibus disputant, magnam partem in his partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt, illa eorum perexigua oratio est, qua medeantur animis nec eos turbulentos esse patiantur, Peripatetici autem ad placandos animos multa adferunt, spinas partiendi et definiendi praetermittunt. Quaerebam igitur, utrum panderem vela orationis statim an eam ante paululum dialecticorum remis propellerem.
      - Isto modo vero; erit enim hoc totum, quod quaero, ex utroque perfectius.

[10] - Est id quidem rectius; sed post requires, si quid fuerit obscurius.
      - Faciam equidem; tu, tamen, ut soles, dices ista ipsa obscura planius quam dicuntur a Graecis.
      - Enitar equidem, sed intento opus est animo, ne omnia dilabantur, si unum aliquid effugerit. Quoniam, quae Graeci pa/qh vocant, nobis perturbationes appellari magis placet quam morbos, in his explicandis veterem illam equidem Pythagorae primum, dein Platonis discriptionem sequar, qui animum in duas partes dividunt: alteram rationis participem faciunt, alteram expertem; in participe rationis ponunt tranquillitatem, id est placidam quietamque constantiam, in illa altera motus turbidos cum irae tum cupiditatis, contrarios inimicosque rationi.

[11] Sit igitur hic fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime.

5. The soul divided by the ancients into the part possessed of reason and that void of reason.

5. M. This is my meaning. Chrysippus and the Stoics, when they treat of disturbances of mind, are, in great part, occupied in dividing and defining them. They have very little to say about the means of curing minds and preventing their disturbance. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, offer much toward the appeasing of such disturbances, but omit the thorny work of division and definition. My question then was whether I should spread the sail of my discourse at once, or should give it a start with the oars of logic.

A. The latter, by all means ; for it is the whole that I want, and the discussion is the more perfect if both ways be pursued. M. This is indeed the more proper method, and you will afterward make suitable inquiries, if anything that I say shall not have been perfectly clear.

A. I will certainly do so. Yet those very matters that are obscure you will expound, as you always do, more clearly than they are stated by the Greeks.

M. I will try, at any rate. But there is need of the closest attention, lest, if one point escape you, the whole may glide away from your mind. Preferring to call what the Greeks term παθη (pathe) perturbations rather than diseases, in explaining them I shall follow the very old description of them which originated with Pythagoras and was adopted by Plato. They divide the soul into two parts, — one possessed of reason, the other destitute of it. In that possessed of reason they place tranquillity, that is, a placid and quiet firmness; in the other, the turbid movements of both anger and desire, contrary and hostile to reason. Be this then the fountain-head of our discussion. Yet in describing these perturbations let us employ the definitions and divisions of the Stoics, who seem to me in this part of the subject to show very great acuteness.

 

VI. Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio sit, quod pa/qoj ille dicit, aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. Quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. Partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonis libidinem et laetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum libido futurorum, ex malis metum et aegritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientis metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine instantia.

[12] Laetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, inlecta et inflammata rapiatur, laetitia ut adepta iam aliquid concupitum ecferatur et gestiat. Natura enim omnes ea, quae bona videntur, secuntur fugiuntque contraria; quam ob rem simul obiecta species est cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. Id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici bou/lhsin appellant, nos appellemus voluntatem. Eam illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. Quae autem ratione adversante incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur.

[13] Itemque cum ita movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo, dupliciter id contingit. Nam cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur; cum autem inaniter et effuse animus exultat, tum illa laetitia gestiens vel nimia dici potest, quam ita definiunt: sine ratione animi elationem. Quoniamque, ut bona natura adpetimus, sic a malis natura declinamus, quae declinatio si cum ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente; quae autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fracta, nominetur metus; est igitur metus ratione aversa cautio.

[14] Praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum aegritudo est, eaque adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. Itaque haec prima definitio est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. Sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur.

6. Perturbation defined as "a commotion of mind contrary to reason."

6. Zeno then defines a perturbation, παθος (pathos) as he calls it, to be a commotion of mind contrary to reason. Some more briefly say that a perturbation is a too vehement desire, and by its being too vehement they mean its departing too far from the even temperament of nature. But they maintain that the division of mental disturbances starts from two imagined goods and two imagined evils, — from the goods, desire and gladness, gladness in goods present, desire of those to come; from the evils they derive fear and grief, fear as to things future, grief for things present,—the same things that are feared in the future, when present, occasioning grief. Gladness and desire have their scope in an opinion of the goodness of their objects. While desire, excited and inflamed, is urged on to what seems good, gladness becomes excessive and exultant on obtaining what has already been desired. By nature all pursue those things that seem good, and shun the contrary. Therefore as soon as the appearance of anything that seems good is presented, Nature herself urges one toward the attainment of it. When this takes place consistently and prudently, the Stoics term such a desire βουλησιν (boulesin), — we call it "volition." They think that this exists in the wise man alone, and they define volition as "reasonable desire." But will, which, with reason opposed to it, is excited too vehemently, is lust or unbridled desire, which is found in all who are not wise. In like manner, when we are in possession of some good, we are moved in one of two ways. When the mind is affected calmly and consistently, we call that "joy;" but when the mind exults inanely and immoderately, that may be called "extravagant or excessive gladness." Moreover, since as we naturally crave good things, so we turn away from evil things, this turning away, if it be done with reason, may be called "caution," which is understood to exist in the wise man only ; but when it is without reason and with grovelling and unmanly dejection, it may be termed "fear." Fear then is "caution contrary to reason." In the next place, the wise man is unaffected by present evil ; while foolish grief is that with which those not under the control of reason are affected, and by which the mind is cast down and shrunken. This then is the first definition, that grief is a "shrinking of the mind opposed to reason." Thus we have four kinds of perturbation, and three calm and self-consistent states, there being no such state that is the express opposite of grief.

 

VII. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et opinione. Itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. Est ergo aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri rectum esse videatur, metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile esse videatur, libido opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse.

[15] Sed quae iudicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam quae efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut aegritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat, metus recessum quendam animi et fugam, laetitia profusam hilaritatem, libido effrenatam adpetentiam. Opinationem autem, quam in omnis definitiones superiores inclusimus, volunt esse inbecillam adsensionem.

[16] Sed singulis perturbationibus partes eiusdem generis plures subiciuntur, ut aegritudini invidentia - utendum est enim docendi causa verbo minus usitato, quoniam invidia non in eo qui invidet solum dicitur, sed etiam in eo cui invidetur-, aemulatio, obtrectatio, misericordia, angor, luctus, maeror, aerumna, dolor, lamentatio, sollicitudo, molestia, adflictatio, desperatio, et si quae sunt de genere eodem. Sub metum autem subiecta sunt pigritia, pudor, terror, timor, pavor, exanimatio, conturbatio, formido, voluptati malevolentia laetans malo alieno, delectatio, iactatio et similia, lubidini ira, excandescentia, odium, inimicitia, discordia, indigentia, desiderium et cetera eius modi.

7. Perturbations the consequence of false opinions.

7. But the Stoics regard all disturbances of mind as created by judgment and opinion. Therefore they define them with the greater precision, that it may be understood not only how vicious they are, but how entirely they are within our own power. Grief then is a recent opinion of the existence of a present evil, because of which it seems right that the soul should be cast down and should shrink within itself; joy, a recent opinion of the existence of a present good, by reason of which it seems right to be transported beyond the wonted bounds ; fear, an opinion as to an impending evil which seems beyond endurance ; desire, an opinion with regard to some good to come, which would be of service were it now present and at hand. But they say that these perturbations contain not only the opinions and judgments of which I have spoken, but also the effects which result from their existence in the mind, — grief occasioning, as it were, a gnawing of pain ; fear, a sort of retreat and flight of the soul; joy, an overflowing hilarity; desire, an unbridled appetency. Meanwhile, the forming of opinions, which entered into the definitions given above, they regard as weak assent. Each perturbation contains several divisions which properly belong to the same class. Thus under the head of grief are enviousness (I employ the less common word, that I may not be misunderstood; for envy is used in speaking not only of him who envies, but also of him who is envied), emulation, jealousy, pity, distress, mourning, sorrow, hardship, pain, lamentation, anxiety, trouble, affliction, despair, and other emotions of the same sort, if others there be. Under fear are included sloth, bashfulness, terror, timidity, consternation, sinking of heart, confusion of mind, dread; under pleasure, the malevolence that rejoices in another's harm, delight, boastfulness, and like affections; under desire, anger, irritability, hatred, enmity, discord, want, longing, and other similar states of mind.

 

VIII. [17] Haec autem definiunt hoc modo: invidentiam esse dicunt aegritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti. (Nam si qui doleat eius rebus secundis a quo ipse laedatur, non recte dicatur invidere, ut si Hectori Agamemno; qui autem, cui alterius commoda nihil noceant, tamen eum doleat is frui, is invideat profecto.) Aemulatio autem dupliciter illa quidem dicitur, ut et in laude et in vitio nomen hoc sit; nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur - sed ea nihil hoc loco utimur; est enim laudis-, et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo quod concupierit alius potiatur, ipse careat. Obtrectatio autem est, ea quam intellegi zhlotupi/an volo, aegritudo ex eo, quod alter quoque potiatur eo quod ipse concupiverit.

[18] Misericordia est aegritudo ex miseria alterius iniuria laborantis (nemo enim parricidae aut proditoris supplicio cordia commovetur); angor aegritudo premens, luctus aegritudo ex eius qui carus fuerit Ïnteritu acerbo, maeror aegritudo flebilis, aerumna aegritudo laboriosa, dolor aegritudo crucians, lamentatio aegritudo cum eiulatu, sollicitudo aegritudo cum cogitatione, molestia aegritudo permanens, adflictatio aegritudo cum vexatione corporis, desperatio aegritudo sine ulla rerum expectatione meliorum.

[19] Quae autem subiecta sunt sub metum, ea sic definiunt: pigritiam metum consequentis laboris, terrorem metum concutientem, ex quo fit ut pudorem rubor, terrorem pallor et tremor et dentium crepitus consequatur, timorem metum mali adpropinquantis, pavorem metum mentem loco moventem, ex quo illud Enni:

'Tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi exanimato expectorat',
Exanimationem metum subsequentem et quasi comitem pavoris, conturbationem metum excutientem cogitata, formidinem metum permanentem.
8. Various forms of grief and of fear defined.

8. These terms they define as follows. They say that enviousness is grief for the prosperity of another, when it does no injury to the envious person. If one is pained by the prosperity of him by whose success he himself is injured, as in the case of Agamemnon in relation to Hector, he is not properly said to be "envious;" but he whom another's well-being cannot in anywise injure, who yet is sorry for it, is certainly chargeable with envy. Emulation is used in two senses, and denotes both a merit and a fault; for the imitation of virtue is called "emulation" (with this we have no concern, it being praiseworthy), and the name is also given to the grief felt by one who fails to obtain what he had desired and another possesses. Jealousy (by which I mean ζηλοτυπιαν [zelotupian]) is also grief which one feels at another's possessing what he would have desired for himself. Pity is grief for another who is suffering undeservedly ; for no one is moved to pity by the punishment of a parricide or a traitor. Distress is pressing grief. ? Mourning is grief for the bitter death of one who has been dear. Sorrow is grief with tears. Hardship is grief with toil. Pain is grief with torment. Lamentation is grief with wailing. Anxiety is grief with deep thought. Trouble is continuous grief. Affliction is grief with bodily vexation. Despair is grief without any hope of better things. The emotions under the head of fear they define as follows. Sloth is the fear of labor in the future. Bashfulness. . . . Terror is a fear that convulses the body; so that while blushing attends bashfulness, paleness and trembling and chattering of teeth are produced by terror. Timidity is the fear of evil close at hand. Consternation is a fear that deranges the mind, as in that verse of Ennius, —

"Then consternation drives all wisdom from my mind."
Sinking of heart is a fear consequent and attendant upon consternation. Confusion of mind is a fear that shakes out thought. Dread is continuous fear.

 

IX. [20] Voluptatis autem partes hoc modo describunt, ut malevolentia sit voluptas ex malo alterius sine emolumento suo, delectatio voluptas suavitate auditus animum deleniens; et qualis est haec aurium, tales sunt oculorum et tactionum et odorationum et saporum, quae sunt omnes unius generis ad perfundendum animum tamquam inliquefactae voluptates, Iactatio est voluptas gestiens et se efferens insolentius.

[21] Quae autem libidini subiecta sunt, ea sic definiuntur, ut ira sit libido poeniendi eius qui videatur laesisse iniuria, excandescentia autem sit ira nascens et modo existens, quae qu/mwsij Graece dicitur, odium ira inveterata, inimicitia ira ulciscendi tempus observans, discordia ira acerbior intimo animo et corde concepta, indigentia libido inexplebilis, desiderium libido eius, qui nondum adsit, videndi. Distinguunt illud etiam, ut libido sit earum rerum, quae dicuntur, de quodam aut quibusdam, quae kathgorh/mata dialectici appellant, ut habere divitias, capere honores, indigentia rerum ipsarum sit, ut honorum, ut pecuniae.

[22] Omnium autem perturbationum fontem esse dicunt intemperantiam, quae est

[a] tota mente a recta ratione defectio, sic aversa a praescriptione rationis, ut nullo modo adpetitiones animi nec regi nec contineri queant. Quem ad modum igitur temperantia sedat adpetitiones et efficit, ut eae rectae rationi pareant, conservatque considerata iudicia mentis, sic huic inimica intemperantia omnem animi statum infiammat conturbat incitat, itaque et aegritudines et metus et reliquae perturbationes omnes gignuntur ex ea.

9. The phases of pleasure and of inordinate desire defined.

9. The divisions of pleasure they define as follows. Malevolence is pleasure in another's misfortune from which one derives no benefit. Delight is pleasure that soothes the mind by sweet sounds, and by similar sensations through the organs of sight, touch, smell and taste, all which are of one kind, and may be described as pleasures liquified to besprinkle the soul Boastfulness is demonstrative pleasure, arrogantly forthputting. The following are the definitions of the states of mind under the head of desire. Anger is the desire to punish one who, we think, has wrongfully done us harm. Irritability is anger nascent and just beginning to be, — called in Greek θυμωσις (thumosis). Hatred is an anger that has become chronic. Enmity is anger on the watch for the opportunity of revenge. Discord is a more bitter anger conceived of hatred in the inmost heart. Want is a desire that cannot be satisfied. Longing is a desire to see some one who is not yet at hand. They also define longing as a desire excited by the report of certain things which the logicians call κατηγορηματα (kategoremata), as possessed by some person or persons, as that they have riches, or are receiving honors ; while want is the desire for the things themselves, as for honors or for money. But they say that intemperance is the cause of every disturbance of soul ; and this is a falling away from a sound mind and right reason, so averse from the rule of reason that the appetites of the mind can be in no measure governed or held in check. As therefore temperance allays the appetites, makes them obey right reason, and maintains the deliberate decisions of the mind, so intemperance, in hostility to it, inflames, disturbs, excites the entire mind. Thus griefs and fears and all other perturbations are born of intemperance.

 

X. [23] Quem ad modum, cum sanguis corruptus est aut pituita redundat aut bilis, in corpore morbi aegrotationesque nascuntur, sic pravarum opinionum conturbatio et ipsarum inter te repugnantia sanitate spoliat animum morbisque perturbat. Ex perturbationibus autem primum morbi conficiuntur, quae vocant illi nosh/mata, eaque quae sunt eis morbis contraria, quae habent ad res certas vitiosam offensionem atque fastidium, deinde aegrotationes, quae appellantur a Stoicis a)rrwsth/mata , isque item oppositae contrariae offensiones. Hoc loco nimium operae consumitur a Stoicis, maxime a Chrysippo, dum morbis corporum comparatur morborum animi similitudo; qua oratione praetermissa minime necessaria ea, quae rem continenti pertractemus.

[24] Intellegatur igitur perturbationem iactantibus se opinionibus inconstanter et turbide in motu esse semper; cum autem hic fervor concitatioque animi inveteraverit et tamquam in venis medullisque insederit, tum existet et morbus et aegrotatio et offensiones eae, quae sunt eis morbis aegrotationibusque contrariae.

10. Diseases and sicknesses of soul, produced by perturbations.

10. As when the blood is poisoned, or there is an excess of phlegm or of bile, diseases and sicknesses are produced in the body, so the confusion of perverse opinions and their mutual repugnancy deprive the soul of health, and trouble it with diseases. From these inward perturbations there are produced, first, diseases which the Stoics call νοσηματα (nosemata), and also dispositions opposed to those diseases, involving a faulty disgust and disdain for certain things,—then, sicknesses which they call αρρωτηματα (arrostemata), and also opposed to them disgusts of a contrary kind. Here the Stoics, and especially Chrysippus, spend too much labor in comparing diseases of the mind with those of the body. Omitting this line of thought as by no means necessary, let us treat only of those things in which the subject in hand is comprised. Let it then be understood that the perturbation of mind, when inconsistent and confused opinions are tossed to and fro, implies perpetual unrest; and when this heat and excitement of mind have become chronic, and seated, as it were, in the veins and marrow, then commence disease and sickness, and the disgusts which are contrary to the diseases and sicknesses.

 

XI. Haec, quae dico, cogitatione inter se differunt, re quidem copulata sunt, eaque oriuntur ex libidine et ex laetitia. Nam cum est concupita pecunia nec adhibita continuo ratio quasi quaedam Socratica medicina, quae sanaret eam cupiditatem, permanat in venas et inhaeret in visceribus illud malum, existitque morbus et aegrotatio, quae evelli inveterata non possunt, eique morbo nomen est avaritia;

[25] similiterque ceteri morbi, ut gloriae cupiditas, ut mulierositas, ut ita appellem eam quae Graece filoguni/a dicitur, ceterique similiter morbi aegrotationesque nascuntur. Quae autem sunt his contraria, ea nasci putantur a metu, ut odium mulierum, quale in misgu/nw Atili est, in hominum universum genus, quod accepimus de Timone qui misa/nqrwpoj appellatur, ut inhospitalitas est: quae omnes aegrotationes animi ex quodam metu nascuntur earum rerum quas fugiunt et oderunt.

[26] Definiunt autem animi aegrotationem opinationem vehementem de re non expetenda, tamquam valde expetenda sit, inhaerentem et penitus insitam. Quod autem nascitur ex offensione, ita definiunt: opinionem vehementem de re non fugienda inhaerentem et penitus insitam tamquam fugienda; haec autem opinatio est iudicatio se scire, quod nesciat. Aegrotationi autem talia quaedam subiecta sunt: avaritia, ambitio, mulierositas, pervicacia, ligurritio, vinulentia, cuppedia, et si qua similia. Est autem avaritia opinatio vehemens de pecunia, quasi valde expetenda sit, inhaerens et penitus insita, similisque est eiusdem generis definitio reliquarum.

[27] Offensionum autem definitiones sunt eius modi, ut inhospitalitas sit opinio vehemens valde fugiendum esse hospitem, eaque inhaerens et penitus insita; similiterque definitur et mulierum odium, ut Hippolyti, et, ut Timonis, generis humani.

11. The disgusts which are the opposites of these diseases and sicknesses.

11. The disease and sickness of which I speak, though they may be discriminated in thought, yet in fact are closely united, and they proceed from desire and joy. Thus when money is desired, and reason is not immediately applied, as a sort of Socratic remedy which would cure that desire, the evil flows into the veins and inheres in the bowels, and becomes a disease and a sickness which, when chronic, cannot be extirpated, and the name of that disease is "avarice." The case is the same with other diseases, as the desire of fame, or the passion for women, if I may so call what in Greek is termed φιλογυνεια (philogyneia); and other diseases and sicknesses have a like origin. The dispositions contrary to these are thought to originate from fear, as the hatred of women, like that in the Μισογυνη (Misogyne) of Attilius, or the hatred of the whole human race, such as is reported of Timon, who is called μισανθρωπος (misanthropos), or inhospitality. All these sicknesses of the mind spring from a certain fear of the objects shunned and hated. The Stoics define sickness of the mind to be an intensely strong opinion, inherent and deeply seated, concerning some object which ought not to be sought, that it deserves to be earnestly sought. What springs from disgust they define as an intensely strong opinion, inherent and deeply seated, concerning some object which ought not to be shunned, that it ought to be shunned ; and this opinion is an assurance on the part of him who holds it that he knows what he does not know. Under the head of "sickness" belong such conditions or habits as avarice, ambition, licentiousness, obstinacy, gluttony, drunkenness, luxuriousness, and the like. Now avarice is an intensely strong opinion, inherent and deeply seated, about money, that it ought to be earnestly sought ; and the definition of the other affections of the same class is similar. The definitions of disgusts may be illustrated in the case of inhospitality, which is an intensely strong opinion, inherent and deeply seated, that a guest is to be sedulously avoided. In like manner we may define the hatred of women, as in the case of Hippolytus, and- the hatred of the whole human race like that felt by Timon.

 

XII. Atque ut ad valetudinis similitudinem veniamus eaque conlatione utamur aliquando, sed parcius quam solent Stoici: ut sunt alii ad alios morbos procliviores - itaque dicimus gravidinosos quosdam, torminosos, non quia iam sint, sed quia saepe sint - alii ad metum, alii ad aliam perturbationem; ex quo in aliis anxietas, unde anxii, in aliis iracundia dicitur. Quae ab ira differt, estque aliud iracundum esse, aliud iratum, ut differt anxietas ab angore (neque enim omnes anxii, qui anguntur aliquando, nec, qui anxii, semper anguntur), ut inter ebrietatem interest, aliudque est amatorem esse, aliud amantem. Atque haec aliorum ad alios morbos proclivitas late patet; nam pertinet ad omnes perturbationes;

[28] in multis etiam vitiis apparet, sed nomen res non habet. Ergo et invidi et malivoli

[et lividi] et timidi et misericordes, quia proclives ad eas perturbationes , non quia semper feruntur. Haec igitur proclivitas ad suum quodque genus a similitudine corporis aegrotatio dicatur, dum ea intellegatur ad aegrotandum proclivitas. Sed haec in bonis rebus, quod alii ad alia bona sunt aptiores, f a c i l i t a s nominetur, in malis p r o c l i v i t a s, ut significet lapsionem, in neutris habeat superius nomen.

12. Difference between occasional and habitual perturbations.

12. To resort to the analogy of bodily health, using occasionally comparisons derived from it, but more sparingly than is the habit of the Stoics, — as different persons are specially inclined. toward different diseases, and so we call some "catarrhal," some "dysenteric," not because they are so now, but because they often are, — so there are some inclined to fear, others to other perturbations. Thus in some there is frequent anxiety, whence they are called "anxious," and in others there is an irascibility which differs from anger ; for it is one thing to be irascible, another to be angry, — even as anxiety differs from an anxious feeling ; for all who some-times feel anxious are not anxious, nor do those who are anxious always feel anxious. There is a like difference between a case of intoxication and the habit of intoxication, and it is one thing to be a lover, and another to be in the habit of making love. This proclivity of different persons to different diseases has a wide application. It belongs to all disturbances of mind.. It appears in the case of many vices, but without a distinctive name. Thus the envious, and the malevolent, and the malignant, and the timid, and the pitiful are so: called, because they are inclined to these disturbances of mind, not because they are always affected by them. This proclivity of each to his own kind of mental disease may from the analogy of the body be termed "sickness," understanding by it a proclivity to being sick. But since different persons have special aptitudes for different forms of goodness,' this inclination with reference to good things is termed "facility;" with reference to bad things "proclivity;" while as to things neither good nor bad it has the former name.

 

XIII. Quo modo autem in corpore est morbus, est aegrotatio, est vitium, sic in animo. Mo r b u m appellant totius corporis corruptionem, aegrotationem morbum cum imbecillitate, vitium, cum partes corporis inter se dissident, ex quo pravitas membrorum, distortio, deformitas.

[29] Itaque illa duo, morbus et aegrotatio, ex totius valetudinis corporis conquassatione et perturbatione gignuntur, vitium autem integra valetudine ipsum ex se cernitur. Sed in animo tantum modo cogitatione possumus morbum ab aegrotatione seiungere, vitiositas autem est habitus aut adfectio in tota vita inconstans et a se ipsa dissentiens. Ita fit, ut in altera corruptione opinionum morbus efficiatur et aegrotatio, in altera inconstantia et repugnantia. Non enim omne vitium partis habet dissentientis, ut eorum, qui non longe a sapientia absunt, adfectio est illa quidem discrepans sibi ipsa, dum est insipiens, sed non distorta nec prava. Morbi autem et aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis, sed perturbationes sintne eiusdem partes, quaestio est.

[30] Vitia enirn adfectiones sunt manentes, perturbationes autem moventes, ut non possint adfectionum manentium partes esse. Atque ut in malis attingit animi naturam corporis similitudo, sic in bonis. Sunt enim in corpore praecipua, pulchritudo, vires valetudo, firmitas, velocitas, sunt item in animo. enim corporis temperatio, cum ea congruunt inter se e quibus constamus, sanitas, sic animi dicitur, cum eius iudicia opinionesque concordant, eaque animi est virtus, quam alii ipsam temperantiam dicunt esse, alii obtemperantem temperantiae praeceptis et eam subsequentem nec habentem ullam speciem suam, sed sive hoc sive illud sit, in solo esse sapiente. Est autem quaedam animi sanitas, quae in insipientem etiam cadat, cum curatione [et perturbatione] medicorum conturbatio mentis aufertur.

[31] Et ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam suavitate eaque dicitur pulchritudo, sic in animo opinionum iudiciorumque aequabilitas et constantia cum firmitate quadam et stabilitate virtutem subsequens aut virtutis vim ipsam continens pulchritudo vocatur. Itemque viribus corporis et nervis et efficacitati similes similibus quoque verbis animi vires nominantur. Velocitas autem corporis celeritas appellatur, quae eadem ingenii etiam laus habetur propter animi multarum rerum brevi tempore percursionem.

13. Analogy between imperfections of the mind and those of the body.

13. As in the body there is disease, there is sickness, there is imperfection, so is it in the mind. The disordered condition of the whole body is called "disease;" when disease is connected with debility, it is "sickness;" while imperfection exists where the parts of the body do not correspond to one another, whence results the unhealthy condition of single members, distortion, deformity. Those two, then, disease and sickness, are produced by the concussion and disturbance of the entire health of the body, while an imperfection shows itself when the health is sound. But as to the mind it is only in thought that we can discriminate between disease and sickness, while an imperfection is a habit or state out of keeping with the life as a whole, and not even in harmony with itself. Thus it is that in the former case disease or sickness may be produced by corrupt opinions. On the other hand, imperfection may result from a lack of consistency and harmony in the mind itself ; for it is not true that in the mind, as in the body, every imperfection betokens a want of symmetry, and in the case of those almost wise, it is a state that lacks self-consistency so long as unwisdom lasts, while there may not be distortion or utter unhealthiness. But diseases and sicknesses are parts of imperfection, while it is questionable whether perturbations of mind are so ; for imperfections are continuous states, while perturbations are fluctuating, and cannot therefore be parts of continuous states. Moreover, as in things evil, so in things good, the analogy of the body applies very closely to the nature of the mind; for as in the body the distinguishing attributes are beauty, strength, health, firmness, quickness, so are they in the mind. Soundness is the condition of the body in which these elements of its well-being are united. So is soundness affirmed of the mind when its decisions and opinions agree. This state is that virtue of the mind, which some call "temperance," while others regard it as obeying the rules of temperance, and making temperance its aim, yet without any specific character of its own. But whether it be this or that, it exists only in the wise man. Yet there is a certain kind of mental soundness which may fall to the lot even of the unwise, when the perturbation of mind is removed by curative treatment. Still further, as there is in the body a certain fit shape of the members with a sweetness of complexion, which is termed ? beauty," so in the mind the same name is given to an equability and consistency of opinions, with a certain firmness and steadfastness, engaged in the pursuit of virtue, or containing all that gives strength to virtue. We also give names derived from the body to the active powers of the mind that resemble the powers, nerves and efficiency of the body. The speed of the body is called "celerity," and this also is regarded as one of the merits of genius, on account of the mind's ability to run through many things in a short time.

 

XIV. Illud animorum corporumque dissimile, quod animi valentes morbo temptari non possunt, corpora possunt; sed corporum offensiones sine culpa accidere possunt, animorum non item, quorum omnes morbi et perturbationes ex aspernatione rationis eveniunt. Itaque in hominibus solum existunt; nam bestiae simile quiddam faciunt, sed in perturbationes non incidunt.

[32] Inter acutos autem et inter hebetes interest, quod ingeniosi, ut aes Corinthium in aeruginem, sic illi in morbum et incidunt tardius et recreantur ocius, hebetes non item. Nec vero in omnem morbum ac perturbationem animus ingeniosi cadit; non enim in ulla ecferata et immania; quaedam autem humanitatis quoque habent primam speciem, ut misericordia aegritudo metus. Aegrotationes autem morbique animorum difficilius evelli posse putantur quam summa illa vitia, quae virtutibus sunt contraria. Morbis enim manentibus vitia sublata esse

[non] possunt, quia non tam celeriter sanantur quam illa tolluntur.

[33] Habes ea quae de perturbationibus enucleate disputant Stoici, quae logika/ appellant, quia disseruntur subtilius. Ex quibus quoniam tamquam ex scrupulosis cotibus enavigavit oratio, reliquae disputationis cursum teneamus, modo satis illa dilucide dixerimus pro rerum obscuritate. Prorsus satis; sed si quae diligentius erunt cognoscenda, quaeremus alias, nunc vela, quae modo dicebas, expectamus et cursum.

14. Healthy bodies can be, healthy minds cannot be, attacked by sickness or disease.

14. There is this difference between minds and bodies, that healthy minds cannot be attacked by disease, healthy bodies can be ; but while diseases of the body may take place without blame, it is not so with those of the mind, in which diseases and disturbances occur only from the neglect of reason. They therefore exist in men alone; for though beasts do some things that might be taken for disease, they are not liable to disturbances of mind. There is, too, this difference between those of quick and those of dull apprehension, that, as Corinthian brass is slow to rust, so men of active ,minds are slower in falling into disease, and are restored more rapidly than those of dull intellect. Nor are those of active mind liable to every sort of disease and perturbation, certainly not to what is wild and savage; but some of their morbid affections appear at first sight humane, as pity, grief, fear. Still further, it is thought that sicknesses and diseases of the mind are eradicated less easily than are those extreme imperfections that are the opposites of the virtues. While diseases continue, imperfections may be removed ; for diseases are not cured as promptly as imperfections are taken away. I have thus given you what the Stoics teach with great precision as to disturbances of mind. They call such discussion λογικα (logika), on account of its subtilty. Now that my discourse has, as it were, made its sea-way beyond the rude cliffs of the shore, let us pursue our course through what remains, if only what I have said shall have been as clear as so obscure a subject permits.

A. You have been sufficiently clear ; but if there are any matters that need to be inspected more carefully, I will ask your aid at some other time. I am now looking for the sails of which you spoke at the outset, and for the voyage. ?

 

XV. [34] Quando, ut aliis locis de virtute et diximus et saepe dicendum erit - pleraeque enim quaestiones, quae ad vitam moresque pertinent, a virtutis fonte ducuntur -, quando igitur virtus est adfectio animi constans conveniensque, laudabiles efficiens eos, in quibus est, et ipsa per se sua sponte separata etiam utilitate laudabilis, ex ea proficiscuntur honestae voluntates sententiae actiones omnisque recta ratio (quamquam ipsa virtus brevissume recta ratio dici potest). Huius igitur virtutis contraria est vitiositas – sic enim malo quam malitiam appellare eam quam Graeci kaki/an appellant; nam malitia certi cuiusdam vitii nomen est, vitiositas omnium -; ex qua concitantur perturbationes, quae sunt, ut paulo ante diximus, turbidi animorum concitatique motus, aversi a ratione et inimicissimi mentis vitaeque tranquillae. Inportant enim aegritudines anxias atque acerbas animosque adfligunt et debilitant metu; idem inflammant adpetitione nimia, quam tum cupiditatem tum libidinem dicimus, inpotentiam quandam animi a temperantia et moderation plurimum dissidentem.

[35] Quae si quando adepta erit id quod ei fuerit concupitum, tum ecferetur alacritate, ut 'nihil ei constet', quod agat, ut ille, qui 'voluptatem animi nimiam summum esse errorem' arbitratur. Eorum igitur malorum in una virtute posita sanatio est.

15. Virtue, the only cure for the diseased mind.

15. M. I have elsewhere spoken of virtue, and shall still have to speak of it often ; for most questions appertaining to life and conduct are derived from the fountain of virtue. It being a uniform and fitting affection of the mind, making those who possess it praiseworthy, and being itself, and for its own sake, even without reference to its utility, deserving of praise, there proceed from it good volitions, sentiments, deeds, and everything that belongs to right reason, although virtue itself might be most comprehensively defined as "right reason." The opposite of virtue thus understood is viciousness (for so rather than "malice" I prefer to call what the Greeks term κακιαν (kakian), malice being the name of a certain kind of vice, viciousness of all), which stimulates the perturbations which, as I said a little while ago, are turbid and excited movements of the soul contrary to reason, and utterly inimical to quietness of mind and life, inasmuch as they bring in anxious and bitter griefs, afflict and enfeeble the mind by fear, and inflame it with excessive desire, which we sometimes call "cupidity," sometimes "lust," and which, under whatever form, is a mental infirmity, utterly inconsistent with temperance and moderation. This craving, when it thinks it has attained what it desired, is so elated by excessive joy as to be incapable of consistent action, verifying the saying of the character in the play, that too much pleasure of the mind is the greatest mistake possible. The cure of these evils then is to be found in virtue alone.

 

XVI. Quid autem est non miserius solum, sed foedius etiam et deformius quam aegritudine quis adflictus debilitatus iacens? Cui miseriae proxumus est is qui adpropinquans aliquod malum metuit exanimatusque pendet animi. Quam vim mali significantes poÎtae impendere apud inferos saxum Tantalo faciunt

'Ob scelera animique inpotentiam et superbiloquentiam.'
Ea communis poena stultitiae est; omnibus enim, quorum mens abhorret a ratione, semper aliqui talis terror impendet.

[36] Atque ut haec tabificae mentis perturbationes sunt, aegritudinem dico et metum, sic hilariores illae, cupiditas avide semper aliquid expetens et inanis alacritas, id est laetitia gestiens, non multum differunt ab amentia. Ex quo intellegitur, qualis ille sit, quem tum moderatum, alias modestum temperantem, alias constantem continentemque dicimus; non numquam haec eadem vocabula ad frugalitatis nomen tamquam ad caput referre volumus. Quodnisi eo nomine virtutes continerentur, numquam ita pervolgatum illud esset, ut iam proverbio locum optineret, 'hominem frugi omnia recte facere'. Quod idem cum Stoici de sapiente dicunt, nimis admirabiliter nimisque magnifice dicere videntur.

16. All the perturbations, whether painful or joyful, in their nature and effect pernicious.

16. But what is there not only more miserable, but more base and deformed, than a man broken down, debilitated, prostrated by affliction? Next to this form of wretchedness is he who fears some approaching evil, and hangs in breathless suspense. To denote the magnitude of this evil the poets imagine in the infernal regions a rock impending over Tantalus,

"For lawless deeds and over-boastful words."
This is the common punishment of folly ; for some such terror is perpetually impending over all whose minds are averse from reason. Still further, as these perturbations of the mind, to wit, grief and fear, consume the strength, so do those of a more cheerful kind, desire always on the eager quest, and empty mirth, that is, exuberant joy, differ very little from madness. Hence it is understood what sort of a man he is, whom we at one time call "moderate," at another "temperate," then again, "firm" and "self-controlling," while we are sometimes inclined to refer all these names to frugality, as chief over them all ; for unless the virtues are all comprehended in that one word, the saying, "A frugal man does all things aright," would not have been so commonly repeated as to become a proverb. When the Stoics say the same about the wise man, they seem to speak of him with the utmost admiration and honor.

 

 
XVII. [37] Ergo, hic, quisquis est qui moderatione et constantia quietus animo est sibique ipse placatus, ut nec tabescat molestiis nec frangatur timore nec sitienter quid expetens ardeat desiderio nec alacritate futili gestiens deliquescat, is est sapiens quem quaerimus, is est beatus, cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad demittendum animum aut nimis laetabile ad ecferendum videri potest. Quid enim videatur ei magnum in rebus humanis, cui aeternitas omnis totiusque mundi nota sit magnitudo? Nam quid aut in studiis humanis aut in tam exigua brevitate vitae magnum sapienti videri potest, qui semper animo sic excubat, ut ei nihil inprovisum accidere possit, nihil inopinatum, nihil omnino novum?

[38] Atque idem ita acrem in omnis partis aciem intendit, ut semper videat sedem sibi ac locum sine molestia atque angore vivendi, ut, quemcumque casum fortuna invexerit, hunc apte et quiete ferat. Quod qui faciet, non aegritudine solum vacabit, sed etiam perturbationibus reliquis omnibus. HÏs autem vacuus animus perfecte atque absolute beatos efficit, idemque concitatus et abstractus ab integra certaque ratione non constantiam solum amittit, verum etiam sanitatem. Quocirca mollis et enervata putanda est Peripateticorum ratio et oratio, qui perturbari animos necesse dicunt esse, sed adhibent modum quendam, quem ultra progredi non oporteat.

[39] Modum tu adhibes vitio? an vitium nullum est non parere rationi? an ratio parum praecipit nec bonum illud esse, quod aut cupias ardenter aut adeptus ecferas te insolenter, nec porro malum, quo aut oppressus iaceas aut, ne opprimare, mente vix constes? eaque omnia aut nimis tristia aut nimis laeta errore fieri, qui [si] error stultis extenuetur die ut, cum res eadem maneat, aliter ferant inveterata aliter recentia, sapientis ne attingat quidem omnino?

[40] Etenim quis erit tandem modus iste? quaeramus enim modum aegritudinis, in qua operae plurimum ponitur. Aegre tulisse P. Rupilium fratris repulsam consulatus scriptum apud Fannium est; sed tamen transisse videtur modum, quippe qui ob eam causam a vita recesserit; moderatius igitur ferre debuit. Quid, si, cum id ferret modice, mors liberorum accessisset? 'Nata esset aegritudo nova, sed ea modica'. Magna tamen facta esset accessio. Quid, si deinde dolores graves corporis, si bonorum amissio, si caecitas, si exilium? Si pro singulis malis aegritudines accederent, summa ea fieret, quae non sustineretur.

17. Freedom from perturbations makes life happy. Absurdity in this respect of the Peripatetic doctrine of a mean between extremes.

17. Whoever then has his mind kept in repose by moderation and firmness, and is at peace with himself so that he is neither wasted by troubles nor broken down by fear, nor burns with longing in his thirsty quest of some object of desire, nor flows out in the demonstration of empty joy, is the wise man whom we seek ; he is the happy man, to whom no human fortune can seem either insupportable so as to cast him down, or too joyful so as to elate him unduly. For what in human affairs can seem great to him who takes cognizance of all eternity and of the immensity of the whole universe ? Indeed, what in human pursuits or in the narrow period of life can seem great to the wise man, whose mind is always so on the watch that nothing sudden, nothing unthought of, nothing altogether new can happen to him? Such a man looks with so keen insight in every direction that he always sees a place of abode where he can live without trouble or distress, and that whatever accident fortune may bring, he can bear it fittingly and calmly; and he with whom this is the case wilt be free not from grief alone, but also from all other perturbations. But a mind free from these makes men perfectly and absolutely happy ; while a mind liable to excitement and drawn away from sound and unerring reason loses not only its self-consistency, but even its sanity. Therefore the reasoning and discourse of the Peripatetics must be regarded as feeble and nerveless, saying, as they do, that the mind must of necessity be disturbed, and prescribing a certain limit beyond which one ought not to go. Do you prescribe limit to a fault ? Or is it no fault not to obey reason ? Or does reason fail to teach you that what you either ardently desire or, when obtained, rejoice over immoderately, is not a real good, nor is that a real evil under which you lie crushed, or as to which the fear that it may crush you deprives you of your self-possession ? And does reason say that it is only the excess of sadness or of joy that is an error ? Now if this error is lessened by time for the unwise, so that, while things remain unchanged, they bear old troubles in one way, new troubles in another, it may certainly not affect the wise at all. What limit shall there be then ? Let us seek the limit of grief, which is the most burdensome of all these morbid affections. Fannius writes that Publius Eupilius bore hardly the defeat of his brother as candidate for the consulship. But he seems to have passed the limit ; for this was the cause of his death. He ought then to have borne it more moderately. But what if while he was bearing it moderately, the death of his children had imposed an added burden ? A new grief would have sprung up. Let that be moderate, still a great addition would have been made. What if there had then come severe bodily pains, loss of property, blindness, exile ? If for each of these evils there was added grief, the sum might have been such as could not be borne.

 

XVIII. [41] Qui modum igitur vitio quaerit, similiter facit, ut si posse putet eum qui se e Leucata praecipitaverit sustinere se, cum velit. Ut enim id non potest, sic animus perturbatus et incitatus nec cohibere se potest nec, quo loco vult, insistere. Omninoque, quae crescentia perniciosa sunt, eadem sunt vitiosa nascentia;

[42] aegritudo autem ceteraeque perturbationes amplificatae certe pestiferae sunt; igitur etiam susceptae continuo in magna pestis parte versantur. Etenim ipsae se impellunt, ubi semel a ratione discessum est, ipsaque sibi imbecillitas indulget in altumque provehitur imprudens nec reperit locum consistendi. Quam ob rem nihil interest, utrum moderatas perturbationes adprobent an moderatam iniustitiam, moderatam ignaviam, moderatam intemperantiam; qui enim vitiis modum apponit, is partem suscipit vitiorum quod cum ipsum per se odiosum est, tum eo molestius, quia sunt in lubrico incitataque semel proclivi labuntur sustinerique nullo modo possunt.

18. Moderation in what is faulty is not only evil, but dangerous.

18. He who seeks a limit for a fault, is like one who, throwing himself from Leucate, should think that he can poise himself in mid-air when he pleases. As he cannot do this, no more can the mind when disturbed and excited restrain itself, and stop where it wants to stop ; and, in general, whatever things are harmful in their growth are faulty in their birth. Now it is certain that grief and other perturbations, when largely increased, are pestilential ; therefore when they first affect the mind, they are at the outset in no small degree baleful. For they urge themselves on when reason has once been forsaken ; and weakness indulges itself, launches out recklessly on the deep, nor finds any stopping place. Therefore the approval of moderate perturbations of mind is the same as approving of moderate injustice, or moderate sloth, or moderate intemperance. He who assigns a limit to faults takes the part of those faults ; and this, while hateful in itself, is all the worse, because the faults for which indulgence is craved are on slippery ground, and when once started on the downward track, glide on, and can in no way be held back.

 

XIX. [43] Quid, quod idem Peripatetici perturbationes istas, quas nos extirpandas putamus, non modo naturalis esse dicunt, sed etiam utiliter a natura datas? Quorum est talis oratio: primum multis verbis iracundiam laudant, cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt, multoque et in hostem et in improbum civem vehementioris iratorum impetus esse, levis autem ratiunculas eorum, qui itam cogitarent: 'proelium rectum est hoc fieri, convenit dimicare pro legibus, pro libertate, pro patria;' haec nullam habent vim, nisi ira excanduit fortitudo. Nec vero de bellatoribus solum disputant: imperia severiora nulla esse putant sine aliqua acerbitate iracundiae; oratorem denique non modo accusantem, sed ne defendentem quidem probant sine aculeis iracundiae, quae etiamsi non adsit, tamen verbis atque motu simulandam arbitrantur, ut auditoris iram oratoris incendat actio. Virum denique videri negant qui irasci nesciet, eamque, quam lenitatem nos dicimus, vitioso lentitudinis nomine appellant.

[44] Nec vero solum hanc libidinem laudant - est enim ira, ut modo definivi, ulciscendi libido -, sed ipsum illud genus vel libidinis vel cupiditatis ad summam utilitatem esse dicunt a natura datum; nihil enim quemquam nisi quod lubeat praeclare facere posse. Noctu ambulabat in publico Themistocles, quod somnum capere non posset, quaerentibusque respondebat Miltiadis tropaeis se e somno suscitari. Cui non sunt auditae Demosthenis vigiliae? qui dolere se aiebat, si quando opificum antelucana victus esset industria. Philosophiae denique ipsius principes numquam in suis studiis tantos progressus sine flagranti cupiditate facere potuissent. Ultimas terras lustrasse Pythagoran Democritum Platonem accepimus; ubi enim quicquid esset quod disci posset, eo veniendum iudicaverunt. Num putamus haec fieri sine summo cupiditatis ardore potuisse?

19. The grounds on which anger and inordinate desire are commended as serviceable.

19. What remains to be said ? This indeed, — that these same Peripatetics not only call those perturbations which, as I think, ought to be extirpated, natural, but maintain that they were given by Nature with a view to their usefulness. They reason in this wise. They first say a great deal in praise of auger. They call it the whetstone of courage, and maintain that it will make the assaults on the enemy and on the bad citizen more energetic ; that there is no weight in the paltry reasoning, "It is right that this battle should be fought ; it is fitting to contend for the laws, for liberty, for the fatherland ;" that these things have no force unless courage be inflamed by anger. Nor do they confine themselves to soldiers alone. They think that no very rigid commands can be given without some bitterness of anger. Finally, they do not approve of an orator's conducting a defence, much less of his making an accusation, without the spur of anger, which, if not real, should, as they think, be counterfeited by word and gesture, so that the manner of the orator may kindle the hearer's anger. They deny that there is any man who knows not how to be angry, and what we term "lenity," they call by the bad name of "sluggishness." Nor do they content themselves with praising this desire (for anger, as I just now defined it, is the desire of revenge) ; but they say that the entire class of desires or appetencies was given by Nature with a view to the highest usefulness ; for no one can do well what he does not want to do. Themistocles walked the street by night because he could not put himself to sleep, and to those who asked why, he answered that he was roused from sleep by the trophies of Miltiades. Who has not heard of the vigils of Demosthenes, who said that it pained him whenever in his work before daylight any artisan got the start of him ? Finally, the leading men in philosophy itself could never have made such progress in their studies without burning desire. We are told that Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato traversed the ends of the earth, thinking it incumbent on them to go wherever there was anything to be learned. Can we imagine that this could have been done without extremely ardent desire ?

 

XX. [45] Ipsam aegritudinem, quam nos ut taetram et inmanem beluam fugiendam diximus, non sine magna utilitate a natura dicunt constitutam, ut homines castigationibus reprehensionibus ignominiis adfici se in delicto dolerent. Impunitas enim peccatorum data videtur eis qui ignominiam et infamiam ferunt sine dolore; morderi est melius conscientia. Ex quo est illud e vita ductum ab Afranio: nam cum dissolutus filius:

'Heu me miserum!'
tum severus pater:
'Dum modo doleat aliquid, doleat quidlubet.'
[46] Reliquas quoque partis aegritudinis utilis esse dicunt, misericordiam ad opem ferendam et calamitates horninum indignorum sublevandas; ipsum illud aemulari obtrectare non esse inutile, cum aut se non idem videat consecutum, quod alium, aut alium idem, quod se; metum vero si qui sustulisset, omnem vitae diligentiam sublatam fore, quae summa esset in eis qui leges, qui magistratus, qui paupertatem, qui ignominiam, qui mortem, qui dolorem timerent. Haec tamen ita disputant, ut resecanda esse fateantur, evelli penitus dicant nec posse nec opus esse et in omnibus fere rebus mediocritatem esse optumam existiment. Quae cum exponunt, nihilne tibi videntur an aliquid dicere?
      - Mihi vero dicere aliquid, itaque expecto, quid ad ista.
20. The grounds on which grief in moderation is justified.

20. Even grief, which, as I said, should be shunned as a foul and savage beast, they regard as appointed by Nature not without great usefulness, that men in their wrong-doing might feel pain in being visited with chastisement, reproach, ignominy; for impunity in evil seems granted to those who bear ignominy and infamy without pain. To be thus stung by their fellow-men is of more efficacy than conscience. Hence that scene drawn from life in the play of Afranius, when the profligate son exclaims,

"Ah wretched me, in grief and suffering sore !"
and the stern father says,
"If he but grieve, I care not why he grieves"
They say that the other forms of grief have their utility, — that pity leads men to give needed help, and to relieve the calamities of the unworthy ; that even emulation and detraction are not useless, when one sees either that he has not attained what another has, or that another has attained what he himself has ; and that were fear taken away, life would be bereft of the circumspection which is most manifest in those who fear the laws, the magistrates, poverty, ignominy, death, pain. They yet, in treating of grief and fear, acknowledge that they ought to be cut close, but say that they cannot be and need not be wholly rooted out ; and in general they regard moderation in everything as preferable. Do you think it necessary for me to say anything about their treatment of these subjects ?

A. I do. I therefore am awaiting what you have to say upon them.

 

XXI. [47] - Reperiam fortasse, sed illud ante: videsne, quanti fuerit apud Academicos verecondia? plane enim dicunt, quod ad rem pertineat. Peripateticis respondetur a Stoicis; digladientur illi per me licet, cui nihil est necesse nisi, ubi sit illud, quod veri simillimum videatur, anquirere. Quid est igitur quod occurrat in hac quaestione, e quo possit attingi aliquid veri simile, quo longius mens humana progredi non potest? Definitio perturbationis, qua recte Zenonem usum puto; ita enim definit, ut perturbatio sit aversa ratione contra naturam animi commotio, vel brevius, ut perturbatio sit adpetitus vehementior, vehementior autem intellegatur is qui procul absit a naturae constantia.

[48] Quid ad has definitiones possim dicere? Atque haec pleraque sunt prudenter acuteque disserentium, illa quidem ex rhetorum pompa: 'ardores animorum cotesque virtutum.' An vero vir fortis, nisi stomachari coepit, non potest fortis esse? Gladiatorium id quidem. Quamquam in eis ipsis videmus saepe constantiam:

'Conlocuntur, congrediuntur, quaerunt aliquid, postulant,'
ut magis placati quam irati esse videantur. Sed in illo genere sit sane Pacideianus aliquis hoc animo, ut narrat Lucilius:
'Occidam illum equidem et vincam, si id quaeritis' inquit,
'Verum illud credo fore: in os prius accipiam ipse
Quam gladium in stomacho furi ac pulmonibus sisto.
Odi hominem, iratus pugno, nec longius quicquam
Nobis, quam dextrae gladium dum acconuno alter;
Usque adeo studio atque odio illius ecferor ira';
21. Anger never necessary.

21. M. I shall perhaps find something to the point ; but I want first to remind you how modest the Academics are ; for what they say meets the case in hand. The Stoics answer the Peripatetics. So far as I care they may fight it out ; for all that I need to ask is, What seems most probable ? Farther than this the human mind cannot go. I agree with Zeno in his definition of perturbation, which he describes as a commotion of mind averse from reason, contrary to nature, or, more comprehensively, as a too vehement desire, that being understood as too vehement which is remote from the even course of Nature. What can be said against these definitions ? Such utterances come from men who discuss the subject wisely and acutely. But "ardor of souls," "whetstones of the virtues," and the like, proceed from rhetorical display. Now cannot a brave man be brave unless he begins to be angry ? This may indeed be said of gladiators. Yet in them we sometimes see unruffled firmness. They converse, walk together, make complaints and demands, in such a way as to seem peaceably disposed rather than angry. But among them there may indeed sometimes be one of the disposition of Pacideianus as personated by Lucilius : —

"I'll kill and conquer him as sure as fate.
I may indeed he wounded at the outset ;
But in his lungs and heart my sword shall rest.
I hate the man, I fight inflamed with anger,
And hardly hold myself from rushing on him
Till each is duly armed for the encounter."

 

XXII. [49] At sine hac gladiatoria iracundia videmus progredientem apud Homerum Aiacem multa cum hilaritate, cum depugnaturus esset cum Hectore; cuius, ut arma sumpsit, ingressio laetitiam attulit sociis, terrorem autem hostibus, ut ipsum Hectorem, quem ad modum est apud Homerum, toto pectore trementem provocasse ad pugnam paeniteret. Atque hi conlocuti inter se, prius quam manum consererent, leniter et quiete nihil ne in ipsa quidem pugna iracunde rabioseve fecerunt. Ego ne Torquatum quidem illum, qui hoc cognomen invenit, iratum existimo Gallo torquem detraxisse, nec Marcellum apud Clastidium ideo fortem fuisse, quia fuerit iratus.

[50] De Africano quidem, quia notior est nobis propter recentem memoriam, vel iurare possum non illum iracundia tum inflammatum fuisse, cum in acie M. Alliennium Paelignum scuto protexerit gladiumque hosti in pectus infixerit. De L. Bruto fortasse dubitarim, an propter infinitum odium tyranni ecfrenatius in Arruntem invaserit; video enim utrumque comminus ictu cecidisse contrario. Quid igitur huc adhibetis iram? An fortitudo, nisi insanire coepit, impetus suos non habet? Quid? Herculem, quem in caelum ista ipsa, quam vos iracundiam esse vultis, sustulit fortitudo, iratumne censes conflixisse cum Erymanthio apro aut leone Nemeaeo? An etiam Theseus Marathonii tauri cornua conprehendit iratus? Vide ne fortitudo minime sit rabiosa sitque iracundia tota levitatis.

22. Signal instances of courage without anger.

22. But without this gladiatorial anger we see Homer's Ajax moving on very cheerfully when he is going to fight with Hector. When he took his arms, his advance toward the place of conflict gave joy to the allies, but struck the enemies with terror, so that Hector himself, according to Homer, trembled all over, and was sorry that he had given the challenge. They calmly and quietly conversed before fighting, and in the fight itself they did nothing angrily or furiously. Nor do I think that the Torquatus who first received this surname was angry when he took the chain from the Gaul, or that Marcellus was brave at Clastidium because he was angry. Of Africanus, better known to us as of more recent fame, I can even swear that he was not inflamed with anger when in battle he protected Marcus Allienus the Pelignian with his shield, and plunged his sword into the enemy's bosom. As to Lucius Brutus I might perhaps hesitate to say whether, on account of his unbounded hatred of the tyrant, he did not rush somewhat impetuously upon Aruns; for I see that they killed each other in close conflict, thrust for thrust. But why do you introduce anger in this connection ? Has not courage its moving force, unless it begins to be mad ? What ? Do you suppose that Hercules, whom the very courage which you identify with anger raised to heaven, was angry when he fought with the Erymanthian boar or the Nemaean lion ? Or was Theseus angry when he took the Marathonian bull by the horns ? Take heed that courage have in your thought the least possible connection with rage, inasmuch as anger is of no weight; nor is that to be deemed courage, which lacks reason.

 

XXIII. Neque enim est ulla fortitudo, quae rationis est expers. [51] 'Contemnendae res humanae sunt, neglegenda mors est, patibiles et dolores et labores putandi'. Haec cum constituta sunt iudicio atque sententia, tum est robusta illa et stabilis fortitudo, nisi forte, quae vehementer acriter animose fiunt iracunde fieri suspicamur. Mihi ne Scipio quidem ille pontufex maxumus, qui hoc Stoicorum verum esse declaravit, numquam privatum esse sapientem, iratus videtur fuisse Ti. Graccho tum, cum consulem languentem reliquit atque ipse privatus, ut si consul esset, qui rem publicam salvam esse vellent, se sequi iussit.

[52] Nescio ecquid ipsi nos fortiter in re p. fecerimus: si quid fecimus, certe irati non fecimus. An est quicquam similius insaniae quam ira? quam bene Ennius 'initium' dixit 'insaniae.' Color, vox, oculi, spiritus, inpotentia dictorum ac factorum quam partem habent sanitatis? Quid Achille Homerico foedius, quid Agamemnone in iurgio? Nam Aiacem quidem ira ad furorem mortemque perduxit. Non igitur desiderat fortitudo advocatam iracundiam; satis est instructa parata armata per sese. Nam isto quidem modo licet dicere utilem vinulentiam ad fortitudinem, utilem etiam dementiam, quod et insani et ebrii multa faciunt saepe vehementÏus. Semper Aiax fortis, fortissimus tamen in furore; nam

Facinus fecit maximum, cum Danais inclinantibus
Summam rem perfecit manu.
23. Anger differs little from insanity.

23. Human fortunes are to be despised ; death is to be looked upon as of no account ; pain and labor are to be regarded as endurable. When these principles are established in opinion and feeling, then there exists a truly robust and firm courage, unless it be suspected that whatever is done ardently, eagerly, spiritedly is done under the impulse of anger. The chief priest Scipio, who reaffirmed the maxim of the Stoics that the wise man is never a private citizen, does not seem to me to have been angry with Tiberius Gracchus, when he left the consul faint-hearted, and though a private man, as if he were the consul ordered those who desired the safety of the State to follow him. I know not what courageous service I myself may have rendered in the commonwealth ; if any, it has certainly not been in anger. Is there anything more like insanity than anger, which Ennius rightly called the beginning of insanity? What symptom of a sound mind is there in the complexion, voice, eyes, breath, lack of self-command in word and deed, of him who is angry? What is more unseemly than Homer's Achilles and Agamemnon in their quarrel ? Indeed, anger led Ajax on to madness and death. Courage then does not require the aid of anger ; it is of itself sufficiently endowed, prepared, armed. If anger be requisite to courage, in like manner we may say that drunkenness, nay, even insanity, helps courage; for madmen and drunkards are wont to do many things with excessive vehemence. Ajax, always brave, is most brave when he is mad.

"His greatest feat was when the Greeks gave way,
And he, a madman, turned the tide of battle."

 

XXIV. [53] Proelium restituit insaniens: dicamus igitur utilem insaniam? Tracta definitiones fortitudinis: intelleges eam stomacho non egere. Fortitudo est igitur 'adfectio animi legi summae in perpetiendis rebus obtemperans' vel 'conservatio stabilis iudicii in eis rebus quae formidolosae videntur subeundis et repellendis' vel 'scientia rerum formidolosarum contrariarumque aut omnino neglegendarum conservans earum rerum stabile iudicium' vel brevius, ut Chrysippus (nam superiores definitiones erant Sphaeri, hominis in primis bene definientis, ut putant Stoici; sunt enim omnino omnes fere similes, sed declarant communis notiones alia magis alia) - quo modo igitur Chrysippus? 'Fortitudo est' inquit 'scientia rerum perferendarum vel adfectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo summae legi parens sine timore.' Quamvis licet insectemur istos, ut Carneades solebat, metuo ne soli philosophi sint. Quae enim istarum definitionum non aperit notionem nostram, quam habemus omnes de fortitudine tectam atque involutam? Qua aperta quis est qui aut bellatori aut imperatori aut oratori quaerat aliquid neque eos existumet sine rabie quicquam fortiter facere posse?

[54] Quid? Stoici, qui omnes insipientes insanos esse dicunt, nonne ista conligunt? Remove perturbationes maxumeque iracundiam: iam videbuntur monstra dicere. Nunc autem ita disserunt, sic se dicere omnes stultos insanire, ut male olere omne caenum. 'At non semper.' Commove: senties. Sic iracundus non semper iratus est; lacesse: iam videbis furentem. Quid? ista bellatrix iracundia, cum domum rediit, qualis est cum uxore, cum liberis, cum familia? an tum quoque est utilis? Est igitur aliquid quod perturbata mens melius possit facere quam constans? an quisquam potest sine perturbatione mentis irasci? Bene igitur nostri, cum omnia essent in moribus vitia, quod nullum erat iracundia foedius, iracundos solos morosos nominaverunt.

24. Courage defined.

24. May we say therefore that madness is serviceable ? Consider the definitions of courage, and you will understand that it has no need of passion. Courage is defined to be an affection of the mind which in whatever is to be endured obeys the highest law ; or, the maintenance of a firm decision in enduring and repelling those things that seem formidable ; or, the science of bearing or altogether ignoring formidable and adverse things, with the maintenance of a firm decision with regard to them; or, more briefly, in the words of Chrysippus; for these definitions are all from Sphaerus, whom the Stoics regard as peculiarly skilled in definition, and they are all nearly alike, expressing the common sentiment with greater or less accuracy. But how does Chrysippus define courage ? It is, he says, the science of bearing things, or an affection of the mind fearlessly obedient to the highest law in suffering and enduring. Although we may inveigh against these men, as Carneades used to do, I apprehend that they may be the only philosophers ; for which of these definitions does not develop the obscure and involved notion which we all have of courage ? When this is developed, who is there that can demand anything more for the warrior, or the commander, or the orator, or can imagine that either cannot do anything bravely unless he be enraged ? What ? Do not the Stoics, who say that all who are unwise are insane, include the angry among the unwise ? Exclude perturbations of mind, most of all, irascibility, and their language will seem absurd. But what they say in their treatment of the subject is this, — that the unwise are insane in the sense in which every cesspool smells badly, — not all the time, — stir it, and you have the smell. So the irascible man is not always angry, — provoke him, and you will see him in a rage. What? How does this warlike irascibility show itself with wife .and children, when it has returned home ? Is there anything which a disturbed mind can do better than a self-collected mind ? Or can any one be angry without disturbance of mind ? Our people, therefore, since all faults belong to the department of morals, because there was nothing more offensive than irascibility, were right in reserving the name of "morose" for the irascible.

 

XXV. [55] Oratorem vero irasci minime decet, simulare non decet. An tibi irasci tum videmur, cum quid in causis acrius et vehementius dicimus? Quid? cum iam rebus transactis et praeteritis orationes scribimus, num irati scribimus?

'Ecquis hoc animadvertit? vincite!'
Num aut egisse umquam iratum Aesopum aut scripsisse existimas iratum Accium? Aguntur ista praeclare et ab oratore quidem melius, si modo est orator, quam ab ullo histrione, sed aguntur leniter et mente tranquilla. Libidinem vero laudare cuius est libidinis? Themistoclem mihi et Demosthenen profertis, additis Pithagoran Democritum Platonem. Quid? vos studia libidinem vocatis? quae vel optimarum rerum, ut ea sunt quae profertis, sedata tamen et tranquilla esse debent. Iam aegritudinem laudare, unam rem maxime detestabilem, quorum est tandem philosophorum? At commode dixit Afranius:
'Dum modo doleat aliquid, doleat quidlibet.'
Dixit enim de adolescente perdito ac dissoluto, nos autem de constanti viro ac sapienti quaerimus. Et quidem ipsam illam iram centurio habeat aut signifer vel ceteri, de quibus dici non necesse est, ne rhetorum aperiamus mysteria; utile est enim uti motu animi, qui uti ratione non potest: nos autem, ut testificor saepe, de sapiente quaerimus.
25. Inordinate desire is never serviceable.

25. It is by no means becoming for an orator to be angry ; it is not unbecoming for him to simulate auger. Do I seem to you to be angry when in pleading a cause I speak very earnestly and vehemently ? What ? When I write out my orations, after the affairs at issue are finished and past, do I write in anger ? Do you think that when Aesopus on the stage exclaims, "Who saw this ? bind him," he is angry, or that Attius was angry when he wrote the play ? These emotions are acted well, and indeed better by an orator, if he be indeed an orator, than by any stage-player ; but they are acted deliberately and with a quiet mind. Then what wantonness it is to praise inordinate desire ! You cite for me Themistocles and Demosthenes; you add Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato. What ? Do you call their studies inordinate desire ? Studies of the best things, such as you bring forward, ought to be calm and tranquil. Then again, to what philosophers does it belong to commend grief, the one thing of all most detestable ? Afranius indeed very fitly wrote,—

"If he but grieve, I care not why he grieves ;"
but this was said of an abandoned and profligate youth, while our inquiry is concerning a firm and wise man. Anger itself may be permitted to a centurion, or a standard-bearer, or others whom I need not mention, lest I tell the secrets of the rhetoricians ; for it is of service for one who has not reason at command to avail himself of emotion. My inquiry, however, as I often repeat, is about the wise man.

 

XXVI. [56] At etiam aemulari utile est, obtrectare, misereri. Cur misereare potius quam feras opem, si id facere possis? an sine misericordia liberales esse non possumus? Non enim suscipere ipsi aegritudines propter alios debemus, sed alios, si possumus, levare aegritudine. Obtrectare vero alteri aut illa vitiosa aemulatione, quae rivalitati similis est, aemulari quid habet utilitatis, cum sit aemulantis angi alieno bono quod ipse non habeat, obtrectantis autem angi alieno bono, quod id etiam alius habeat? Qui id adprobari possit, aegritudinem suscipere pro experientia, si quid habere velis? nam solum habere velle summa dementia est.

[57] Mediocritates autem malorum quis laudare recte possit? Quis enim potest, in quo libido cupiditasve sit, non libidinosus et cupidus esse? in quo ira, non iracundus? in quo angor, non anxius? in quo timor, non timidus? Libidinosum igitur et iracundum et anxium et timidum censemus esse sapientem? De cuius excellentia multa quidem dici quamvis fuse lateque possunt, sed brevissime illo modo, sapientiam esse rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque, quae cuiusque rei causa sit; ex quo eflÏcitur, ut divina imitetur, humana omnia inferiore virtute ducat. In hanc tu igitur tamquam in mare, quod est ventis subiectum perturbationem cadere tibi dixisti videri? Quid est quod tantam gravitatem constantiamque perturbet? an improvisum aliquid aut repentinum? Quid potest accidere tale ei, cui nihil, quod homini evenire possit, ? Nam quod aiunt nimia resecari oportere, naturale relinqui, quid tandem potest esse naturale, quod idem nimium esse possit? Sunt enim omnia ista ex errorum orta radicibus, quae evellenda et extrahenda penitus, non circumcidenda nec amputanda sunt.

26. Nor is emulation, detraction, or pity.

26. But it is said that emulation, detraction, pity are of service. Yet why do you pity rather than give help if you can ? For we ought not ourselves to incur grief on account of others, but, if we can, to relieve others of grief. Then what use is there in detraction, or in emulation of that vicious type which resembles jealous rivalry, since it is the part of such emulation for one to be vexed at another's good which he has not, — of detraction, to be vexed at another's good because it is his ? How can it be worthy of approval for you to grieve if you want anything instead of trying to obtain it ? And it is the extreme of folly to desire to be the sole possessor of any good. But who can rightly praise the moderate possession of evils ? For can one in whom there is lust or cupidity be otherwise than lustful and avaricious ? Is not he in whom there is anger irascible ? Is not he in whom there is anxiety anxious ? Is not he in whom there is fear timid ? Do we then think that the wise man is lustful, and irascible, and anxious, and timid ? The excellence of the wise man admits of copious and broad treatment ; but wishing to be as brief as possible, I will only say that wisdom is the science of things divine and human, and the knowledge of the cause of everything. Hence it is that the wise man imitates things divine, and counts all things human as inferior to virtue. Now do you profess to think that this condition of mind is liable to perturbation, as the sea is to gusts of wind ? What is there that• can disturb such gravity and firmness ? Anything unprovided for and sudden ? What of this sort can happen to one whom nothing that can happen to man. can take by surprise ? As to what is said about the fitness of cutting off what is excessive and leaving what is natural, what can be natural of which there can be too much ? For all these things grow from roots of errors that must be torn up and pulled out, not lopped and pruned.

 

XXVII. [58] Sed quoniam suspicor te non tam de sapiente quam de te ipso quaerere - illum enim putas omni perturbatione esse liberum, te vis -, videamus, quanta sint quae philosophia remedia morbis animorum adhibeantur. Est enim quaedam medicina certe, nec tam fuit hominum generi infensa atque inimica natura, ut corporibus tot res salutaris, animis nullam invenerit; de quibus hoc etiam est merita melius, quod corporum adiumenta adhibentur extrinsecus, animorum salus inclusa in is ipsis est. Sed quo maior est in eis praestantia et divinior, eo maiore indigent diligentia. Itaque bene adhibita ratio cernit, quid optumum sit, neglecta multis implicatur erroribus.

[59] Ad te igitur mihi iam convertenda omnis oratio est; simulas enim quaerere te de sapiente, quaeris autem fortasse de te. Earum igitur perturbationum, quas exposui, variae sunt curationes. Nam neque omnis aegritudo, una ratione sedatur (alia est enim lugenti, alia miseranti aut invidendi adhibenda medicina); est etiam in omnibus quattuor perturbationibus illa distinctio, utrum ad universam perturbationem, quae est aspernatio rationis aut adpetitus vehementior, an ad singulas, ut ad metum lubidinem reliquas melius adhibeatur oratio, et utili illudne non videatur aegre ferundum, ex quo suscepta sit aegritudo, an omnium rerum tollenda omnino aegritudo, ut, si quis aegre ferat se pauperem esse, idne disputes, paupertatem malum non esse, an hominem aegre ferre nihil oportere. Nimirum hoc melius, ne, si forte de paupertate non persuaseris, sit aegritudini concedendum; aegritudine autem sublata propriis rationibus, quibus heri usi sumus, quodam modo etiam paupertatis malum tollitur.

27. Curative treatment of the perturbations.

27. But as I suspect that you are not inquiring about the wise man so much as about yourself— thinking that he is free from every perturbation, and yourself desiring to be so — let us see what are the remedies which philosophy applies to the diseases of the soul. There certainly is some curative treatment ; for never was Nature so hostile and inimical to the human race as to contrive so many means of health for bodies, none for souls, for which she has really done even better, inasmuch as such helps as the body needs are furnished from without, while those that the soul requires it contains. But the greater and the more divine the excellence of the soul, the more careful diligence does it need. Therefore reason, well applied, discerns what is best ; carelessly employed, is involved in many errors. All that I shall now say must then be specially directed to you ; for while you feign to be inquiring about the wise man, you are really inquiring about yourself. Now there are various cures for the perturbations which I have explained ; for all diseases are not relieved in the same way, — one mode of treatment must be applied to grief, another to pity or to envy. It is optional, too, in our treatment of the four classes of perturbations, whether what is to be said shall apply to perturbation in general, which is a spurning of reason or an excess of desire, or whether it shall apply to each severally, as to fear, lust, and the others, — also whether the aim shall be to show that the particular cause of grief is one that ought not to be borne distressfully, or entirely to remove grief for all causes whatsoever, — for instance, in case one were bearing poverty in a sorrowful spirit, whether it be desirable to prove that poverty is not an evil, or that man ought not for any reason to suffer grief. Undoubtedly this last is the better mode ; for should your reasoning about poverty fail to carry conviction, you must permit the man to grieve, while when grief is taken away by such appropriate arguments as we employed yesterday, the evil of poverty is also in some sort taken away.

 

XXVIII. [60] Sed omnis eius modi perturbatio animi placatione abluatur illa quidem, cum doceas nec bonum illud esse, ex quo laetitia aut libido oriatur, nec malum, ex quo aut metus aut aegritudo; verum tamen haec est certa et propria sanatio, si doceas ipsas perturbationes per se esse vitiosas nec habere quicquam aut naturale aut necessarium, ut ipsam aegritudinem leniri videmus, cum obicimus maerentibus imbecillitatem animi ecfeminati, cumque eorum gravitatem constantiamque laudamus, qui non turbulente humana patiantur. Quod quidem solet eis etiam accidere, qui illa mala esse censent, ferenda tamen aequo animo arbitrantur. Putat aliquis esse voluptatem bonum, alius autem, pecuniam; tamen et ille ab intemperantia et hic ab avaritia avocari potest. Illa autem altera ratio et oratio, quae simul et opinionem falsam tollit et aegritudinem detrahit, est ea quidem utilior, sed raro proficit neque est ad volgus adhibenda.

[61] Quaedam autem sunt aegritudines, quas levare illa medicina nullo modo possit, ut, si quis aegre ferat nihil in se esse virtutis, nihil animi, nihil officii, nihil honestatis, propter mala is quidem angatur, sed alia quaedam sit ad eum admovenda curatio, et talis quidem, quae possit esse omnium etiam de ceteris rebus discrepantium philosophorum. Inter omnis enim convenire oportet commotiones animorum a recta ratione aversas esse vitiosas, ut, etiamsi vel mala sint illa, quae metum aegritudinemve, vel bona, quae cupiditatem laetitiamve moveant, tamen sit vitiosa ipsa commotio. Constantem enim quendam volumus, sedatum, gravem, humana omnia spernentem illum esse, quem magnanimum et fortem virum dicimus. Talis autem nec maerens nec timens nec cupiens nec gestiens esse quisquam potest. Eorum enim haec sunt, qui eventus humanos superiores quam suos animos esse ducunt.

28. The best cure is the belief that they are vicious in their very nature.

28. But every perturbation of the kind under discussion may be washed away by this soothing process for the mind, namely, by teaching that the special object from which inordinate joy or desire springs is not a good, nor that which causes either fear or grief an evil. Nevertheless, the sure and fitting cure is to teach that the. perturbations themselves are in their, very essence vicious, and have about them nothing that is natural or necessary, — since we see grief itself allayed when we charge persons in sorrow with the feebleness of an effeminate mind, and when we praise the solidity and firmness of those who bear the vicissitudes of human fortune unmoved. This, however, is wont to be the case even with persons who regard these things as evils, yet think that they ought to be borne with equanimity. Thus one man regards pleasure as a good, another, money ; yet the former can be called away from intemperance, the latter, from avarice. But the other mode of reasoning and discoursing, which takes. away at the same time both the false opinion and the disease itself, is indeed more serviceable, yet is rarely, made availing, and does not admit of being applied to mankind at large. There are also some diseases -which that mode of treatment cannot in any wise relieve. Thus, if one is grieved by the consciousness that there is in him no virtue, no soul, no sense of duty, no honor, he may indeed be distressed by real evils ; but some other curative treatment must be applied to him, and such treatment as may have the sanction of all philosophers, however far apart they may be in other matters. All must indeed agree that commotions of mind opposed to right reason are vicious, so that, even if those things which cause fear or grief are evil, or those which excite inordinate desire or joy, good, yet the commotion itself is vicious ; for we all desire that the man whom we call magnanimous and brave should be firm, calm, of massive character, superior to all human vicissitudes. But one who either grieves, or fears, or covets, or is elated by joy, cannot be of this character ; for the morbid affections that I have named belong to those who regard the events of human life as of higher importance than their own souls have.

 

XXIX. [62 ] Quare omnium philosophorum, ut ante dixi, una ratio est medendi, ut nihil, quale sit illud quod perturbet animum, sed de ipsa sit perturbatione dicendum. Itaque primum in ipsa cupiditate, cum id solum agitur utea tollatur, non, est quaerendum, bonum illud necne sit quod lubidinem moveat, sed lubido ipsa tollenda ut, sive, quod honestum est, id sit summum bonum, sive voluptas sive horum utrumque coniunctum sive tria illa genera bonorum, tamen, etiamsi virtutis ipsius vehementior adpetitus sit, eadem sit omnibus ad deterrendum adhibenda oratio. Continet autem omnem sedationem animi humana in conspectu posita natura; quae quo facilius expressa cernatur, explicanda est oratione communis condicio lexque vitae.

[63] Itaque non sine causa, cum Orestem fabulam doceret Euripides, primos tris versus revocasse dicitur Socrates:

'Neque tam terribilis ulla fando oratio est,
Nec sors nec ira caelitum invectum malum,
Quod non natura humana patiendo ecferat.'
Est autem utilis ad persuadendum ea quae acciderint ferri et posse et oportere enumeratio eorum qui tulerunt. Etsi aegritudinis sedatio et hesterna disputatione explicata est et in Consolationis libro, quem in medio - non enim sapientes eramus - maerore et dolore conscripsimus; quodque vetat Chrysippus, ad recentÏs quasi tumores animi remedium adhibere, id nos fecimus naturaeque vim attulimus, ut magnitudini medicinae doloris magnitudo concederet.
29. The evil of inordinate desire is not diminished by the worth of its object.

29. Therefore, as I have already stated, all the philosophers have one method of cure, so that nothing need be said as to the quality of that which disturbs the mind, but only as to the disturbance itself. Thus as regards inordinate desire, if the only thing in view be its removal, it is not to be asked whether the object be good or not, — the desire itself is to be taken away, so that whether the supreme good be the right, or pleasure, or the two combined, or what are commonly called the three kinds of good, yet even if it be the desire for virtue itself that is unduly strong, the same dissuasives are to be urged upon all. But human nature, on close inspection, is found to contain every means for calming the mind ; and that it may be more easily placed in clear view, the condition and law of life must be explained. Therefore it was not without reason that when Euripides brought out the play of Orestes, Socrates called for the repetition of the first three verses : —

"No doom by tragic muse or wrath divine
Is told or felt, so full of bitter woe,
That human patience cannot bear the load."
The enumeration of those who have borne the like is of service in persuading men that what has befallen them can be and ought to be borne. But the mode of calming grief was expounded in our yesterday's discussion, as also in my book entitled Consolation, which I wrote in the midst of grief and pain (for I was not then wise), and what Chrysippus forbids, the employing of curative treatment for agitations of the soul still recent, I did, and applied force to nature, that the greatness of the pain might yield to the greatness of the cure.

 

XXX. [64] Sed aegritudini, de qua satis est disputatum, finitimus est metus, de quo pauca dicenda sunt. Est enim metus, ut aegritudo praesentis, sic ille futuri mali. Itaque non nulli aegritudinis partem quandam metum esse dicebant, alii autem metum praemolestiam appellabant, quod esset quasi dux consequentis molestiae. Quibus igitur rationibus instantia feruntur, eisdem contemnuntur sequentia. Nam videndum est in utrisque, ne quid humile summissum molle ecfeminatum fractum abiectumque faciamus. Sed quamquam de ipsius metus inconstantia inbecillitate levitate dicendum est, tamen multum prodest ea, quae metuuntur, ipsa contemnere. Itaque sive casu accidit sive consilio, percommode factum est, quod eis de rebus quae maxime metuuntur, de morte et de dolore, primo et proxumo die disputatum est. Quae si probata sunt, metu magna ex parte liberati sumus.

30. Fear must be prevented or subdued by contempt for its objects.

30. Closely allied to grief, which has been sufficiently discussed, is fear, on which a few things need to be said. As grief appertains to present, so does fear to future evil. Therefore some have said that fear is a division under the head of grief, while others have called it "trouble anticipated," because it is, so to speak, the leader of trouble that is going to follow. For all the reasons, then, for which things present are endured, things future are held in contempt. With regard to both, equal heed must be given that we do nothing grovelling, mean, soft, effeminate, broken-spirited and abject. But although Ave must speak of the irresolution, feebleness, light-headedness of fear, it yet is of great service to despise the very things which are the objects of fear. Therefore, whether it happened by chance or was of design, it was very much to our purpose that on the first and second day we discussed the things that are most feared, — death and pain. If our conclusions on these subjects are approved, we are freed in great part from fear.

 

XXXI. [65] Ac de malorum opinione hactenus; videamus nunc de bonorum, id est de laetitia et de cupiditate. Mihi quidem in tota ratione ea, quae pertinet ad animi perturbationem, una, res videtur causam continere, omnis eas esse in nostra potestate, omnis iudicio susceptas, omnis voluntarias. Hic igitur error est eripiendus, haec detrahenda opinio atque ut in malis opinatis tolerabilia, sic in bonis sedatiora sunt effÏcienda ea quae magna et laetabilia ducuntur. Atque hoc quidem commune malorum et bonorum, ut, si iam difficile sit persuadere nihil earum rerum, quae perturbent animum, aut in bonis aut in malis esse habendum, tamen alia ad alium motum curatio sit adhibenda aliaque ratione malevolus, alia amator, alia rursus anxius, alia timidus corrigendus.

[66] Atque erat facile sequentem eam rationem, quae maxume probatur de bonis et malis, negare umquam laetitia adfici posse insipientem, quod nihil umquam haberet boni; sed loquimur nunc more communi. Sint sane ista bona, quae putantur, honores divitiae voluptates cetera, tamen in eis ipsis potiundis exultans gestiensque laetitia turpis est, ut, si ridere concessum sit, vituperetur tamen cachinnatio. Eodem enim vitio est ecfusio animi in laetitita quo in dolore contractio, eademque levitate cupiditas est in appetendo qua laetitia in fruendo, et ut nimis adflicti molestia, sic nimis elati laetitia iure iudicantur leves; et, curvi invidere aegritudinis sit, malis autem alienis voluptatem capere laetitiae, utrumque immanitate et feritate quadam proponendo castigari solet; atque ut cavere decet, timere non decet, sic gaudere decet, laetari non decet, quoniam docendi causa a gaudio laetitiam distinguimus;

[67] illud iam supra diximus, contractionem animi recte fieri numquam posse, elationem posse. Aliter enim Naevianus ille gaudet Hector:

'Laetus sum laudari me abs te, pater, a laudato viro',
aliter ille apud Trabeam:
'Lena delenita argento nutum observabit meum,
Quid velim, quid studeam. Adveniens digito impellam ianuam,
Fores patebunt. De Inproviso Chrysis ubi me aspexerit,
Alacris ob viam mihi veniet complexum exoptans meum,
Mihi se dedet.'
Quam haec pulchra putet, ipse iam dicet:
'Fortunam ipsam anteibo fortunis meis'.
31. All perturbations are matters of opinion, voluntary, under our own control.

31. Thus far as to opinion about evils. Let us now consider opinion about goods, that is, inordinate gladness and desire. To me, indeed, it seems that in everything appertaining to perturbations of mind the entire case is contained in the one fact that all these perturbations are under our own control, all of our own choice, all voluntary. The error that is their source must, then, be removed, the opinion from which they spring must be extirpated ; and as of supposed evils such as we encounter are thus to be made more tolerable, so among supposed goods such as are called great and gladsome are to be received with a calmer mind: Yet as to both evils and goods, if it is difficult to convince any one that none of those things that disturb the mind ought to be accounted as among either goods or evils, different modes of treatment must be applied to different mental disorders, — the malevolent must be corrected in one way, the amatory in another, the anxious, again, in another, the timid in yet another. It were indeed easy, according to the most approved mode of reasoning concerning good and evil, to show that an unwise man can have had no experience of happiness, inasmuch as he never possessed any true good. But I am now using the language of common life. Suppose then that those are really goods which. are regarded as such, honors, riches, pleasures, and the like, yet exulting and extravagant joy in their possession is shameful, just as while laughter may be permitted, cachinnation may deserve reproof. The same blame rests on exhilaration in gladness as on depression in pain ; over-earnestness in seeking objects of desire is on the same footing with an excess of happiness in their enjoyment ; and as those who are too much cast down by trouble, so those who are too much elated by joy are fitly regarded as light-minded. Still further, as envy comes under the head of grief, so does taking pleasure in another's misfortunes under that of joy, and both are usually chastised by the exposure of their savageness and beastliness. Moreover, as it is becoming to avoid rashness, unbecoming to fear, so is it becoming to be happy, unbecoming to be immoderately glad ; for in order to be explicit I distinguish between the two. I have already said that depression of the mind can never be right, that elation may be ; for the joy of Hector in the play of Naevius,

"I joy to hear my praise from one who merits praise," [Hector Proficiscens]
is of an entirely different type from that expressed in these verses of Trabea, —
"The kind procuress, by my money won,
Will meet my will. My touch will move the doors,
And Chrysis, who does not expect my coming,
Will rush with joyful greeting as I enter,
And gladly welcome my desired embrace."
How splendid the personage in the play regards this, he himself shall tell : —
"Fortune herself falls short of my good fortunes."

 

XXXII. [68] Haec laetitia quam turpis sit, satis est diligenter attendentem penitus videre. Et ut turpes sunt, qui ecferunt se laetitia tum cum fruuntur Veneriis voluptatibus, sic flagitiosi, qui eas inflammato animo concupiscunt. Totus vero iste, qui volgo appellatur amor - nec hercule invenio, quo nomine alio possit appellari -, tantae levitatis est, ut nihil videam quod putem conferendum. Quem Caecilius

'deum qui non summum putet,
aut stultum aut rerum esse imperitum' existumat.
'Cui in manu sit,'quem esse dementem velit,
Quem sapere' quem sanari' quem in morbum inici,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quem contra amari, quem expeti, quem arcessier.'
[69] 0 praeclaram emendatricem vitae poÎticam, quae amorem flagitii et levitatis auctorem in concilio deorum conlocandum putet! De comoedia loquor, quae, si haec flagitia non probaremus, nulla esset omnino; quid ait ex tragoedia princeps ille Argonautarum?
'Tu me amoris magis quam honoris servavisti gratia.'
Quid ergo? hic amor Medeae quanta miseriarum excitavit incendia! Atque ea tamen apud alium poÎtam patri dicere audet se 'coniugem' habuisse
'Illum, Amor quem dederat, qui plus pollet potiorque est patre'.
32. Love, treated indulgently by the poets.

32. One needs only careful consideration to perceive in his inmost soul how shameful is joy of this type ; and as those are base who are transported with gladness in the enjoyment of sensual pleasure, so are those scandalously vile whose minds are inflamed with desire for such indulgence. Indeed, all of what is commonly called "love" (nor, by Hercules, can I find any other name for it) is so trivial that I can see nothing to be compared with it. Yet Caecilius says of it : —

"A fool is he, or in affairs unversed,
Who deems not Love supreme and sovereign God,
Whose hand dispenses madness, wisdom, health,
Disease, success, reciprocated love,
His own caprice his all-sufficient law."
? poetry, what a pre-eminent corrector of life, which seeks to place Love, the creator of profligacy and levity, in the council of the gods ! I am speaking of comedy, which, if we did not approve of these vilenesses, would have no existence at all. But what, even in tragedy, says that leader of the Argonauts ?
"You saved my life for love, and not for honor." [Ennius, Medea Exul]
What then ? What flames of wretchedness did the love of Medea kindle ! And she, in the words of another poet, says that she had a husband,
"The gift of Love, far dearer than a father." [probably from Pacuvius, Medea]

 

XXXIII. [70] Sed poÎtas ludere sinamus, quorum fabulis in hoc flagitio versari ipsum videmus Iovem: ad magistros virtutis philosophos veniamus, qui amorem negant stupri ess

e et in eo litigant cum Epicuro non multum, ut opinio mea fert, mentiente. Quis est enim iste amor amicitiae? cur neque deformem adulescentem quisquam amat neque formosum senem? Mihi quidem haec in Graecorum gymnasiis nata consuetudo videtur, in quibus isti liberi et concessi sunt amores. Bene ergo Ennius:

'Flagiti principium est nudare inter civis corpora.'

Qui ut sint, quod fieri posse video, pudici, solliciti tamen et anxii sunt, eoque magis, quod se ipsi continent et coercent.

[71] Atque, ut muliebris amores omittam, quibus maiorem licentiam natura concessit, quis aut de Ganymedi raptu dubitat, quid poetae velint, aut non intellegit, quid apud Euripidem et loquatur et cupiat Laius? Quid denique homines doctissimi et summi poetae de se ipsis et carminibus edunt et cantibus? Fortis vir in sua re p. cognitus quae de iuvenum amore scribit Alcaeus! Nam Anacreontis quidem tota poÎsis est amatoria. Maxume vero omnium flagrasse amore Reginum Ibycum apparet ex scriptis.

33. By some philosophers, also.

33. But we may suffer some sportive freedom in the poets, in whose fiction we see Jupiter himself implicated in these scandalous affairs. Let us come to philosophers, preceptors of virtue, who deny the necessarily licentious character of love, and in this are at variance with Epicurus, who, as I think, is not far from the right. For what is that love of friendship of which they speak ? Why is not a deformed young man or a beautiful old man the object of love ? The worst form of licentiousness, as I think, sprang from the Greek gymnasium, where every improper liberty is permitted. It was well said by Ennius,

"In public nudeness license had its birth."
To say nothing of the love of women, for which Nature has granted a greater freedom, who can doubt what the poets mean by the rape of Ganymede ? Or who does not understand what the Laïus of Euripides says and desires ? Or, finally, what the most learned men and the greatest poets publish about themselves in their songs and poems ? What does Alcaeus — distinguished for courage in his own country — write about the love of young men ? Indeed, all Anacreon's verse is amatory. But most scandalous of all in this regard, if judged by his writings, was Ibycus of Rhegium.

 

XXXIV. Atque horum omnium lubidinosos esse amores videmus: philosophi sumus exorti, et auctore quidem nostro Platone, quem non iniuria Dicaearchus accusat, qui amori auctoritatem tribueremus. [72] Stoici vero et Sapientem amaturum esse dicunt amorem ipsum 'conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie' definiunt. Qui si quis est in rerum natura sine sollicitudine, sine desiderio, sine cura, sine suspirio, sit sane; vacat enim omni libidine; haec autem de libidine oratio est. Sin autem est aliquis amor, ut est certe, qui nihil absit aut non multum ab insanÏa, qualis in Leucadia est:

'Si quidem sit quisquam deus,
Cui ego sim curae'

[73] At id erat deis omnibus curandum, quem ad modum hic frueretur voluptate amatoria!

'Heu me infelicem!'
Nihil verius. Probe et ille:
'Sanusne es, qui temere lamentare?'
Sic insanus videtur etiam suis. At quas tragoedias efficit!
'Te, Apollo sancte, fer opem, teque, amnipotens Neptune, invoco,
Vosque adeo, Venti!'
Mundum totum se ad amorem suum sublevandum conversurum putat, Venerem unam excludit ut iniquam:
'Nam quid ego te appellem, Venus?'
Eam prae lubidine negat curare quicquam: quasi vero ipse non propter lubidinem tanta flagitia et faciat et dicat.
34. Platonic love unreal and absurd.

34. Now we see that the loves of all these writers are licentious. There have also appeared some of us philosophers — chief among them my favorite Plato, whom on this score Dicaearchus rightly accuses — who have given their sanction to love. The Stoics, indeed, both say that a wise man may be a lover, and define love as the endeavor to form friendship from personal beauty. If there is in reality any one devoid of care, of desire, incapable even of a sigh, I have nothing to say of him ; for he is entirely free from sensuality, and it is of this that I am now speaking. If, however, there is any love, as there certainly is, which is quite or almost insanity, such as is impersonated in the Leucadia

"If there be one among the immortal gods,
Who makes indeed my happiness his care." [Turpilius, Leucadia]
But all the gods ought to have taken care that his love should be gratified.
"Oh wretched me, while Heaven withholds its aid."
Nothing more true ; and he is well answered : —
"Art thou demented in thy senseless wailing?"
Thus his friends look upon him as insane. But what a tragedy is he making of it !
"Holy Apollo, help ! and, mighty Neptune,
On thee I call. Ye winds, I crave your aid."
He thinks that the whole universe will turn to in aid of his love. Venus alone he excepts, as indisposed to do him justice.
"For why, ? Venus, should I call on thee ?"
He says that it is on account of her lustfulness that she does not care for him, as if it were not in very lustfulness that he is saying and doing such abominable things.

 

XXXV. [74] Sic igitur adfecto haec adhibenda curatio est, ut et illud quod cupiat ostendatur quam leve, quam contemnendum, quam nihili, sit omnino, quam facile vel aliunde vel alio modo perfici vel omnino neglegi sit; abducendus etiam est non numquam ad alia studia sollicitudines curas negotia, loci denique mutatione tamquam aegroti non convalescentes saepe curandus est;

[75] etiam novo quidam amore veterem amorem tamquam clavo clavum eiciendum putant; maxume autem, admonendus , quantus sit furor amoris. Omnibus, enim ex animi perturbationibus est profecto nulla vehementior, ut, si iam ipsa illa accusare nolis, stupra dico et corruptelas et adulteria, incesta denique, quorum omnium accusabilis est turpitudo, - sed ut haec omittas, perturbatio ipsa mentis in amore foeda per se est.

[76] Nam ut illa praeteream, quae sunt furoris, haec ipsa per sese quam habent levitatem, quae videntur esse mediocria,

          Iniuriae
Suspiciones inimicitiae indutiae
Bellum pax rursum! incerta haec si tu postules
Ratione certa facere, nihilo plus agas,
Quam si des operam, ut cum ratione insanias.
Haec inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis quem non ipsa pravitate deterreat? Est etiam illud, quod in omni perturbatione dicitur, demonstrandum, nullam esse nisi opinabilem, nisi iudicio susceptam, nisi voluntariam. Etenim si naturalis amor esset, et amarent omnes et semper amarent et idem amarent, neque alium pudor, alium cogitatio, alium satietas deterreret.
35. The cure of love.

35. In attempting to cure one thus affected it is well to show him how trivial, how contemptible, how utterly worthless is the indulgence that he craves, how easily gratification may be sought from other sources and in other ways, or the whole matter be dismissed from thought. Sometimes it is desirable to lead one away to new pursuits, solicitudes, cares, occupations. Then too, the cure may often be effected by a change of place, as in the case of invalids who are not convalescent. Some also think that an old love is to be driven out by a new love, as a nail is displaced by another nail. But especially should one be warned of the intensity of the madness produced by love ; for of all perturbations of mind there is certainly none more vehement, so that, if you will not lay to its charge such crimes as ravishing, seduction, adultery, and even incest, the vileness of all which may be put to its account, yet omitting all these things, the very disturbance of mind in love is in itself disgusting. To pass over the symptoms indicative of madness, what fickleness of character is implied in the very things that seem harmless !

"Wrongs and suspicions, enmity and truce,
War without cause, and peace succeeding war.
Of these caprices would you know the law,
The reason why? Then may you fix by rule
The madman's fancies and his fits of rage." [Terence, Eunuchus]
Whom ought not this inconstancy, this fickleness, by its own unseemliness, to deter ? For what I have said with regard to every perturbation should be clearly shown, namely, that there is no perturbation which is not a matter of opinion, of one's own choice, voluntary. If love were natural, all would love, and would love always, and would love the same object, nor would shame deter one, reflection another, satiety another.

 

XXXVI. [77] Ira vero, quae quam diu perturbat animum, dubitationem insaniae non habet, cuius inpulsu existit etiam inter fratres tale iurgium:

'Quis homo te exsuperavit usquam gentium impudentia?'
'Quis autem malitia te?'--

Nosti, quae secuntur; alternis enim versibus intorquentur inter fratres gravissimae contumeliae, ut facile appareat Atrei filios esse, eius qui meditatur poenam in fratrem novam:

Maior mihi moles, maius miscendum malum,
Qui illius acerbum cor contundam et comprimam'.
Quo igitur haec erumpit moles? audi Thyestem:
'Ipsus hortatur me frater, ut meos malis miser
Mandarem natos' -
Eorum viscera apponit; quid est enim quo non progrediatur eodem ira, quo furor? Itaque iratos proprie dicimus exisse de potestate, id est de consilio, de ratione, de mente; horum enim potestas in totum animum esse debet.

[78] His aut subtrahendi sunt ei, in quos impetum conantur facere, dum se ipsi conligant, - quid est autem se ipsum colligere nisi dissupatas animi partis rursum in suum locum cogere? - aut rogandi orandique sunt, ut, si quam habent ulciscendi vim, differant in tempus aliud, dum defervescat ira. Defervescere autem certe signiiÏcat ardorem animi invita ratione excitatum. Ex quo illud laudatur Archytae, qui cum vilico factus esset iratior,

'Quo te modo' inquit 'accepissem, nisi iratus essem!'
36. The sons of Atreus cited as instances of implacable anger.

36. Anger, too, which, so long as it disturbs the mind, leaves no doubt of its being madness, — by whose impulse there arises between brothers [i.e., Agamemnon and Menelaus] a quarrel like this,—

"'In shamelessness what mortal is thine equal ?'
'In malice whom can I compare with thee ?' " [Ennius, Iphigenia]
You know what follows. The brothers in alternate verses hurl at each other the severest contumely, so as to make it plainly manifest that they are the sons of Atreus, — the man who plans a novel punishment for his brother, —
Evil stupendous must I bring upon him,
That I may bruise and crush his bitter heart." [Attius, Atreus]
What then will this stupendous evil be ? Let Thyestes tell : —
"My impious brother caters for my table,
And for the viands serves my slaughtered sons." [Attius, Atreus]
Their entrails he places before their father. To what length will not anger, like madness, go ? Therefore we properly say that the angry have got beyond their own control, beyond counsel, reason, intellect. Those whom they endeavor to assail must be taken out of their way till they collect themselves (what does "collecting themselves" mean, unless it be getting together again into their place the scattered parts of the mind ?), and the angry men themselves must be begged, besought, that, if they have any power of revenge, they will postpone its exercise to another time, till their anger cools. Now, cooling implies a heat of mind without the consent of reason. Hence the praise bestowed on that saying of Archytas when he was angry with his steward, "How would I have dealt with you, if I had not been angry !"

 

XXXVII. [79] Ubi sunt ergo isti, qui iracundiam utilem dicunt - potest utilis esse insania? - aut naturalem? An quicquam est secundum naturam, quod fit repugnante ratione? Quo modo autem, si naturalis esset ira, aut alius alio magis iracundus esset, aut finem haberet prius quam esset ulta, ulciscendi lubido, aut quemquam paeniteret, quod fecisset per iram? Ut Alexandrum regem videmus, qui cum interemisset Clitum familiarem suum, vix a se manus abstinuit; tanta vis fuit paenitendi. Quibus cognitis quis est qui dubitet quin hic quoque motus animi sit totus opinabilis ac voluntarius? Quis enim dubitarit quin aegrotationes animi, qualis est avaritia, gloriae cupiditas, ex eo, quod magni aestumetur ea res ex qua animus aegrotat, oriantur? Unde intellegi debet perturbationem quoque omnem esse in opinione.

[80] Et si fidentia, id est firma animi confisio, scientia quaedam est et opinio gravis non temere adsentientis, metus quoque est diffidentia expectati et inpendentis mali, et si spes est expectatio boni, mali expectationem esse necesse est metum. Ut igitur metus, sic reliquae perturbationes sunt in malo. Ergo ut constantia scientiae, sic perturbatio erroris est. Qui autem natura dicuntur iracundi aut misericordes aut invidi aut tale quid, ei sunt constituti quasi mala valetudine animi, sanabiles tamen, ut Socrates dicitur: cum multa in conventu vitia conlegisset in eum Zopyrus, qui se naturam cuiusque ex forma perspicere profitebatur, derisus est a ceteris, qui illa in Socrate vitia non agnoscerent, ab ipso autern Socrate sublevatus, cum illa sibi insita, sed ratione a se deiecta diceret.

[81] Ergo ut optuma quisque valetudine adfectus potest videri [ut] natura ad aliquem morbum proclivior, sic animus alius ad alia vitia propensior. Qui autem non natura, sed culpa vitiosi esse dicuntur, eorum vitia constant e falsis opinionibus rerum bonarum et malarum, ut sit alius ad alios motus perturbationesque proclivior. Inveteratio autem, ut in corporibus, aegrius depellitur quam perturbatio, citiusque repentinus oculorum tumor sanatur quam diuturna lippitudo depellitur.

37. Perturbations of mind always the result of error of belief or of judgment.

37. Where then are those who say that anger is of use ? Can insanity be of use ? Or those who say that anger is natural ? Can anything that has reason for its antagonist be in accordance with nature ? How, if anger were natural, could one man be more irascible than another ? Or how could the desire for revenge cease till it was gratified ? Or how could any one repent of what he had done in anger ? as we see in the case of king Alexander who, after killing his friend Clitus, hardly refrained from taking his own life, so strong was his feeling of remorse. In view of these things who can doubt that this movement of the mind in anger is wholly a matter of opinion, and voluntary ? And who can doubt that such diseases of the mind as avarice and ambition spring from the unduly high estimate of that which occasions the mind's disease ? Whence it ought to be inferred that every perturbation of mind also consists in opinion. Moreover, if confidence, that is, firm assurance of mind, is the virtual knowledge and settled opinion of one who does not give his assent without reason, fear is lack of confidence as to expected and impending evil ; and if. hope is the expectation of good, fear must necessarily be the expectation of evil. Like fear, so are the other perturbations involved in evil. As firmness then belongs to knowledge, so does perturbation belong to error. Those who are said to be irascible, or pitiful, or envious, or otherwise similarly affected, by nature, have minds, so to speak, constitutionally in bad health, yet are curable, as is said to have been the case with Socrates. Zopyrus, who professed to know a man's character from his appearance, when in a public assembly he had given a long catalogue of the faults of Socrates, and was derided by others who did not recognize those faults in him, was relieved from blame by Socrates himself, who said that these faults were implanted in him by nature, but that he had exterminated them by reason. Therefore, as one may seem to be in perfect health, yet somewhat inclined by nature to a particular disease, so in different minds is there a propensity to different faults. The faults of those who are said to be faulty, not by nature, but of their own depraved will, spring from false opinions as to things good and evil, so that from this source also different persons have a proclivity to different movements and perturbations of mind. But as it is in bodies, so is it in minds,—chronic disease of mind is dispelled with greater difficulty than fresh perturbations, just as a sudden tumor of the eyes is cured sooner than an inflammation of long standing can be removed.

 

XXXVIII. [82] Sed cognita iam causa perturbationum quae omnes oriuntur ex iudiciis opinionum et voluntatibus, sit iam huius disputationis modus. Scire autem nos oportet cognitis, quoad possunt ab homine cognosci, bonorum et malorum finibus nihil a philosophia posse aut maius aut utilius optari quam haec, quae a nobis hoc quadriduo disputata sunt. Morte enim contempta et dolore ad patiendum levato adiunximus sedationem aegritudinis, qua nullum homini malum maius est. Etsi enim omnis animi perturbatio gravis est nec multum differt ab amentia, [tamen ita] ceteros, cum sunt in aliqua perturbatione aut metus aut laetitiae aut cupiditatis, commotos modo et perturbatos dicere solemus, at eos, qui se aegritudini dediderunt, miseros adflictos aerumnosos calamitosos.

[83] Itaque non fortuito factum videtur, sed a te ratione propositum, ut separatim de aegritudine et de ceteris perturbationibus disputaremus; in ea est enim fons miseriarum et caput. Sed et aegritudinis et reliquorum animi morborum una sanatio est, omnis opinabilis esse et voluntarios ea reque suscipi, quod ita rectum esse videatur. Hunc errorem quasi radicem malorum omnium stirpitus philosophia se extracturam pollicetur.

[84] Demus igitur nos huic excolendos patiamurque nos sanari. His enim malis insidentibus non modo beati, sed ne sani quidem esse possumus. Aut igitur negemus quicquam ratione confici, cum contra nihil sine ratione recte fieri possit, aut, cum philosohia ex rationum conlatione constet, ab ea, si et boni et beati volumus esse, omnia adiumenta et auxilia petamus bene beateque vivendi.

38. Therefore curable by philosophy.

38. Now that we have ascertained the cause of perturbations of mind, which all spring from opinion and will, this discussion need not be continued longer. But when we know, as far as they can be known by man, the supreme good and the corresponding extreme of evil, we ought to be aware that nothing greater or more useful can be desired from philosophy than the truth as to these subjects which we have discussed for four successive days ; for to the contempt of death and the relief of pain so as to make it endurable, we added the appeasing of grief, than which man is liable to no greater evil. Although every perturbation of mind is indeed severe, and differs little from insanity, yet we are wont to speak of others when they are in some perturbation of fear, or joy, or desire, merely as agitated and disturbed, while we call those who have given themselves up to grief wretched, afflicted, miserable, unfortunate. Therefore it seems to have been proposed by yon, not by chance, but for sufficient reason, that we should discuss grief separately from the other perturbations ; for in grief is the fountain and source of misery. But the cure of grief and of the other diseases of mind is the same, namely, the conviction that they all are matters of opinion, and voluntary, and are yielded to because they are thought to be right. This error, as the root of all evils, Philosophy promises thoroughly to eradicate. Let us then submit ourselves to her culture, and suffer ourselves to be cured ; for while these evils have their seat within us, we not only cannot be happy, we cannot even be sane. Let us therefore either deny that anything is effected by reason, while, on the -other hand, nothing can be rightly done without reason ; or else, Philosophy consisting in the comparison of reasons,[1] let us, if we wish to be good and happy, seek from her every furtherance and help toward living well and happily.

[1] Note (Peabody): Every act of judgment is a comparison. Comprehension is the taking of two things together. We cannot comprehend a single object by itself, but only by comparing it with some object more or less similar, or with some assumed standard of quality or quantity. Cicero here means to say, that reason is the only fit ting guide of conduct, and that as philosophy consists in comparing the premises which reason furnishes, and framing judgments or forming conclusions from them, philosophy is pre-eminently the guide of life.

For background on Stoic concepts of passions according to Cicero, see The Passions according to the Classical Stoics by Dr. Jan Garrett.


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